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Abstract 
This thesis bundles four empirical studies and focuses on the role of bank competition and 
financial inclusion on bank performance–profitability, stability and efficiency. The first 
essay uses bank-level data from an emerging market economy–India– and finds that credit 
risk (defined as NPL ratio) has negative effects on profitability, and it is more pronounced 
for foreign-owned banks. However, this dampening effect diminishes as bank size 
increases. The second essay exploits membership variation of Indian banks of a unique 
institutional mechanism–Corporate-Debt-Restructuring (CDR)–to test whether banks that 
have restructured corporate loans and made use of extensive regulatory forbearance on 
asset classification and provisioning on those loans, improve their stability for the period 
1992-2012. We find robust evidence that CDR improves banking stability of the treated 
banks but this treatment effect decreases as the market power of banks increases. 
 
Together with bank stability, broadening access to finance has become an important public 
policy priority since the global financial crisis. Therefore, in the final two essays, we first 
construct a composite index of financial inclusion for 87 countries for the period 2004-
2012, and then show robust evidence that an inclusive financial sector is good for bank 
stability, cost and profit efficiency in a sample of 2,913 banks using different estimation 
techniques and methodologies. These effects are stronger when banks have higher market 
power and operate in countries with stronger rule of law and institutional quality. 
 
The results in this thesis are novel in the literature and have important public policy 
implications. First, Indian policymakers should emphasise further improvement of asset 
quality and strike the right balance while promoting bank competition along with having 
a stable banking sector. Second, policymakers around the world should introduce more 
enabling inclusive financial environment to ensure sound and efficient functioning of 
banks while achieving financial inclusion as a development goal.   
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Chapter I 
 
Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Financial institutions play critical roles in facilitating development in an 
economy. They exist to reduce informational asymmetries and transaction costs that hinder 
channeling an economy’s savings towards the most productive investment opportunities 
(Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Demirgüç-Kunt, Beck and Honohan, 2008). Banks build 
relationship with customers, and in so doing, they acquire and process proprietary 
information to reduce information asymmetry frictions–that typically inhibit arm’s length 
arrangements in market transactions because of adverse selection and moral hazards, that 
are binding with borrowers (Diamond, 1984; Fama, 1985). Evidence suggests that 
financial development, that is efficient operation of the banking sectors, stimulates 
economic growth (King and Levine, 1993; Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Beck, Levine and 
Loayza, 2000). Well-functioning financial institutions–ensuring efficient allocation of 
funds and providing access to financial services for all households and firms–enhance 
growth, improve income distribution and reduce poverty. However, when they work 
inefficiently, growth and entrepreneurial innovation opportunities are reduced, income 
 16 
inequalities persist, and in the extreme cases costly financial crisis follows such as the 
crisis of 2007-08 (Demirgüç-Kunt, Beck and Honohan, 2008). As banks invest in risky 
and illiquid loans by using riskless and liquid demandable deposits (Boot and Thakor, 
2015), bankruptcy of banks poses serious systemic risks that would entail growth loses for 
the real economy. Therefore, unlike non-financial institutions, banks are heavily regulated 
and supervised for ensuring their efficient functioning in the economy. 
In the last two decades, banking sectors around the world, particularly in the 
developing economies, have gone through numerous important reforms and structural 
changes. When regulatory barriers fell, de novo entry of private domestic and foreign 
banks increased; with the advancement of technology a new frontier of financial 
intermediation emerged (e.g., mobile banking, agent banking); opportunities to diversify 
business towards non-traditional banking activities and new geographic areas opened; and 
enthusiasm for commercial bank’s microfinance style of operations was encouraged. In 
the last two decades, the Indian banking sector has observed two major financial reforms. 
The outcome of these reforms is a healthy competitive environment, where banks of 
heterogeneous sizes (e.g., small and large banks) and ownership types (e.g., public, private 
domestic and private foreign banks) compete fiercely for market shares. Due to greater 
competitive pressures, banks not only have opted for selecting high standard borrowers 
and proper allocation of loans to improve asset quality and thus reduce credit risk but also 
have increasingly focused on non-interest fee/commission-based banking activities for 
higher profits. Therefore, the changing milieu of banking operations has substantial effects 
on bank profitability. Existing literature suggests that the differences in resource, expertise 
and objectives between different sizes of banks and/or ownership groups to monitor loans 
may have considerable influences on the lending decisions they make and the ways they 
conduct their business activities for profits (e.g., Berger, Dick, Goldberg and White, 2007; 
 17 
Mercieca, Schaeck and Wolfe, 2007; Stever, 2007; Bhaumik and Piesse, 2008; Goddard, 
McKillop and Wilson, 2008; Lepetit, Nys, Rous and Tarazi, 2008). Furthermore, empirical 
evidence prior to the recent global financial crisis suggested that government ownership 
of banks leads to suboptimal performances and fetters financial development (La Porta, 
Lopez de Silanes and Shleifer, 2002; Khwaja and Mian, 2005). However, more recent 
evidence suggests that lending by state-owned banks is less procyclical than that of private 
sector banks, and as such assists in smoothing macroeconomic volatility during crisis 
periods (Berger, Molyneux and Wilson, 2015; Bertay, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 
2015). 
In addition to the multifaceted financial reforms, the Indian government has been 
consistently working to establish a sound regulatory framework in order to facilitate 
effective supervision and institutional infrastructure. To facilitate speedy recovery of 
defaulted loans without needing the Civil Procedure Code, the Indian authorities ratified 
Debt Recovery Tribunals (DRTs) Act in 1992. In 2002, the Securitisation and 
Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Securities Interest (SARFAESI) Act 
was enacted to strengthen the rights of the secured creditors, thereby financial institutions 
were allowed to seize and liquidate the assets of the defaulted firm without much delay. 
Furthermore, in the early 2000s, to reduce credit risk and enhance financial stability, the 
Central Bank of India–Reserve Bank of India (RBI) – introduced an out-of-court 
restructuring programme called Corporate Debt Restructuring (CDR)–a speedy, cost 
effective, and market friendly institutional mechanism, for restructuring corporate debts in 
order to reduce nonperforming corporate loans, and hence improve banking stability. 
Banks were extended special regulatory forbearance on asset classification and 
provisioning to the restructured assets. Although according to the global practice any assets 
restructured should fall into lower asset category and loan loss provisions should be made 
 18 
accordingly, as per the CDR scheme, any standard assets not only could retain their assets 
classification upon restructuring without slipping into lower asset categories but also were 
allowed to make concessional provisions of 2% only. Therefore, this special regulatory 
forbearance on asset classification and provisioning may have given extra opportunities to 
the banks who participated in the restructuring loans, thereby understating nonperforming 
loans and overstating net income.  
Despite all the reforms that have taken place over the last two decades in most of 
the countries around the world, particularly in the developing world, the total adult 
population yet to be included in the banking systems is staggering.  The need for long-term 
credits by households and enterprises is enormous, especially in the developing countries. 
Recent studies show that almost 2.5 billion adults, just over half of the world’s adult 
population, do not use any form of formal financial services (that is, only 41% of people 
in the developing countries compared to 89% in developed ones have bank accounts) 
(Kendall, Mylenko and Ponce, 2010; Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper, 2012). The most 
challenging issues for the financial institutions to facilitate access to finance are the high 
operating costs and the risk associated with servicing, monitoring and administering loans 
to individual households and small and medium enterprises (SMEs) who often lack 
required documentations, collaterals and credit histories (e.g., Conning, 1999; Demirgüç-
Kunt, Beck and Honohan, 2008; Hermes, Lensink and Meesters, 2011). Therefore, 
broadening access of the low income groups to formal financial services has always been 
perceived as an antagonistic strategy, which might dampen the performance of banks. 
However, over the last decade, extending access of the low income groups to the formal 
financial sector has become a public policy priority around the world. The central banks 
both in emerging and developed countries have taken many initiatives in conjunction with 
many multilateral agencies including the IMF, G20, the Alliance for Financial Inclusion 
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(AFI), and the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) to enhance the inclusive 
banking agenda (Demirgüç-Kunt, Beck and Honohan, 2008). 
According to modern development theory, lack of access to finance acts as a 
critical mechanism for generating persistent income inequality and sluggish growth 
(Demirgüç-Kunt, Beck and Honohan, 2008; Demirgüç-Kunt and Cihak, 2015). More 
recent studies show that financial institutions are increasingly searching for new markets 
and opportunities and focusing on broadening access of the unbanked population to formal 
financial services as they encounter fierce competition (Beck and Brown, 2014). They also 
see the benefits of including poor customers in the formal banking systems and adopting 
microfinance style operations (Harper and Arora, 2005). Both theoretical and empirical 
literature show that the level of bank competition has implications for a borrower’s access 
to finance, the degree of banking stability, efficient allocation of funds and the resulting 
efficient banking operations, and hence economic growth (Keeley, 1990; Petersen and 
Rajan, 1995; Koetter, Kolari and Spierdijk, 2012; Love and Martínez Pería, 2014). In 
addition, existing literature also shows that greater institutional development facilitates 
better access to finance especially for the smallest firms (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 2005); for example, more effective rule of law provides more flexibility in 
terms of contract enforcement without much delay.  
 
1.2 Research objectives and contributions 
Motivated by the background above, the aim of this thesis is to take stock of 
existing banking literature on bank performance and offer new insight into three distinct 
banking issues–market structure, bank regulation and financial inclusion. To this end, this 
study provides new evidence while complementing existing literature in the context of the 
Indian banking sector–a key emerging economy–on the relationship between bank 
performance, bank competition and bank risk. Furthermore, considering the overarching 
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importance of inclusive finance for economic growth, this study also provides novel 
empirical evidence–most probably the first comprehensive empirical work–on the impact 
of financial inclusion on stability and efficiency of banks by drawing an international 
sample of developed and developing economies. It also investigates the role of bank 
competition and institutional quality on these relationships, and makes some important 
contributions in the literature which should be useful for policy guidelines as follows: 
First, empirical evidence on the issues related to bank profitability, competition 
and risk is abundant in the context of developed market economies. Such research however 
in the context of the Indian banking sector is somewhat inadequate and often limited to the 
analyses of productivity and technical efficiency differentials between ownership groups 
(see, Das and Ghosh, 2006, 2009; Sahoo and Tone, 2009; Tabak and Tecles, 2010; Das and 
Kumbhakar, 2012; Bhattacharyya and Pal, 2013; Fujii, Managi and Matousek, 2014; 
Tzeremes, 2015). Most of these studies have employed either parametric or non-parametric 
techniques to measure efficiency scores for individual banks and then found the 
differentials between bank ownership types. So far existing literature fails to consider two 
important banking issues – nonperforming loans and non-traditional banking activities, 
and how these issues affect bank performance. More recently a study by Pennathur, 
Subrahmanyam and Vishwasrao (2012) investigated the impact of income diversification 
on bank risk disentangling the ownership factor, but the issue of bank size heterogeneity 
and mixed ownership groups on the impact of credit risk and income diversification is still 
unexplored. Despite multiple reforms, the Indian banking sector is still dominated by state-
owned banks and the sizes of banks are heterogeneous. According to Bhaumik and Piesse 
(2008), since emerging markets are undergoing substantial reforms, credit disbursal 
behaviour may vary significantly across banks of different ownership types. Therefore, it 
is important to delve deep into the role of bank size and ownership structure on the effects 
of credit risk and income diversification on profitability, while using bank-level data for 
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the post reform periods, that is, from 2004 to 2011. This chapter complements the existing 
studies, providing new evidence drawn from one of the fastest-growing emerging 
economies of the world–India. The findings of this study have substantial policy 
implications for India as well as for other emerging economies (e.g., Bangladesh) that have 
undergone similar financial reforms in the last two decades. It contributes to the debate on 
how heterogeneous bank sizes and ownership structure can moderate the effects of credit 
risk and income diversification on banking profitability.  
In general, the empirical evidence is in line with the results of developed market 
economies that market concentration increases bank performance, suggesting large banks 
dominate the entire banking industry. It shows that credit risk has a negative impact on 
profitability which is pronounced for the foreign-owned banks. The dampening effects of 
nonperforming loans diminish as bank size increases. As bank size gets bigger, the positive 
effect of non-interest income increases. These findings–the influence of bank 
size/ownership on the impact of credit risk or income diversification–can provide an 
understanding of heterogeneities when formulating policies in order to augment 
profitability and financial stability in the banking sector. Since a profitable financial 
system absorbs negative shocks at a macro level, the determinants of profitability can 
capture unstable economic conditions (Athanasoglou, Brissimis and Delis, 2008; 
Albertazzi and Gambacorta, 2009), which would also be of interest to bank management, 
financial markets, and academics.  
Second, in the third chapter we build on the first study and delve deep into credit 
risk. As credit risk is the perennial problem of the Indian banking sector, the government 
of India has introduced various laws and institutional mechanisms to curb this risk. The 
notable laws that were enacted in the last two decades were DRTs of 1993 and the 
SARFAESI Act of 2002. Both laws have strengthened the legal right of banks to enforce 
debt contracts. Similarly, in the early 2000s, as Indian corporates faced extreme difficulty 
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in meeting their debt servicing obligations to the banks/financial institutions, RBI 
introduced an out-of-court restructuring mechanism in the form of CDR. Through this 
institutional set up, corporates were able to maintain their investments and value and 
forestall bankruptcy, while the banks that participated in this programme and restructured 
corporate debts were able to minimise their exposure to those sick corporates and reduce 
credit risk, and hence lower fragility. According to CDR norms, the participating banks 
could retain the asset classification of restructured loans, and even could upgrade 
nonperforming restructured assets to a standard (performing) category after a specified 
period and charge less to their net income for loan loss provisions (Working-Group, 2012). 
By exploiting the CDR mechanism, many banks had the opportunity to understate the 
volume of non-performing loans while overstating their profitability. Though empirical 
studies on the effects of the DRTs Act (Visaria, 2009) and on the effects of SARFAESI 
Acts (Vig, 2013) on various banking issues are available, there is no study discussing 
whether the recently adopted institutional mechanism, CDR, was indeed fruitful in 
reducing risk-taking attitudes of Indian banks during a period when most of the banks 
around the world were going through unprecedented turmoil. Therefore, in this paper, we 
exploit the membership variation of individual banks in the CDR programme and 
empirically investigate whether the banks that have participated in this mechanism 
improve their stability. This study has contributed to the literature by exploring the efficacy 
of regulatory intervention in reducing the banks’ exposure to non-performing corporate 
loans in the context of India.  
The result shows that banking stability of the participating banks increases 
substantially after the implementation of the programme. From the economic policy 
standpoint, it is important to investigate the impact of the regulatory forbearance under the 
guise of the CDR system on the member banks’ stability so that appropriate action can be 
taken to reduce excessive risk-taking not only by the Indian policymakers but also in other 
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emerging market economies in case of such widespread corporate sickness. Moreover, as 
the banking literature is divided and engulfed with the ambiguous conclusion that bank 
competition can both improve stability and worsen it (Keeley, 1990; Allen and Gale, 2004; 
Schaeck, Cihak and Wolfe, 2009; Martinez-Miera and Repullo, 2010; Beck, De Jonghe 
and Schepens, 2013; Anginer, Demirgüç-Kunt and Zhu, 2014), we also provide empirical 
evidence on this elusive nexus from an emerging economy–India–by using bank level data 
of almost two decades that includes multiple financial reforms. This complementary 
evidence would aid regulators in achieving the right balance between bank competition 
and stability. 
Finally, in the last two essays–the main contributions of this thesis– using cross-
country data from a number of sources, we investigate the effects of the most contemporary 
global policy issue–financial inclusion–on bank performance. Despite the remarkable 
benefits of access to finance on financial development and hence to inclusive economic 
growth, empirical literature on the issues related to bank performances is nonexistent. 
Perhaps the most closely related paper is the seminal work of Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Martínez Pería (2007) who investigate the determinants of financial sector outreach, and 
its role on a firm’s financing obstacles. The limited research in this area is somewhat 
obvious given the limitations of supply- and demand-side data availability on access. In 
addition, the lack of development of reliable quantitative index of financial inclusion 
hitherto restricts explicitly analysing the effects of inclusive financial systems on various 
aspects of banking performance.  
In chapter IV, using a unique dataset–Financial Access Survey (FAS)–we 
construct a multidimensional index of financial inclusion for 87 countries for the period 
2004-2012, and investigate a new research question of whether the global policy drive 
towards greater financial inclusion is good for bank stability in a sample of 2,913 banks. 
The result that a more inclusive financial sector leads to greater bank stability, and this 
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nexus is reinforced while banks operate with high market power and in the countries with 
greater institutional setups, provides novel insights for regulatory authorities, banking 
supervisors and market participants. These results highlight that the importance of 
ensuring an inclusive financial system is not only a development goal but also an issue that 
should be prioritised by the financial institutions as such a policy drive is good for banks 
in terms of their stability.  
This chapter makes several contributions to the literature. First, by constructing a 
composite index of financial inclusion for 87 countries around the world for the period 
2004 to 2012, it shows empirically, for the first time, how the degree of financial inclusion 
affects bank-level stability. Second, since there is no extant study in academic or regulatory 
circles on such an important global policy issue, this study contributes to the debate on 
financial development and economic growth in a cross-country set up. Third, we contribute 
to the literature that explores the determinants of banking stability (e.g., Berger, Klapper 
and Turk-Ariss, 2009; Laeven and Levine, 2009; Houston, Lin, Lin and Ma, 2010; Beck, 
De Jonghe and Schepens, 2013; Anginer, Demirgüç-Kunt and Zhu, 2014). Fourth, it 
provides in-depth evidence on a policy debate drawing from a sample period that saw a 
massive upsurge in the regulatory efforts to broaden the access of the disadvantaged groups 
to financial services around the world. Finally, from a supervisory and policy perspective, 
it is important to understand whether broadening the access of the isolated poor people to 
formal financial services is complementary or antagonistic to the soundness of banks; 
therefore, the results of this study should prove useful to researchers and policymakers 
alike. Further policymaking for inclusive economic growth should also be benefited 
through supplementary findings that bank market power and institutional quality can 
augment the relationship between financial inclusion and bank stability.  
In Chapter V, while extending chapter IV, we dig deep into another important 
aspect of bank performance, that of banks ‘shying away’ from extending financial services 
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to poor customers. Although giant strides have been made in recent years in the field of 
access to finance, there still remains an open question as to how bank level efficiency is 
influenced by an inclusive financial sector. In this essay, two imperative questions have 
been answered in a systematic manner: does financial inclusion affect bank efficiency? 
And similarly what is the role of bank competition and institutional quality on the 
relationship between financial inclusion and bank-level cost/profit efficiency? 
The result that inclusive financial sectors enhance the levels of cost and profit 
efficiency of banks is critical for policymakers to spur inclusive economic growth as 
efficiency gains increase availability of more productive loans and overall economic 
development (Fries and Taci, 2005). Further evidence shows that the efficiency enhancing 
effects of financial inclusion is stronger when banks face lower competition and operate in 
countries with stronger rule of law and institutional quality. These findings on such an 
important contemporary policy issue would be useful to researchers and policymakers 
alike for making informed decisions on access policies and efficient intermediation of 
financial systems. 
This chapter makes a few important contributions to the existing literature. First, 
this chapter fills an important gap in the literature by providing new evidence on the impact 
of financial inclusion on bank efficiency using an international sample of 2913 banks 
across 87 countries for the period 2004-2012. Second, it contributes to the literature on 
finance and growth by exploring the connection between important aspects of financial 
development and the efficiency of financial institutions. Well-functioning and efficient 
financial systems exert a first-order impact on economic growth and development (see e.g., 
Levine, 2005). Finally, this chapter contributes to the literature that explores the 
determinants of bank efficiency (e.g., Berger, Demsetz and Strahan, 1999; Rossi, 
Schwaiger and Winkler, 2009; Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2013; Chortareas, Girardone and 
Ventouri, 2013). Despite the extensive literature on bank efficiency (see Berger, 2007, for 
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reviews of the literature), an empirical study on whether an inclusive financial sector 
increases or decreases efficient operation of banks does not yet exist.  
 
 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis can be divided into two parts: the first part is dedicated to the 
understanding of market structure and credit risk of Indian banks on performance over the 
last two decades (Chapter II and III), and the second part is devoted to the empirical 
analysis of the financial inclusion-bank stability/efficiency nexus containing two chapters 
(Chapter IV and V). The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows.  
Chapter II contains the first essay of this thesis. This essay comprises an analysis 
of the relationship between credit risk, income diversification and profitability using panel 
dataset of Indian banks for the post reform periods. Following a detailed review of the 
literature on bank market structure, the influence of bank size/ownership structure on the 
association between credit risk/income diversification and profitability, this paper 
empirically tests whether credit risk and income diversification interacting with bank size 
or ownership affect bank profitability. This chapter also provides numerous robustness 
tests in support of the evidence found in the main analyses.  
Chapter III extends the credit risk arguments of Chapter II and digs deep into the 
most contemporary but contentious regulatory issue of the Indian banking sector. This 
paper estimates the causal effect of a unique programme–Corporate Debt Restructuring 
(CDR)–on the stability of Indian banks for the period 1992-2012 by using difference-in-
differences approach. Following the recent development in measuring market power, this 
paper also estimates efficiency-adjusted Lerner indices along with a conventional one 
using a stochastic frontier analysis approach, to check for the interactive effect of CDR on 
bank stability. To provide unbiased treatment effects of CDR eliminating any sample 
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selection problem, it also provides supporting evidence by using a number of alternative 
matching estimators including the recently developed bias-corrected covariate matching 
estimator. Finally, this paper investigates the ambiguous trade-off between market power 
and stability for a sample period that includes multiple reforms and structural changes in 
India.  
Chapter IV provides novel evidence in the banking literature by investigating the 
relationship between financial inclusion and bank stability (i.e., access-stability) using a 
large international sample. This paper first constructs a multidimensional index of financial 
inclusion for 87 countries for the period 2004-2012 using a unique survey dataset–
Financial Access Survey (FAS), and then examines a new research question as to whether 
the global policy drive towards greater financial inclusion is good for bank stability in a 
sample of 2,913 banks. It employs instrumental variable (IV) estimators to extract the 
exogenous component of financial inclusion to address concerns about endogeneity. This 
paper also investigates whether the access-stability relationship changes due to higher 
market power and the institutional settings in which banks operate. Finally, it substantiates 
the empirical evidence by exploiting cross-country and temporal variation in the timing of 
countries into a global network of financial inclusion policymakers, and shows how an 
enabling inclusive financial environment enhances the soundness of banks using a “Quasi-
natural experiment” approach. In the end, policy implications are discussed that should be 
important for all stakeholders in the universe of financial systems.  
Chapter V expands the analysis of Chapter IV and examines the effects of 
financial inclusion on bank cost/profit efficiency. By incorporating multiple access 
dimensions in constructing a composite index of financial inclusion at country level, this 
paper links the bank-level cost and profit efficiency scores obtained from stochastic 
frontier analysis (SFA), a technique that is extensively used in measuring the efficiency of 
individual banks. Considering the importance of bank competition and institutional setups 
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on access to finance, this paper also examines the interactive effect of financial inclusion 
with bank-level competition and country-level institutional qualities. To provide robust 
evidence, this paper uses alternative measures of financial inclusion and bank efficiency, 
alternative samples and methodologies including instrumental variable analysis. Finally, it 
explores the effects of a network of financial inclusion policymakers–which sets the stage 
for many enabling laws in the member countries to broaden the access of the poor people 
to financial services–on the levels of cost/profit efficiency of banks following some policy 
implications.  
Chapter VI provides the overall summary of this thesis and concludes with policy 
implications that have been drawn from the findings of four empirical essays. The 
conclusion also substantiates the inherent limitations of the thesis and suggests tentative 
areas for future research. 
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Chapter II 
 
The Profitability of Indian Banks: Do Size and 
Ownership Matter in the Impact of Credit 
Risk and Income Diversification? 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Following the two-decade long experience of financial reforms in the Indian banking 
sector, it has become important to assess whether credit risk impairs the profitability of 
Indian banks. This paper examines the effect of bank-level credit risk and ownership 
structures on bank performance while controlling for market-specific and macroeconomic 
determinants, over the period 2004-2011. We find that market concentration has a positive 
impact on the profitability of Indian banks, suggesting large banks dominate the entire 
banking industry. The marginal effect of credit risk indicates that the negative impact of 
non-performing loans (as a measure of credit risk) on profitability decreases with bank 
size, yielding a threshold level of bank size. This negative impact of credit risk is more 
pronounced for the foreign banks (although they account for a small proportion of the loan 
market) relative to the public and private domestic banks. Besides, the marginal effect of 
income diversification indicates that the positive impact of non-interest income increases 
as bank size gets bigger. In addition, we observe the effect of non-interest income being 
stronger for the public banks during the post-reform period. These results hold against an 
array of robustness tests.     
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2.1 Introduction 
In the last two decades, despite the Indian banking sector having undergone 
multiple financial reforms, still state-owned banks dominate the entire sector with almost 
70% of deposits and assets.1 Though the de novo entry of private domestic and foreign 
banks has enhanced the competitive environment over the years, the size of individual 
banks and/or ownership structure still remains one of the important moderating factors for 
how these banks manage their credit risk and diversify their sources of revenue for higher 
profitability. Therefore, in this chapter, we examine the determinants of profitability of 
Indian banks and also investigate whether bank size and/or ownership structure matter in 
the impact of credit risk and income diversification for the period 2004 to 2011.  
The motivation to conduct this research stems from several factors. First, RBI in 
its 2002-2003 report urged banks to reduce operating expenses and pursue non-interest 
sources of income.2 Since the 2004-2005 financial year, though Indian banks have 
observed strong growth in assets their income from investments activities has gone down 
due to the rising interest rate in the market.3 Furthermore, in 2002-2003, RBI introduced 
the CDR programme for restructuring corporate loans. By using this mechanism, member 
banks of CDR could understate nonperforming loans while overstating profitability (see 
Chapter III for details on CDR). Most of the banks that have participated in CDR are state-
owned and large banks. It is reasonable to believe that small and large banks and/or public 
and private banks (including foreign banks) have distinct comparative advantage in dealing 
1 See for example, Klapper, Martinez-Peria and Zia (2015) 
2 The RBI report on Trend and Progress of Banking in India, 2002-2003 states that “the future profitability 
of public sector banks would depend on their ability to generate greater non-interest income and control 
operating expenses”. The concluding remark of that report was “Harnessing technology to improve 
productivity so as to produce highly competitive types of banking and generating greater non-interest income 
by diversifying into non-fund based activities will be important features of the Indian banking of tomorrow”.  
3 In March 2004, the interest rate of 5-year government security was 4.78%, which increased to 6.36% in 
March 2005. Therefore, banks  which had large portion of fixed income investments suffered a sharp decline 
in profitability as bond prices went down although the interest income went up for the higher interest rate. 
In the front of ‘other income’ component their profits had declined by 15.1% (RBI, 2005a). 
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with various facets of banking activities such as credit risk management and income 
diversification. This empirical chapter will complement the existing studies on India 
(Sarkar, Sarkar and Bhaumik, 1998; Pennathur, Subrahmanyam and Vishwasrao, 2012) 
while disentangling the role of bank size/ownership in the impact of credit risk/income 
diversification on profitability. Since a profitable financial system absorbs negative shocks 
at a macro level, the results of this study would be useful for policymakers to identify any 
unstable economic conditions (Athanasoglou, Brissimis and Delis, 2008; Albertazzi and 
Gambacorta, 2009), which would be important for bank supervisors to take necessary steps 
for ensuring sufficient competition and stability in the banking sector.       
Second, recent literature shows that the differences in resources, expertise and 
objectives between large and small banks to monitor loans may have considerable 
influence on the lending decisions they make and the ways they conduct their business 
activities for profit (e.g., Berger, Dick, Goldberg and White, 2007; Mercieca, Schaeck and 
Wolfe, 2007; Stever, 2007; Goddard, McKillop and Wilson, 2008; Lepetit, Nys, Rous and 
Tarazi, 2008). It is also documented in the literature that different ownership types do have 
unique sets of objectives and the ways they manage credit risk and diversified portfolios.4 
Regarding Indian public sector banks, it is possible that there is the existence of a complex 
principal-agent problem as 51% of the shares of the banks are owned by the government. 
These banks therefore may enjoy less monitoring as other shareholders have little incentive 
to exercise due diligence and monitor the management performance (see, Jiang, Yao and 
Feng, 2013). This also echoes with the RBI reports which emphasise the complex 
principal-agent relationships due to government ownership in the banks.5 In this case, 
4 Pennathur, Subrahmanyam and Vishwasrao (2012) state “in the Indian context, for example, the pursuit of 
non-interest sources of income is risky because of the lack of prior experience, nascent or non-existent 
financial networks, and cost and lack of technology, especially at the public sector banks and small private 
domestic banks”. 
5 The Trend and Progress of Banking in India, 2002-2003 report of RBI states that “A feature unique to the 
Indian financial system relates to the dominance of Government ownership in the public sector banking 
system in India. To the extent there is public ownership in banks, there are possibilities of multiple objectives 
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understanding the interactive effects of bank size/ownership structure and credit 
risk/income diversification on profitability would be vital for articulating effective policies 
that could create a level playing field for all banks.  
Finally, we also contribute to the literature drawing evidence from an emerging 
market economy–India– that consists of mixed ownership groups and heterogeneous bank 
sizes. In the last two decades, most of the emerging market economies reduced the share 
of assets held by the government banks in the banking sectors. For example, between 1997 
and 2009, government ownership in Bangladesh and Pakistan fell from 70% to 35% and 
from 68% to 21%, respectively. Over this period, other Asian countries – South Korea and 
Thailand – also witnessed a decline (both, from 30% to 22%) in government ownership. 
Although China started banking reforms in the early 2000s, government ownership has 
fallen by almost 21% in the same period (for details, see  Klapper, Martinez-Peria and Zia, 
2015). Furthermore, most of the Latin American banking sectors have also witnessed 
significantly declining government ownership. For example, between 1990 and 2010, 
government ownership in the Brazilian banking sector fell from 54% to 34%. For the same 
period, the Mexican government reduced its share of assets in the banking sector from 98% 
to 0.3% (for details, see De Carvalho, De Paula and Williams, 2015). However, despite 
having multiple financial reforms in the last two decades, government ownership in the 
Indian banking sector has just fallen from 80% to 72%. Since state-owned banks in most 
of the developing countries may have certain social development objectives, which are not 
tied to generating high operating income, and India being the fastest growing economy in 
the world with mixed ownership groups, where state-owned banks still play a critical role 
in providing access to credit, the Indian banking sector therefore provides an excellent 
laboratory in which to examine how ownership and bank size matter in the impact of credit 
of the Government as owner and the complex principal-agent relationships”. 
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risk/income diversification on profitability.  
Empirical evidence on this strand of literature is mostly based on developed 
market economies (e.g., Mercieca, Schaeck and Wolfe, 2007; Stever, 2007; Goddard, 
McKillop and Wilson, 2008), and studies on the Indian banking sector are rather limited. 
Recently, Pennathur, Subrahmanyam and Vishwasrao (2012) have shown that Indian 
public sector banks earn significantly less non-interest income compared to foreign banks. 
However, the role of bank size on the effect of credit risk/income diversification is still 
unexplored. Therefore, the findings of this paper will provide substantial understanding to 
take bank size heterogeneity into consideration while formulating policies in order to 
augment financial stability.  
We use bank-level data of 73 banks over the period 2004 to 2011. The empirical 
results show that large banks still dominate the entire banking industry and earn higher 
than normal profits through non-competitive price settings. We also find that Indian bank 
profitability is positively influenced by bank size, income diversification, capital adequacy, 
public sector dummy and negatively influenced by credit risk, operational inefficiency, 
inflation, interest rates and GDP growth rate. The marginal effect of credit risk indicates 
that the negative impact of non-performing loans on profitability decreases with bank size, 
the significant negative effect even becomes reductive once the bank size reaches a 
threshold point. The evidence also highlights that the negative impact of credit risk is 
pronounced for the private foreign banks but not for the public and private domestic banks. 
The marginal effect of income diversification indicates that the positive impact of non-
interest income increases as bank size gets bigger. In addition, we observe that non-interest 
income ameliorates the profitability of all ownership types, with the effect being stronger 
for the public sector banks.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 provides an overview of 
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the Indian banking sector whereas section 2.3 discusses the literature and empirical 
hypotheses. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 specify the model for estimation and describe the 
variables and descriptive statistics, respectively. Section 2.6 presents the main empirical 
results and sensitivity analyses. Section 2.7 concludes with some policy implications and 
limitations of this study. 
2.2 The Indian banking system 
The Indian banking system comprises a large number of banks with heterogeneous 
size and ownership. There are 26 public banks in which the government has majority 
ownership, 21 private banks and 38 foreign banks as of 2011. The public sector banks 
constitute a 73.7% share in the assets of the banking system, while private domestic and 
private foreign banks constitute only 19.5% and 6.7%, respectively. These commercial 
banks are regulated and monitored by the RBI.6 
Prior to liberalisation and the initiation of banking sector reform in the early 1990s, 
the banking sector used to be heavily regulated with the aim to achieve social and economic 
development objectives.  The predominant establishments were the large-scale pre-
emption of banks’ resources through Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR), Cash Reserve Ratio 
(CRR), an administered interest rates regime, credit guarantee schemes and lending to 
priority sectors at concessional interest rates (Pennathur, Subrahmanyam and Vishwasrao, 
2012).7 The net effect of these controls resulted in an inefficient allocation of resources, 
high operating costs and deteriorated asset quality. 
In 1992, the RBI started the liberalisation process stressing deregulation and 
opening up of the banking sector to market forces. It has been consistently working 
towards not only the establishment of a sound regulatory framework with prompt and 
6 The Indian banking system consists of two types of banks viz. commercial and co-operative banks. Together 
they are referred to as Scheduled Commercial Banks, as they are included in the Second Schedule of the RBI 
Act, 1934.   
7 The SLR and CRR were 24% and 5%, respectively as of 2011. The corresponding figures as of 1994 were 
34.25% and 14.0%, respectively.  
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effective supervision but also the development of technological and institutional 
infrastructure (Allen, Chakrabarti and De, 2007). The major reforms which have improved 
the competitiveness and efficiency in the resource allocation process of the banking sector 
and strengthened the transmission mechanism of monetary policy include reduction in 
SLR/CRR, permission for de novo entry of banks in the private sector, deregulation of 
interest rates, adoption of capital adequacy norms, prudential norms for asset classification 
and provisions in line with global practices. 
Figure 2.1 
CR5 and HHI calculated on the basis of total loans of the market. 
 
 
The state-owned public commercial banks used to dominate 80% of the deposits 
and assets of the Indian banking industry. Since liberalisation, with the emergence of new 
private and foreign commercial banks, state-owned banks have lost market share to their 
competitors over the years. For instance, ICICI bank, a private bank, within a decade of its 
formation, became the second largest bank in India (Allen, Chakrabarti and De, 2007). The 
concentration level of the Indian banking industry has seen a decrease over the study period 
(Figure 2.1). The five-bank concentration ratio (CR5) was 42.6% in 2004 and it came down 
to 38.6% in 2011. A similar pattern is observed for Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, which is 
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a clear sign of the improving competitive conditions of the banking sector. 
 
In the early 1990s, the NPL was almost 27%, the high standard of selecting 
borrowers and proper allocation of loans; however, Indian banks made it possible to bring 
it down to 0.73% in 2008, which can be gleaned from Figure 2.2. However, the upward 
trend between 2008 and 2011, is a worrying sign for the soundness of the banking sector; 
this could be due to the global financial crisis and liquidity crunch in 2008. Until recently 
banks were allowed to restrcuture coporate loans with a provision of 2% but it was raised 
to 5% by RBI on June 2013.8 Among all types of banks, state-owned banks would be 
stricken hardest by the deteriorating assets quality which is a great cause for concern for 
the regulators.9  
 
Figure 2.2 
Credit risk defined as the ratio of net nonperforming loans over net loans. 
 
 
 
8 After the global financial crisis in 2008, the liquidity crunch and slowdown in the global markets required 
banks to restructure their corporate loans (Corporate Debt Restructuring). It is estimated that 10-15% of the 
loans restructured then are believed to have turned bad. It is noted that foreign private banks, those who 
operate in India, are not allowed to restructure their corporate debt.  
9 Unnikrishnan, D., “Restructured Loans of Banks tops Rs. 2.5 trillion”, July 2013 http://www.livemint.com/ 
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The multiple reforms resulted in unprecedented changes in market structure, 
patterns of ownership and financial operations of Indian commercial banks. The increasing 
adoption of technology has rendered improved productivity and fierce competitiveness 
among the banking groups, which led them to focus beyond traditional banking activities. 
In recent years, banks have generated twice as much non-interest income by diversifying 
into non-traditional activities as they earned in the early 1990s (10% of the total income). 
The efforts of earning greater non-interest income from non-fund based activities have 
increased tremendously in recent years after the categorical recommendations of the RBI 
in the 2002-03 report, where it suggests that public sector banks should focus on generating 
greater quantum of non-interest income in order to be profitable in the future.10  
2.3 Literature review and hypothesis development  
Recently, following the banking study of Short (1979) and Bourke (1989), 
numerous studies have been undertaken to explore major determinants of profitability. 
These studies can be classified into two groups. The first set of empirical studies has 
focused their analysis on cross-country evidence. The notable studies on the cross-country 
framework include Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999), Goddard, Molyneux and Wilson 
(2004), Staikouras and Wood (2011). The second set of studies which focused their 
analysis on individual countries includes Berger, (1995a), Athanasoglou, Brissimis and 
Delis (2008), Ben Naceur and Goaied (2008), García-Herrero, Gavilá and Santabárbara 
(2009), Dietrich and Wanzenried (2011), and Curak, Poposki and Pepur (2012). Given the 
heterogeneity of datasets, time periods and countries, it is obvious that the empirical 
findings of these studies cannot be generalised to the context of the Indian banking sector, 
which has, in the recent past, gone through a phase of decline in economic growth, assets 
10 The Report on Trend and Progress of Banking 2002-03 suggests that the future profitability of public sector 
banks would depend on their ability to generate greater non-interest income and control operating expenses. 
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quality and non-interest sources of income.  
In general, bank profitability is a function of internal and external determinants. 
The internal determinants are related to micro or bank-specific factors that originate from 
balance sheets and/or profit and loss accounts. These factors are influenced by the 
management decisions and policy objectives (Staikouras and Wood, 2011). The important 
bank-specific factors include market share, bank size, capital adequacy, credit risk, 
liquidity risk, operational efficiency and income diversification. Different sized banks may 
have different abilities to reap economies of scale or scope through diversification, market 
power, stronger band image or implicit regulatory (too-big-to-fail) protection (Curak, 
Poposki and Pepur, 2012). Numerous studies have found a significant positive relationship 
between size and profitability (Goddard, Molyneux and Wilson, 2004; García-Herrero, 
Gavilá and Santabárbara, 2009; Chortareas, Garza-Garcia and Girardone, 2011) (see sub-
section 3.2). The glimpse of efficient cost management can be taken from the ratio of 
operating expenses over total assets. Higher ratio is related to higher expenses and will 
have a negative impact on profitability (Athanasoglou, Brissimis and Delis, 2008). The 
most common and serious risks that banks encounter in day-to-day operations are credit 
risk, solvency risk and liquidity risk. The credit risk is measured as the ratio of net non-
performing loans over total net loans. It is negatively related to bank performance; 
however, bank size or ownership can have a significant influence on the negative effect of 
credit risk (see sub-section 2.3.3).  
Well-capitalised banks are considered safe and solvent to absorb any unexpected 
shock. To account for insolvency risk of individual banks, capital adequacy ratio is 
considered. It is measured as equity capital over total assets, and a positive relationship is 
expected. Liquidity risk is the inability of banks to pay their obligations as quickly as 
possible, and failure to do so can lead to bank failure (Curak, Poposki and Pepur, 2012). It 
is measured as the ratio of total loan over total assets. A positive relationship is expected 
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with profitability since highly liquid banks are more aggressive towards profitability 
(Hesse and Poghosyan, 2009; Chortareas, Garza-Garcia and Girardone, 2011). A bank 
with higher diversified non-interest income streams is considered to be more profitable 
and is cushioned from a volatile environment. To account for an individual bank’s income 
diversity, the ratio of non-interest income over total income is considered. It is argued in 
the literature that bank size or ownership does matter in the pursuit of non-interest income, 
and accordingly to the bank’s profitability (see sub-section 2.3.4).  
 The external determinants are comprised of macroeconomic and market-specific 
variables (Athanasoglou, Brissimis and Delis, 2008; Staikouras and Wood, 2011). These 
variables are outside of the prerogative of bank-specific decisions and policies. To control 
for the macroeconomic environments, most of the previous studies used inflation, real 
interest rate, and real GDP growth rate. The impact of inflation on profitability is 
substantial, and any major fluctuation in inflation can have serious implication towards 
banking profitability and to some extent to the stability of the financial system (Revell, 
1979). However, the effect of inflation is ambiguous. Some studies (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Huizinga, 1999; Athanasoglou, Brissimis and Delis, 2008) find a positive relationship 
whereas others find a negative relationship between inflation and profitability. Real 
interest rate volatility fosters bank profits since banks transfer these risks to consumers 
(Maudos and de Guevara, 2007) particularly in developing countries (Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Huizinga, 1999). The relationship between GDP and profitability is ambiguous. On the 
one hand, a positive relationship is expected because of the pro-cyclical nature of the 
banking business (Athanasoglou, Brissimis and Delis, 2008; Chortareas, Garza-Garcia and 
Girardone, 2011). During the boom period, banks in general expand lending and charge 
higher interest rates on loans as well as generate higher fee income through ever increased 
transactions in the stock market. Banks generate fewer bad assets (NPLs) and ultimately 
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earn higher returns. On the other hand, Goddard, Liu, Molyneux and Wilson (2011) argue 
that an abundance of business opportunities might lead to an intensification of competition 
and thus a negative relationship between GDP and profitability can be expected. Again, 
during an economic downturn with slow growth environment, in particular in a period of 
recession, credit quality deteriorates, and default increases, thus bank profitability declines 
(Flamini, Schumacher and McDonald, 2009).  
The industry/market-specific variables can have a significant impact on banking 
profitability as ownership-structure and market structure. Athanasoglou, Brissimis and 
Delis (2008) state that a relationship between ownership-structure and profitability may 
exist; however, they find no clear evidence in the literature to support this view. Sarkar, 
Sarkar and Bhaumik (1998) find evidence of a weak ownership effect of private over 
public banks in India for the period 1993-1994 and 1994-1995. However, Bhaumik and 
Dimova (2004), for the sample of Indian banks for the period 1995-1996 through 2000-
2001, find no evidence of ownership effect on performance, and conclude that due to 
intensified competition among the ownership groups public banks have managed to 
eliminate the performance gap (see sub-section 2.3.2). The literature on the impact of 
market structure on banking profitability is extensive and linked to the traditional industrial 
organisation theory. In the following sub-sections, we discuss the effect of market structure 
on profitability, the role of bank size and ownership on the impact of credit risk and/or 
income diversification on profitability.  
2.3.1 Market structure and profitability     
A plethora of research has been devoted to the determination of the connection 
between market structure and profitability. Many studies, which are related to the 
traditional industrial organisation theory, find a positive relationship between them. Two 
competing hypotheses are developed in relation to market structure and profitability, 
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namely market power (MP) and the efficient structure (ES) hypothesis. Along with these 
hypotheses, recent studies (e.g., Berger, 1995a; Claeys and Vander Vennet, 2008) focus on 
the profit-efficiency relationship by identifying X-efficiency and scale-efficiency.11 Lately 
both hypotheses have been used in a single equation framework to investigate the effect of 
bank-specific, market-specific and macroeconomic determinants of profitability (e.g., 
Athanasoglou, Brissimis and Delis, 2008; Chortareas, Garza-Garcia and Girardone, 2011; 
Staikouras and Wood, 2011; Mirzaei, Moore and Liu, 2013).      
The market power hypothesis is divided into traditional structure-conduct-
performance (SCP) and relative market power (RMP) hypothesis. SCP suggests that the 
conduct and performance of the banks depend on the structural characteristics of the 
market in which they operate. It asserts that banks which operate in a concentrated market 
are able to extract monopolistic rents by using their market power to charge higher interest 
rates on loans and offer lower rates on deposits (Staikouras and Wood, 2011). This setting 
of prices is less favourable to consumers’ welfare. Since concentration is linked to the 
degree of competition, a greater concentrated banking industry is considered to have a 
lower degree of competition and is conducive for implicit/explicit collusion among banks 
to earn higher than normal profits (Bain, 1951).12 However, if the concentration falls, the 
price of the banks gets closer to marginal cost and as a result there is a fall of market power 
of large banks and, hence competition increases. The SCP hypothesis would hold if we 
find a significant positive relationship between market concentration and profitability. The 
recent banking studies that find support for the SCP hypothesis are by Lloyd-Williams, 
11X-efficiency hypothesis postulates that banks with greater managerial efficiency and/or better technologies 
and/or production processes have lower costs and therefore higher profits, and the scale-efficiency 
hypothesis states that sometimes despite having similar production and management technology some banks 
can operate at an optimal level of economies of scale, and hence can reduce their unit costs and earn higher 
unit profits. 
12 Implicit collusion may occur through barometric price leadership and explicit collusion may occur through 
cartel agreement which enables banks to operate at the point of joint profit maximisation (Goddard, 
Molyneux and Wilson, 2001). 
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Molyneux and Thornton (1994) on Spain, Molyneux and Forbes (1995) on 18 European 
Countries, Claeys and Vander Vennet (2008) on Central and Eastern European countries; 
Al-Muharrami and Matthews (2009) on the industry of Arab Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC), Sufian (2010) on Republic of Korea, Bhatti and Hussain (2010) on Pakistan, and 
Ahamed (2012) on Bangladesh. 
Since the initiation of financial liberalisation of the Indian banking industry, there 
have been significant changes in the market structure mainly through consolidation of 
banks and participation of foreign banks into the system. These changes can intensify the 
market power of the large banks by fostering collusive behaviour among them and hence 
hinder competition, profitability and productive efficiency. The concentration indices 
reveal that the Indian banking industry is still moderately concentrated and around 40% 
market share is in the hands of the five largest banks (see Figure 2.1). Therefore, we believe 
that concentration has a significant positive impact on profitability of the Indian banking 
industry, suggesting the SCP hypothesis is valid for India.  
The opponents of the SCP hypothesis argue however that there is also a reverse 
causality, as such performance of banks can affect the conduct and in turn the structure of 
the market. According to the RMP hypothesis, banks with greater market share and well 
differentiated products are able to exercise market power in setting prices for those 
products and earn supernormal profits (Berger, 1995a). The subtle difference between SCP 
and RMP is that in the latter case banks can earn supernormal profits and it does not have 
to occur in the concentrated market (Goldberg and Rai, 1996). Demsetz (1973), Peltzman 
(1977) and Smirlock (1985) argue that market concentration is not a random event but 
rather the result of banks with superior efficiency obtaining a large market share. In this 
case, market share and profits will be correlated but there will be no causal relation 
between market concentration and profits (Smirlock, 1985). Evanoff and Fortier (1988) 
also argue that higher profits in concentrated markets could be the result of greater 
 43 
productive efficiency of firms (through economies of scale and/or new technologies) with 
larger market share. Therefore, a positive relationship between market share and 
profitability yield support for the RMP hypothesis. The recent banking studies that find 
support for RMP hypothesis are by Fu and Heffernan (2009) on China and Garza-Garcia 
(2012) on Mexico.   
2.3.2 Bank size, ownership and profitability 
The empirical findings on the relationship between bank size and profitability are 
conflicting. While studies by Goddard, Molyneux and Wilson (2004) on European, 
Flamini, Schumacher and McDonald (2009) on Sub-Saharan African and Chortareas, 
Garza-Garcia and Girardone (2011) on Latin American countries find that large banks are 
more profitable, studies by Smirlock (1985) on the US find the opposite result. Goddard, 
Molyneux and Wilson (2004) explain several factors that are the reason for large banks 
being profitable. Large banks can exploit scale and scope economies, market power 
through stronger brand image or implicit regulatory (too-big-to-fail) protection. In 
addition, by exercising market power in wholesale or capital markets, large banks can 
contribute substantially to their profitability. Alternatively, if large banks cannot exploit 
economies of scale due to possible bureaucratic bottlenecks, managerial inefficiencies and 
complex organizational structure they are likely to be less profitable than the smaller ones 
(Flamini, Schumacher and McDonald, 2009). In a review, Berger and Humphrey (1997) 
find consistent evidence that large banks are more efficient on average than small ones. 
The efficiency studies on India also find similar results that large banks are more efficient 
because of scale economies (Das and Ghosh, 2006, 2009; Tabak and Tecles, 2010; 
Bhattacharyya and Pal, 2013). On the other hand, Bonin, Hasan and Wachtel (2005), in 
transition countries, find that small banks are more efficient. 
The distinctive institutional objectives and management structures of different 
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banking groups impact the profitability differently. Like the relationship between size and 
profitability, the literature that analyses the influence of different ownership types on 
banking profitability also renders divergent conclusions. While some empirical studies 
find evidence of foreign banks being more profit efficient (e.g., Berger, Hasan and Zhou, 
2009; Sahoo and Tone, 2009), others find evidence of public banks being more efficient 
(Das and Ghosh, 2006, 2009; Tabak and Tecles, 2010). Micco, Panizza and Yanez (2007), 
for the industrial countries, did not find any evidence to support the idea that privately-
owned banks are more profitable than state-owned banks; however, they did find support 
for the developing countries. In addition, Iannotta, Nocera and Sironi (2007) conclude that 
publicly-owned banks demonstrate lower profitability than their counterparts because of 
higher risk associated with financing projects. Conversely, Dietrich and Wanzenried (2011) 
find that Swiss public-owned banks are more profitable than privately owned banks during 
a financial crisis. Regarding India, Sarkar, Sarkar and Bhaumik (1998) find that foreign 
banks are more profitable than public banks and domestic private banks show a weak 
advantage over public banks in the earlier liberalization period. However, most of the 
studies on the post liberalization period show a convergence or improvement in the 
banking performance (e.g., Bhaumik and Dimova, 2004). With respect to both costs and 
profit, most of the recent studies show that public sector banks are more efficient than 
private domestic and foreign banks (e.g., Sensarma, 2006; Ray and Das, 2010; 
Bhattacharyya and Pal, 2013; and to name a few).          
2.3.3 Credit risk and bank profitability 
Hypothesis 1: The negative impact of credit risk on profitability in the form of non-
performing loans differs across bank size groups.  
Hypothesis 2: The negative impact of credit risk on profitability in the form of non-
performing loans differs across ownership types.   
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Many theories suggest that credit risk reduces banking profitability. Theories 
mainly emphasise the negative impact of credit risk on profitability in the form of 
nonperforming loans. The underlying premise of their argument is that bad loans, or 
accumulation of unpaid loans, reduce the amount of good loans which lowers the returns 
of banks. García-Herrero, Gavilá and Santabárbara (2009) point out that poor asset quality 
has a negative impact on the bank returns. In general, the higher the exposure to credit risk, 
the lower the bank’s profitability (Athanasoglou, Brissimis and Delis, 2008; Hesse and 
Poghosyan, 2009).13 Berger and DeYoung (1997) advocate that efficient banks are good at 
managing their credit risk and propose a ‘bad management’ hypothesis, in which non-
performing loans increase due to poor management practices in the form of poor loan 
underwriting, monitoring and control, and thereby banks become cost inefficient. 
According to Das and Ghosh (2009), cost inefficiency is a major source of performance 
inadequacy in banks. Most of the recent efficiency studies have taken asset quality into 
account and have found that a high level of non-performing loans does make banks 
inefficient (e.g., Altunbas, Liu, Molyneux and Seth, 2000; Girardone, Molyneux and 
Gardener, 2004; Das and Ghosh, 2009).  
For identifying creditworthy borrowers and monitoring loans, banks need to have 
an effective credit risk management system in place, to reduce the exposure of credit risk 
and maximise a bank’s risk-adjusted rate of return. In the context of India, large and 
medium sized banks are found to be more efficient than their smaller counterparts (e.g., 
Das and Ghosh, 2009). It is argued that large Indian banks are better able to adjust their 
optimal mix and scale of outputs and hence become more profit efficient. Comparatively 
large banks have better infrastructure, managerial skills, and geographical spread in terms 
of branch networks to differentiate good and bad borrowers and disburse loans to 
13 Hesse and Poghosyan (2009) suggest that non-performing loans over total loans provide better reflection 
of credit risk for banks. 
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creditworthy customers. According to Berger and Udell (2002), small banks rely on soft 
information and are good at making relationships with customers and, thus making quick 
lending decisions. On the other hand, large banks always rely on hard information and 
make mostly transaction-based lending (Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan and Stein, 2005). 
Therefore, we develop hypothesis 1 to test whether bank size heterogeneity influences the 
impact of credit risk on profitability.  
According to Bhaumik and Piesse (2008), since the emerging market is undergoing 
substantial reforms, credit disbursal behaviour may vary significantly across banks of 
different ownership types. Even after two decades of financial liberalization, state-owned 
banks, along with profit maximizing objectives, have a unique set of peripheral objectives, 
e.g., encouraging employment of low-skilled workers, expanding bank branches in the 
rural areas to promote job opportunities, disbursing loans to government priority sector at 
below market rates (Das and Ghosh, 2009), which might yield low returns. However, it 
has been noted in recent studies that medium-sized state-owned banks have, on average, 
less non-performing loans which may be due to high level of technical efficiency (e.g., 
Das and Ghosh, 2006, 2009). Regarding Indian bank ownership types and banking 
relationships, Berger, Klapper, Peria and Zaidi (2008) find that different ownership types 
build divergent relationships. They find that state-owned banks have more relationships 
with state-owned firms and rural firms than private banks, whereas foreign banks have a 
stronger relationship with more transparent firms or corporate and large firms. All these 
differences across ownership types may have a significant impact on credit quality (e.g., 
non-performing loans) which ultimately rolls on to profitability. Therefore, we develop 
hypothesis 2 to test whether bank ownership heterogeneity influences the effect of credit 
risk on profitability.  
 Since credit quality is considered one of the main indicators of the financial 
soundness and health of a bank, default on loans and advances and/or low asset quality 
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have important repercussions for the entire economy of a country. While there is evidence 
of a negative impact of credit risk on profitability, there is admittedly limited or no 
evidence for the influence of bank size or ownership on the impact of credit risk on 
profitability. Empirical verification, in the context of Indian banks which were saddled 
with non-performing loans, to examine the relationship between credit risk and 
profitability and whether bank size or ownership heterogeneity has any significant 
influence on the impact of credit risk would provide a better understanding to adopt 
necessary measures in order to augment financial stability.     
2.3.4 Income diversification and bank profitability 
Hypothesis 3: The positive impact of income diversification on profitability in the 
form of non-interest income differs across bank size groups. 
Hypothesis 4: The positive impact of income diversification on profitability in the 
form of non-interest income differs across ownership types.  
According to economic theory, if revenue stems from various financial activities 
and those are less than perfectly correlated it should increase the bank profitability. The 
conventional industry wisdom suggests that banks with greater diversification through 
non-traditional sources of income are capable of reducing income volatility substantially. 
To disentangle the question of whether diversification enhances profitability has been 
explored comprehensively both theoretically and empirically (e.g., Stiroh, 2004; Acharya, 
Hasan and Saunders, 2006; Stiroh and Rumble, 2006; Mercieca, Schaeck and Wolfe, 2007; 
Elsas, Hackethal and Holzhäuser, 2010).  
The underlying findings of these systematic studies are mixed and mostly based on 
developed market economies (e.g., US and Europe). The empirical studies that find 
positive impact of diversification on profitability are by Baele, De Jonghe and Vander 
Vennet (2007) on 17 European countries, Chiorazzo, Milani and Salvini (2008) on the 
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Italian banking industry and Elsas, Hackethal and Holzhäuser (2010) on nine developed 
countries’ banking markets. Well-diversified banks can materialise many benefits through 
non-intermediation activities. Among the identified benefits, Elsas, Hackethal and 
Holzhäuser (2010) cite efficiency gains through economies of scale and scope, superior 
resource allocation through internal capital markets, and bank-specific competitive 
advantage. Goddard, McKillop and Wilson (2008) cite the reduction of idiosyncratic risk, 
and the strengthening of the financial system as the motives for diversification.  
Recent literature embarks on the inherent differences between large and small 
banks and their capability of adopting diversification strategies to enhance profitability. It 
is argued that due to superior technological infrastructure, expertise and economies of scale 
and scope, large banks tend to outperform small ones in diversifying investments. 
Mercieca, Schaeck and Wolfe (2007) examine the impact of diversification on the 
performance of small European banks for 15 countries for the period 1997-2003. They did 
not find any direct diversification benefits for the small banks either within or across 
business lines. On the other hand, for the Italian banking sample, Chiorazzo, Milani and 
Salvini (2008) find a stronger relationship between diversification and profitability for the 
large banks. For US credit unions, Goddard, McKillop and Wilson (2008) and Goddard et 
al. (2008) suggest that similar diversification strategies are not appropriate for the large 
and small credit unions. They advocate that small credit unions should limit diversification 
towards non-interest sources of income because they lack sufficient scale and requisite 
expertise in order to diversify away from traditional interest activities. Lepetit, Nys, Rous 
and Tarazi (2008) argue that larger banks tend to have more non-traditional activities. We, 
therefore, formulate hypothesis 3 to examine whether bank size has any significant 
influence on the impact of income diversification to enhance profitability.  
However, the theoretical underpinnings against income diversification seem to 
suggest that hypothesis 3 might not hold. The implicit costs which are associated with 
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diversification can overshadow the benefits. Among the identified costs, Elsas, Hackethal 
and Holzhäuser (2010) cite agency problems related to diversifying investments,  
inefficient resource allocation problem due to malfunctioning of internal capital markets, 
asymmetric informational problem due to miscommunication between head office and 
divisional managers and the reckless rent-seeking attitude of managers. The agency 
problem arises when managers pursue growth through diversification by taking excessive 
risk, in excess of what is required by shareholders (Goddard, McKillop and Wilson, 2008). 
It is worth mentioning that a large portion of the Indian banking sector is controlled by the 
Government of India, where the principal-agent problem is eminent. Therefore, 
diversification can have a negative impact on profitability. In addition, Stiroh and Rumble 
(2006) argue that if commercial banks have an investment banking window and some fee-
based income stems from investment banking activities, those earnings are more volatile 
than traditional lending activities, and thus banks with a higher portion of non-traditional 
income streams would be less profitable. DeYoung and Roland (2001) argue that it is less 
costly for the bank-clients of non-traditional fee-based activities to switch banks compared 
to bank-clients of traditional financial activities because in the latter case switching a bank 
requires establishing a new relationship with a bank, and it turns out to be costly for 
customers. The empirical studies that find a negative impact of diversification on 
profitability are by DeYoung and Roland (2001), Stiroh (2004) and Stiroh and Rumble 
(2006) for US financial holding companies. Acharya, Hasan and Saunders (2006) find that 
diversification of loans does not typically enhance profitability or reduce risk in Italian 
banks.  
Pennathur, Subrahmanyam and Vishwasrao (2012) find that ownership types have 
a definite impact on non-interest income for Indian banks. They mention that bank size 
and management quality are deemed to be significant forces for banking profitability. They 
also argue that the pursuit of non-interest sources of income is risky for Indian banks due 
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to lack of prior experience, limited financial networks and unsophisticated technological 
infrastructure, especially at the small public and private sector domestic banks. However, 
with the RBI’s indication of enhancing non-interest sources of income, state-owned banks 
are no less cogent than private domestic or foreign banks on fee-based income (RBI, 2003). 
It has been acknowledged in the recent papers (e.g., Das and Ghosh, 2009; Tabak and 
Tecles, 2010) that the state-owned banks are more efficient by highlighting that these banks 
undertake most of the government sponsored programs, such as personal provident fund 
collection, tax collection, etc., which are likely to generate substantial fee-based income. 
Therefore, we develop hypothesis 4 to test whether the impact of income diversification 
on profitability differs across ownership types.    
The existing empirical literature on the impact of income diversification on 
profitability is heavily concentrated on US and European banking markets, while little 
attention has been paid to emerging markets especially India. Comprehending the 
significant effect of income diversification on profitability and how this effect differs 
depending on bank size or ownership types has immense importance to regulators for both 
Indian and other emerging Asian countries in order to maintain the desired level of bank 
stability.  
2.4 The Model Specification and Variable Selection 
2.4.1 The Benchmark Model Specification 
To identify the determinants of bank profitability, we develop a panel data model 
that considers the potential influence of market structure in accordance with the existing 
empirical model. Following Smirlock (1985) and Lloyd-Williams, Molyneux and 
Thornton (1994), we can take both market structure variables i.e., concentration (HHI) and 
market share (MS) into the profit equation at the same time to discriminate between the 
SCP and RMP hypotheses. The extended profit equation is as follows:  
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In which ∏ is a profit measure of bank performance. Here i  denotes bank and t  
stands for time. itε  , is the disturbance, which consists of two components where iv is the 
bank-specific unobserved heterogeneity and itu is the idiosyncratic error term. This is a 
one-way error component regression model, where 2 (0, )i vv IIN σ≈ and is independent of 
2 (0, )it uu IIN σ≈ . X represents a vector of bank-specific variables varying across banks and 
over time, M is a vector of contemporaneous macroeconomic variables varying over time. 
Finally, D is a vector of dummy variables varying across banks.  
2.4.2 Dependent variables and determinants of profitability 
This section describes the dependent variables and the determinants of bank profitability. 
Since determinants of bank profitability are a function of internal and external factors we 
classify them into three clusters namely bank-specific, market/industry-specific and 
macroeconomic factors.   
2.4.2.1 Dependent variables 
In most of the earlier studies (e.g., Smirlock, 1985; Evanoff and Fortier, 1988; 
Berger and Hannan, 1989) price of a single banking product was employed as the measure 
of performance. Since, a bank is a multi-product service industry, prices of certain 
individual products or services are not a good measure for bank performance because cross 
subsidization among the products and services is more common than in other single 
product industries (Lloyd-Williams, Molyneux and Thornton, 1994). Bell and Murphy 
(1969) state two basic shortcomings for those studies which employed prices as the 
performance measure: (i) the costs of production of the particular banking service have not 
been considered (ii) may underestimate the total impact of the monopoly power on bank 
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performance by using a vague definition of bank output. Rhoades (1981) argues that, 
according to the theoretical model, market structure will influence the margin between 
prices and costs. So the margin will be accounted for in a profit measure but not in the 
price (interest rates) measure unless costs are explicitly accounted for. In addition, Gilbert 
(1984) argues that using average rates and average service charge rates are the poor 
measures of bank performance. Molyneux and Forbes (1995) also suggest using 
profitability measure because the profits and losses of all products are consolidated into 
one figure. It avoids the problem of cross subsidisation (Evanoff and Fortier, 1988).  
Considering the multi-product nature of the banking business, using a single price 
of a product as the measure of bank performance would be misleading, as profit measures 
would be more informative. Therefore, we use two different measures of bank 
performances: return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). ROA is the ratio of net 
income over average total assets and ROE is the ratio of net income over average equity. 
We consider ROE as the main profitability variable, as it provides a comprehensive picture 
of profitability and is of greatest interest to the shareholders. ROA may be biased to off-
balance-sheet activities. However, we report results from both measures.   
 
2.4.2.2 Bank-specific variables 
The main sources of bank-specific risk that may have a significant impact on 
banking profitability are through credit risk, solvency risk and liquidity risk. To understand 
the determinants of bank profitability, we have used seven bank-specific variables which 
have been documented as instrumental in explaining banking profitability. Firstly, an 
empirical analysis of banking profitability should control for the size-induced difference 
of banks. Different sized banks may have different abilities to reap economies of scale or 
scope. It is argued that large banks may exert market power and hence generate greater 
profit. They also have highly diversified product and loan portfolios compared to their 
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smaller counterparts, which might provide certain leeway in reducing risks. Therefore, we 
used logarithm of total assets (Size) as an indirect proxy for scale-efficiency and expected 
a positive relationship with profitability. Numerous studies have found a significant 
positive impact of size on profitability (e.g., Goddard, Molyneux and Wilson, 2004; 
García-Herrero, Gavilá and Santabárbara, 2009; Chortareas, Garza-Garcia and Girardone, 
2011). However, extremely large banks may suffer from diseconomies of scale due to 
agency costs, the nitty gritty of administrative procedures and excessive overhead 
expenses.  
The second variable is credit risk (i.e., NPL). It is included to account for the credit 
risk of individual banks, where NPL is the ratio of net non-performing loans to net total 
loans. Hesse and Poghosyan (2009) suggest that NPLs over net total loans provide better 
reflection of credit risk for banks. Since NPLs are costly to banks, a negative relationship 
is expected with profitability. Third, income diversification (Div) is measured as total non-
interest income over total income (cf. Stiroh and Rumble, 2006). We expect a positive 
relationship between diversification and bank profitability.  Fourthly, capital adequacy 
(measured by the ratio of equity capital to total assets, i.e., EqA) is considered to be one 
of the important factors affecting bank profitability. Banks with higher capital are capable 
of absorbing any negative shocks and are assumed to possess less insolvency risk. Since 
higher capital ratio may have possibility of lower bankruptcy and hence greater 
opportunity for banks to realise lower funding costs and higher incentives of monitoring 
management activities by shareholders, it is expected that capitalisation is positively 
related to profitability.  
The fifth variable is liquidity risk (i.e., LTA). Banks lacking in liquidity struggle 
to meet their obligations towards creditors which can ultimately lead to bankruptcy. 
Following previous studies (e.g., Chortareas, Garza-Garcia and Girardone, 2011; Garza-
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Garcia, 2012), we use the ratio of bank total loans to total assets (LTA) to proxy for the 
liquidity risk. The higher the LTA the more aggressive a bank should be towards 
profitability due to a substantially greater portion of interest bearing assets (Claeys and 
Vander Vennet, 2008; Hesse and Poghosyan, 2009). However, García-Herrero, Gavilá and 
Santabárbara (2009) argue that a greater amount of loans is associated with higher 
operational costs in originating, servicing and monitoring. Since literature has found mixed 
evidence on the expected sign of liquidity, we therefore expect an ambiguous relationship.    
The sixth variable is related to operational inefficiency of individual banks 
represented by the ratio of operating expenses to total assets (i.e., OPT). It provides the 
snapshots of efficient costs management of banks. Higher ratio is related to higher 
expenses and will have a negative impact on profitability (Athanasoglou, Brissimis and 
Delis, 2008). Following Mirzaei, Moore and Liu (2013), we use OPT as a proxy for cost 
efficiency. We expect a negative relationship between OPT and profitability. The final 
bank-specific variable is the annual growth rate of total assets (GTA). It is included on the 
basis of the argument that rapid business growth through growth in assets is likely to be 
instrumental for bank profitability.   
 
2.4.2.3 Market-specific variables 
Similar to bank-specific variables, bank profitability is also affected by market 
structure or industry-specific variables. According to the industrial organisation literature, 
we have used market concentration (HHI) and market share (MS) variables in the profit 
equation and both are measured based on the lending market of Indian commercial banks. 
While HHI provides measures of how much the largest banks contribute to activity in a 
banking industry, MS shows the market power of an individual bank. However, the 
traditional SCP hypothesis would apply to the data if 1 20 and 0α α> =  which implies that 
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the market share does not affect a bank’s profitability and that profitability is the result of 
monopoly behavior measured by concentration. The RMP hypothesis holds if 
1 20 and 0α α= >  which implies that banks with a large market share are more efficient 
than their rivals and thus earn higher profits. In that circumstance, market concentration 
does not affect bank profitability.  
Regarding ownership structure, we have included two dummy variables for public-
owned banks (i.e., public) and foreign-owned private banks (i.e., foreign) in our study. A 
further dummy (i.e., Old Bank) is added to examine whether banks established before 
liberalisation (1992) are more profitable than the banks established after liberalisation. 
There were 26 public commercial banks in India as of 2010-11; with the view to examining 
whether the percentage share of government ownership in those public banks makes a 
difference to the profitability, we add another industry-specific variable (i.e., %Govt.) to 
equation (2.1). Detailed definitions of the variables included in this study are provided in 
table 2.1. 
 
2.4.2.4 Macroeconomic variables 
Since the banking industry is highly regulated and the environment in which they 
operate has significant influence on the performance of banks, an incomprehensive account 
of those variables in the profit equation would provide biased results. Therefore, 
acknowledging macroeconomic determinants in the profit equation would solve the 
problem of omitted variable bias in the regression.  
Three macroeconomic indicators are used to check whether there is any correlation 
between the profitability of banks and macroeconomic state of the economy. The most 
important macroeconomic indicator is inflation (INF). INF is included to control for 
economic uncertainty in the banking industry. It was reported in the previous studies that 
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high inflationary environment is congenial for greater margins and bank returns (Bourke, 
1989). However, we expect an ambiguous relationship between inflation and profitability 
because banks can earn higher returns from an inflationary environment only when 
managers can anticipate inflation accurately and adjust interest rates on loans and deposits.  
The second macroeconomic variable is the real interest rate (INT). Since interest rate 
volatility can foster bank profits we expect a positive relationship between interest rate and 
profitability. Finally, we include real GDP growth rate in the profit equation. A positive 
relationship is expected between GDP and profitability. However, a high GDP growth rate 
can have a negative impact on profitability if competition effect persists and deposits 
supply dwindles because of greater consumption along with GDP growth. To examine the 
determinants of bank profitability we use the following extended model:   
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2.4.3 Bank size, credit risk and income diversification 
The perceived advantages (e.g., economies of scale and scope, market power and so on) 
that are inherently associated with large banks are likely to impact on their prudential 
parameter (e.g., NPL) and their diversified profit maximization capacity (e.g., non-interest 
sources of income), which eventually reflect on profitability. Therefore, with a view to 
examining whether bank size heterogeneity has any significant influence on the impact of 
credit risk or income diversification, we use the following empirical specification:  
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where NPL, Size and DIV are the proxy for credit risk, natural logarithm of total assets 
and income diversification of individual banks over time, respectively. The interactions of 
credit risk and bank size as well as income diversification and bank size are included to 
examine whether bank size has any influence on the impact of credit risk and income 
diversification. We use the analogous explanatory variable as in equation (2.1) to control 
for the various characteristics of banking operations that may have a differing effect on 
profitability for small and large banks.14 
2.4.4 Ownership, credit risk and income diversification   
To disentangle whether the relationship between credit risk or diversification and 
profitability varies across different ownership types (public, private domestic and foreign 
banks), we interact each ownership dummy with credit risk and diversification. In this 
case, since fixed effect estimation does not allow testing for the differences in banking 
ownership groups, we run the regressions by using a random effects estimator.   
2.5 Data description and analysis  
This section describes the sources of data used in our study. To get a homogenous 
sample we focus on only the commercial banks in India for the period 2004 to 2011.15 The 
main source of data on the bank’s balance sheets, income statements and annual reports is 
from the Reserve Bank of India. Our dataset is considered to be superior to the BankScope 
14 The vector of dummies is not included. 
15 For India, financial year starts from 1 April and ends on 31 March of every year. Therefore, 2004 denotes 
the 2003-2004 financial year and so on. 
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database; however, for the sake of accuracy, we have cross-checked them with the data 
obtained from BankScope.16 Regarding foreign commercial banks’ data we had to depend 
exclusively on the income statements and balance sheets collected from RBI since 
BankScope does not provide any data regarding foreign banks operating in India. Since 
we have eliminated observations with missing data for the variables, we have therefore an 
unbalanced panel dataset. It should be noted that we have applied rules to eliminate outliers 
based on the 1st and 99th percentiles of the distributions of the dependent variable in the 
profit equation. The sample includes 73 commercial banks operating in the Indian banking 
industry. This accounts for the Indian banks holding more than 95% of total assets. We 
augment our RBI dataset with the country level macroeconomic indicators retrieved from 
the World Bank database.17 Descriptive statistics and the correlation coefficients of 
independent variables are now discussed. 
Table 2.2 shows the descriptive statistics of basic variables used in the estimation 
of profit equations. The descriptive statistics provide very interesting insights. The return 
on equity (ROE) varies between -46.9% and 38.3% with an average of 13.5%, while the 
return on assets (ROA) varies between -2.1% and 6.71% with an average of 1.3%. In both 
profitability measures the minimum values are negative. The probable explanation is that 
during the 2004-05 fiscal years the profitability of many banks had shrunk drastically due 
to the rising interest rate environment in India. The average of CR5 (40.71%) and HHI 
(582) indicate that the Indian banking industry is moderately concentrated18. The 
maximum value (18.6%) of market share (MS) indicates weak evidence of market 
competition in India. The logarithm of total assets varies between 5.71 and 16.32 reflecting 
the massive heterogeneity of bank sizes in the industry. The credit risk (NPL) varies 
16 BankScope is maintained by Fitch/IBCA/Bureau Van Dijk. 
17 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator 
18 HHI is multiplied by 10,000. 
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between 0% and 76%, with mean of 2% and standard deviation of 6.07%. The average 
NPL ratio over the years shows a minimum of 0.78% in 2008 and maximum of 5.35% in 
2004. It shows that some banks suffer from the huge burden of bad assets. The income 
diversification (DIV) varies between -12.66% and 83.22%, with mean of 19.13% and 
standard deviation of 14.25%. The mean value suggests that one-fifth of the total income 
was generated from non-interest income sources.  The capitalisation (EqA) varies between 
1.0% and 98.1% with a mean of 13.5% indicating the healthy status of the Indian banking 
industry. However, there are some banks (e.g., SCBs) still under-capitalised compared with 
the international competitive norm. The operational inefficiency varies between 0.32% and 
10.6%. The ratio of loans to total assets varies between 0% and 75.8%, while growth rate 
of total assets varies between 76.9% and 917.5%. Finally, for the macroeconomic 
indicators, the inflation (INF) rate varies between 3.8% and 12%, the real interest rate 
(INT) varies between -0.5% and 6.87%. The mean value GDP growth rate is 8%, however 
it reached almost 11% in 2006-07 followed by 4% in 2007-08 because of the global 
financial crisis. 
Panels A and B of Table 2.3 show the comparative study on mean values of the 
dependent and some selected explanatory variables in terms of bank-size groups and 
ownership types, respectively.19 We find wider variations comparing the statistics across 
bank-size groups. Panel A shows that large banks (17.1%) have almost three times higher 
ROE than small banks (6.5%). Regarding credit risk, small banks have the highest average 
credit risk (3.7%), followed by medium-sized banks (1.6%) and large banks (1.1%). On 
the other hand, small banks (25.5%) have the highest non-interest income, followed by 
medium-sized banks (18%) and large banks (15%). The mean comparison tests show that 
19 Based on total assets, three size classes have been considered. These are: small banks: assets up to Rs. 35 
billion, medium-sized banks: assets between Rs. 35 billion to Rs. 685 billion, large banks: assets above Rs. 
685 billion. 
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the credit risk is significantly different between small and medium banks and between 
small and large banks. Overall, the results suggest that bank size heterogeneity does matter 
in the management of credit risk and in the pursuit of non-interest income.  
We also find wider variations comparing statistics across ownership types. Panel B 
shows that private foreign banks have the highest average credit risk (2.8%), followed by 
public banks (1.7%) and private domestic banks (1.6%). Regarding non-interest income, 
the differences between public and private foreign banks are enormous. Private foreign 
banks (29%) earn almost twice as much as public (13.5%) and private domestic banks 
(15.1%) from non-interest sources of income. Private foreign banks in India face enormous 
restrictions on licensing/ branching and acquisition activities by RBI. Since foreign banks 
have prior experience, and better financial networks, they reasonably emphasise non-
interest sources of income to render advisory services to the ever growing corporate sector 
(Pennathur, Subrahmanyam and Vishwasrao, 2012). The comparison tests of the means of 
all three ownership types are significantly different. Therefore, the overall results suggest 
that ownership does matter for maintaining credit risk and in the pursuit of non-interest 
income.  
Figure 2.3 shows the Kernel density plots (based on Gaussian kernel) of credit risk 
and income diversification for all three banking size groups and ownership types. The 
upper panel shows an asymmetric distribution for all size-groups and ownership types, 
indicating small banks and the private foreign banks have the highest credit risk. Similarly, 
the lower panel of Figure 2.3 shows the kernel density plots of income diversification. It 
reveals an asymmetric distribution for all size-groups and ownership types, indicating 
small banks and private foreign banks have the most diversified portfolios.   
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Figure 2.3 
Kernel density estimates (KDE) for Credit Risk and Income Diversification by bank 
size groups and ownership types. 
  
  
Note: Based on total assets, three size classes have been considered. These are: small banks: assets up to Rs. 
35 billion, medium-sized banks: assets between Rs. 35 billion to Rs. 685 billion, large banks: assets above 
Rs. 685 billion. Since credit risk ratio is limited by zero, we applied a logistical transformation to create 
kernel density plot. Kernel density plots on the upper panel show the credit risk, while plots on the lower 
panel show the income diversification for all size groups and ownership types.  
 
The correlation matrix between independent variables is presented in table 2.4. It 
suggests that the variables used in our study do not possess a serious multicollinearity 
problem. Gujarati (2003) explains that a serious multicollinearity problem will arise if the 
pair-wise correlation coefficient between two regresses exceeds 0.8.20  
2.6 Regression Results 
In this section first we present the estimation results of the profitability of the Indian 
20 Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is also calculated to check for multicollinearity between independent 
variables; VIF shows that all variables are less than the critical value of 10, suggesting no serious 
multicollinearity problem. The mean VIF is 2.43.  
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banking industry. Then, we show the empirical results of the influence of bank size and 
ownership on the impact of credit risk and diversification. Finally, we report an array of 
robustness tests.  
We estimate equation (2.1) to find out the determinants of profitability. In doing 
so, we also examine the impact of market structure (i.e. HHI and MS) on the profitability 
of the Indian banking industry. Since we have augmented this model with macroeconomic 
and dummy variables we run the regressions in three steps to identify the stability of the 
sign and significance. In the first step, we run regression only with market structure and 
bank-specific variables. In the second step, we report the estimates of all bank-specific, 
market-specific and macroeconomic determinants. In the final step, we add a vector of 
dummy variables in the profit equation to examine whether ownership structure, the 
percentage share of government ownership at public banks, and bank age have any 
significant impact on profitability.    
The estimation technique used in this study is panel data methods.21 Hausman tests 
were carried out to choose between fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) 
estimators.22 We run the estimators by clustering banks to get heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation corrected robust standard errors.23 All the diagnostic statistics are reported 
at the bottom of each table. The explanatory power of the model is reasonable. The F-
statistic or Wald-test (e.g., RE models) for all models is significant at the 1% level.  
21 Numerous advantages are associated with panel data methods. The usage of this method increase the 
number of data points and hence increases the degrees of freedom. It can reduce the omitted variables 
problem substantially by using information relating to both cross-section and time-series. 
22 The null hypothesis of the Hausman test is that the difference in coefficients is not systematic, and rejecting 
the null suggests that FE is better than the RE estimator.  
23 In general, the endogeneity problem is a matter of concern for panel regressions. However, this problem 
can be eliminated by using the Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM) where it uses instrumental 
variables. Since, instrument variables have one or two periods lagged values, using them would result in 
losses of degrees of freedom. The dataset of our study is unbalanced and with annual frequency of 
observations; therefore, using instrumental variables would provide poor empirical performance. By using 
the static panel estimators, we have got relatively good results with satisfactory diagnostic statistics. 
However, an array of robustness tests is performed to check the sensitivity of the results. For details please 
see Stata user’s guide.   
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2.6.1 The determinants of bank profitability 
Table 2.5 reports the empirical results for a bank’s return on equity for the Indian 
banking industry through the first three models (i.e. 1, 2 and 3). It also reports the results 
for a bank’s return on assets for India through the last three models (i.e. 4, 5 and 6). Since 
bank ownership does not change over time, we use year dummies (i.e. time trend) in all 
regressions.  
Models 1-3 of table 2.5 show that concentration (HHI) coefficients are always 
positive and significantly related to return on equity at the conventional statistical level, 
whereas the coefficients of market share are always negative and insignificant. This 
indicates that market concentration dominates the market share for the Indian banking 
industry, supporting the traditional interpretation of the structure-conduct-performance 
(SCP) hypothesis and rejecting the relative-market-power (RMP) hypothesis. We find 
similar results when return on assets is used as the dependent variable. These findings 
suggest that profitability for the Indian banking sector is determined by the concentration 
not by the market share of banks. It should be noted that the five largest banks of India 
have almost half of the market share of the Indian banking industry. These findings accord 
with much of the existing literature on emerging markets, which finds a positive and 
statistically significant relationship between market concentration and banking 
profitability (e.g., Al-Muharrami and Matthews, 2009; Bhatti and Hussain, 2010; Sufian, 
2010; Ahamed, 2012).  
Interpreting the bank-specific variable, we find that all of the coefficients are 
significant in models at least at the conventional statistical significance level except for the 
liquidity risk and growth rate of total assets. The coefficient of bank size (i.e. logarithm of 
total assets) is always positive and statistically significant, implying the existence of 
economies of scale in the Indian banking sector. This is an indication that size-induced 
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differences between banks lead to higher returns because larger banks operate at the most 
efficient scale (i.e., increasing return portion of their average cost curve). The scale 
efficiencies of larger banks also resonate with the positive impact of concentration on 
profitability in the banking sector. The empirical literature on optimal bank size is 
conflicting. However, a large number of studies find similar results to ours that larger banks 
enjoy economies of scale and scope whereas smaller banks suffer from diseconomies of 
scale and scope (e.g., Mirzaei, Moore and Liu, 2013).24 
We find a negative and statistically significant relationship between credit risk and 
profitability. Since nonperforming loans are costly to the banks and a higher accumulation 
of unpaid loans renders lower profits, the negative relationship between credit risk and 
profitability is consistent with a priori expectations. Based on model 1, we find that a 1% 
decrease in net NPLs leads to a 0.12% increase in return on equity. However, the detailed 
explanations on the influence of bank size and ownership on the impact of credit risk are 
discussed in sub-sections 2.6.2 and 2.6.3, respectively. 
The income diversification (DIV), measured as non-interest income to total 
income, appears to be instrumental for the profitability of the Indian banking sector.25 The 
positive relationship between diversification and profitability is consistent with a priori 
expectations, and significant for all models at the 1% level, implies that banks with higher 
non-interest sources of income are more profitable. This result is consistent with Baele, De 
Jonghe and Vander Vennet (2007) and Chiorazzo, Milani and Salvini (2008). Similar to 
credit risk, the detailed explanations on the influence of bank size and ownership in the 
impact of diversification are also discussed in sub-sections 2.6.2 and 2.6.3, respectively. 
24 According to the total assets size of individual banks, we created a dummy for the large bank group and 
ran regression on the entire sample. We find that large banks are statistically significant at the 1% level and 
positively related with return on equity (not with return on assets).  It confirms that bank size has a significant 
impact on profitability.  
25 We run a Durbin–Wu–Hausman test to check for endogeneity of the independent variable income 
diversification; the result obtained suggests that there is no endogeneity between profitability and 
diversification. 
 65 
                                                        
Capitalisation (EQA) is one of the most important bank-specific factors with a 
significant impact on the profitability of Indian banks.  The capitalisation is negative and 
significant with return on equity. It reflects the expected theoretical relationship between 
risk and return, that is banks with a high-level of equity capital (i.e., low bankruptcy risk) 
lose potential profitable trading opportunities, and thereby earn lower profits (e.g., Berger, 
1995b; Goddard, Molyneux and Wilson, 2004). However, it is positive and statistically 
significant with return on assets, indicating the soundness of Indian banks. A bank with 
higher equity capital can reduce bankruptcy costs, and hence earn higher profits through 
charging higher interest on loans and/or paying less on deposits (Ben Naceur and Goaied, 
2008). The shareholders’ intense monitoring of bank managers’ activities can have a 
significant impetus on profitability as well. Recent studies that find a significant positive 
relationship between capitalisation and return on assets include Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Huizinga (1999), Chortareas, Garza-Garcia and Girardone (2011), Garza-Garcia (2012) 
and Berger and Bouwman (2013).  
The liquidity risk (LTA), measured as the ratio of total loans over total assets, does 
not have a significant impact on profitability. However, the negative coefficient suggests 
that greater composition of assets in the form of loans may have a negative impact on 
returns. It is also consistent with a priori expectations and in line with the findings of 
Garza-Garcia (2012). The negative impact on profitability may be due to the high operating 
costs associated with servicing and monitoring a large number of loans.  
The operational inefficiency measure (OPT) is negative and significant for models 
1-4. The negative relationship between OPT and profitability is consistent with a priori 
expectations and in line with the findings of Athanasoglou, Brissimis and Delis (2008). 
The negative coefficient suggests the existence of the X-efficiency hypothesis in which 
banks with efficient management are able to cut their operating expenses, and thereby 
increase profitability. The growth rate of total assets (GTA) does not have any significant 
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impact on profitability. However, the positive coefficient indicates that banks with higher 
growth rate in terms of total assets earn greater returns.  
Explaining macroeconomic variables, we find inflation (INF) is always negative 
and statistically significant with profitability. This relationship indicates that bank 
managers were unable to anticipate inflation accurately over the sample period and act 
accordingly to adjust interest rates, resulting in faster increase of costs rather than 
revenues. The real interest rate (INT) is negative and significantly related with return on 
equity. The probable explanation for the negative coefficient is that real interest rate in 
India has risen significantly over the study period, which may have provided stringent 
economic conditions for the banking sector. Since banks transfer the interest rate risk to 
consumers, a high real interest rate may have reduced the amount of credit and financial 
services and, therefore they were unable to reap higher returns. This result contrasts with 
Bourke (1989), who finds a positive relationship between interest rate and profitability. 
However, the negative relationship is an indication that banks can be more profitable if 
they pursue non-interest sources of income in conjunction with their interest income. The 
final macroeconomic factor is the real GDP growth rate. We find a robust link between 
GDP and bank profitability. It does not conform to a priori expectations that higher growth 
rate results in higher returns for banks. However, we find a negative relationship between 
them. The increasing competition in the banking sector may have contributed to this 
inverse relationship. It is reasonable to understand that during a boom period banks tend 
to compete with each other fiercely for the deposits and loans as well as for other non-
interest income, and thus respond in an anti-cyclical manner.  
Models 3 and 6 show the estimation results of the dummy variables used in this study. The 
coefficient of the dummy variable of public banks is positive and statistically significant 
with return on equity. The dummy variable for foreign-owned banks does not have a 
statistically significant relationship with profitability but it is negatively related. The 
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possible explanation is that private foreign banks are slightly in a disadvantaged position 
in India due to lacking cultural, political and language knowledge. Since public sector 
banks are not wholly owned by public we add the percentage of government ownership at 
public banks to examine the impact of the level of government ownership on profitability. 
In doing so, we find a significant negative relationship with returns on equity at the 1% 
level. This strong negative relationship suggests that public banks with a higher level of 
government ownership earn significantly lower profits. The coefficient of old banks (i.e., 
any banks established before liberalisation in 1992) is positive and significant with return 
on assets, indicating that old banks in India earn higher returns than any bank that entered 
into the banking sector after the liberalization process began.  
2.6.2 Credit risk and income diversification: The influence of bank size 
Table 2.6a reports the estimation results of the influence of bank size on the impact 
of credit risk or income diversification on profitability. In these regressions the main 
concern is the coefficients of the interaction terms and their marginal effect.  
Prior to describing the impact of credit risk or income diversification, it should be 
noted that, in the case of multiplicative terms in the models, based on simple t-statistics 
we cannot make accurate inference because model parameters do not provide adequate 
information (Brambor, Clark and Golder, 2006). Merely looking at the results without 
following correct procedures in the case of interaction terms would mislead the inference. 
Following Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006), we use marginal effect to show the influence 
of bank size on the impact of credit risk or income diversification26. A ‘Size Index’ is 
created based on the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 90th, 95th percentiles and mean values of bank 
26 One may assume that the multicollinearity problem may arise if all constitutive terms are used in an 
interaction model. Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006) however state that multicollinearity may provide large 
standard errors but they are the correct standard errors.   
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size.  
The coefficient of the interaction between credit risk and size is positive and 
insignificant. However, the positive sign implies that large banks are better able to manage 
their credit risk and earn higher profits. For a more precise analysis, we have calculated 
the marginal effect and standard errors of credit risk on profitability for different sizes of 
banks. From the marginal effects it can be envisaged that smaller banks (at 10th and 25th 
percentile in the Size Index) are vulnerable to higher credit risk and, hence earn less profit 
(Table 2.6b). The probable explanation is that the under-developed small banks tend to 
invest in risky projects or channel funds to lower quality borrowers. In addition, small 
banks have limited resources and limited ability to screen and monitor borrowers 
adequately in order to stem accumulating bad loans. It supports hypothesis 2 that the 
negative impact of credit risk on profitability in the form of NPLs varies with bank size.  
The result also corroborates with the use of marginal effect graphs. Figure 2.3 
shows the impact of credit risk or income diversification on profitability conditional on 
bank size. The graphs in the upper panel display the marginal effect of credit risk (i.e., 
thick solid line) at different levels of bank size on return on equity (left) or return on assets 
(right). It also confirms that the negative impact of credit risk diminishes as bank size 
increases. This in turn suggests that if the bank size is sufficiently high, then the marginal 
effect of credit risk may stop being negative and become positive. However, we have 
drawn two-tailed 95% confidence intervals around the marginal effect; the effect of credit 
risk is significant whenever the upper and lower bounds of the confidence intervals are 
both above (or below) the zero line. Therefore, it can be gleaned from Figure 2.3 that credit 
risk stops having a statistically significant effect on ROE and ROA once the bank size 
exceeds about Rs. 31.9 and 75.9 billion, respectively. 
On the other hand, the coefficient of interaction between income diversification 
and bank size is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. It suggests that large 
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banks are better able to diversify their income towards non-interest sources and earn higher 
profits than their smaller counterparts, supporting hypothesis 4 that the positive impact of 
income diversification on profitability in the form of non-interest income differs with bank 
size. The marginal effect and standard error are reported in table 6b. It suggests the impact 
of income diversification on bank profitability is conditional on bank size. As bank size 
increases, the positive impact of income diversification increases. These findings have 
reasonable economic interpretations. Since diversification acts as an inflator for the bank’s 
profitability, reasonable income stemming from non-interest sources would be ideal for 
Indian banks to maintain stability and fight against negative shocks. It is evident from this 
empirical estimation that larger banks with non-interest sources of income enjoy greater 
performance benefits than the smaller banks in the market. These favourable impacts 
increase as bank size increases. Though small banks have the highest diversified income 
from non-interest sources (recall table 2.3), overall it appears that larger banks achieve 
more favorable diversification benefits in the Indian banking industry. The probable reason 
could be the market power which allows them to enjoy cost synergies stemming from the 
economies of scale. It can be said that a bank with reasonable diversified income can water 
down any negative shocks better than a bank which has a trivial number of diversified 
portfolios. A well-diversified bank can increase returns substantially and hedge against 
risks.  
 
The result is also verified in Figure 2.4. The graphs on the lower panel display the 
marginal effect of diversification at different levels of bank size on ROE (left) or 
ROA(right). It also confirms that the positive impact of diversification on profitability 
increases with bank size (in the case of ROA, we observe a marginal increase). These 
results also correspond with most of the previous studies on India, in which medium and 
large banks are found to be more efficient in terms of costs and profits (e.g., Das and 
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Ghosh, 2009; Bhattacharyya and Pal, 2013).   
Figure 2.4 
Marginal effect of credit risk or income diversification on bank profitability (e.g. 
return on equity and return on assets) 
  
  
Note that it corresponds with our results in Tables 2.6a and 2.6b. The graphs on the upper panel display the 
marginal effect of credit risk at different levels of bank size on ROE (left) or ROA(right). It shows that the 
negative impact of credit risk diminishes as bank size increases. The thick line gives the marginal impact as 
estimated by 1 3/ *npl Sizeβ β∂Π ∂ = + , where ∏  is the banking profitability. The dotted lines represent the 95% 
confidence interval. The graphs on the lower panel display the marginal effect of income diversification at 
different levels of bank size on ROE (left) or ROA(right). It shows that the positive impact of diversification 
increases as bank size increases. The thick line gives the marginal impact as estimated by
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/ *div Sizeβ β∂Π ∂ = + .  
 
2.6.3 Credit risk and income diversification: The influence of ownership  
Table 2.7 presents the empirical estimations of the role of ownership on the impact 
of credit risk or diversification. It shows that the relationship between credit risk or 
diversification and profitability varies significantly across different bank ownership types. 
In this regression, we report the results of credit risk and diversification interacting with 
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the dummies for public, private and foreign banks.   
While credit risk is negative and significantly associated with banking profitability 
for foreign commercial banks, it is insignificantly related to public and private commercial 
banks, supporting hypothesis 2. This implies that high NPLs results in lower profits for 
foreign banks, but not for public and private banks. This result corresponds with the mean 
comparison tests represented in Panel B of Table 2.3, where it shows that private foreign 
banks in India comparatively had the highest amount of NPLs (2.78%) for the sample 
period. The possible explanation is that due to having relatively larger size, economies of 
scale and domestic knowledge, the public and private domestic banks are better at 
managing credit risk effectively.   
Regarding the influence of ownership on the impact of diversification, the banks 
of all three ownership types enjoy higher profitability as non-interest sources of income 
increase, with the effect being strongest for the public banks, supporting hypothesis 4. 
Though a substantial amount of income for private foreign banks stems from non-interest 
sources (i.e., 29.09%), after controlling for other variables, we find that public and private 
domestic banks benefited more from the income of non-traditional activities than the 
private foreign banks in India. The result implies that public and private domestic banks 
with a reasonable amount of non-interest sources of income alongside traditional banking 
activities can help overall profitability. This result also corresponds with most of the Indian 
studies that find public and private domestic banks are more efficient than private foreign 
banks with respect to costs and profit efficiency. Das and Ghosh (2009) state that medium-
sized public banks have on average a low level of NPLs because of their high-level of 
technical efficiency. They also point out that state-owned banks generate a substantial 
amount of fee-based income from government sponsored programs, and thus become more 
efficient than their counterparts.    
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2.6.4 Robustness Checks 
2.6.4.1 Attrition Effect 
During the sample period, some banks drop out due to mergers and acquisitions. 
We have kept those banks which have presence for the entire sample period and re-
estimated equation (2.1) in order to check whether attrition affects our results. After 
dropping banks, we have 70 banks in the sample. In this case, we have also used different 
specifications for the concentration index. Five-bank concentration ratio (CR5) is being 
used instead of HHI. The results are presented in the left four columns of table 2.8. The 
sign and significance of the coefficients of all bank-specific, market-specific and 
macroeconomic variables remain unchanged with the exception being the operating 
inefficiency and inflation.   
 
2.6.4.2 Alternative cutoff 
Since our dataset includes many small and large banks, to avoid the effect of ‘too-
big-to-fail’ and ‘too-small-to-survive’ banks we use an alternative cutoff. To check the 
robustness a more stringent outlier adjustment was made. We deleted data at the 10th and 
90th percentile of total assets and re-estimated equation (2.1). In this case also, we have 
CR5. The results of the robustness tests confirm that our base results are robust to the 
alternative measure of concentration and cutoff. The sign and significance of most of the 
variables remain unchanged with some interesting findings. The insignificant credit risk 
variable implies that medium-sized banks are not too exposed to NPLs nor have prudent 
credit risk management system in place, reiterating support for hypothesis 1. In general, 
small banks, especially foreign banks, are burdened with huge NPLs in India. The 
coefficient of income diversification is significant and greater than the earlier finding 
suggesting that medium-sized banks are more inclined to non-interest sources of income, 
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and thereby earn higher profits. In addition, the insignificant operating inefficiency 
variable indicates that medium-sized banks are more efficient, in tune with the finding of 
Das and Ghosh (2009).  
2.7 Conclusion and policy implications 
The multiple financial sector reforms in the 1990s have altered the organizational 
forms, the dynamics of competition and the way commercial banks operate in India. To 
live up to the competitive forces, banks have not only pursued improving operational 
efficiency by reducing bad assets and expenses but also diversified their income towards 
fee-based non-interest sources of income, which must have impacted the profitability.  
This paper has investigated the effects of bank-specific, market-specific and 
macroeconomic determinants of profitability of the Indian banking industry for the period 
2004-2011, assessing the outcome of reforms in a banking sector consisting of banks with 
heterogeneous sizes and mixed ownership groups. Thus, this paper has examined whether 
credit risk and income diversification interacts with bank size or ownership affecting bank 
profitability. 
We find that market concentration has a positive impact on the performance of 
Indian banks, indicating large banks dominate the entire banking industry and earn higher 
than normal profits through non-competitive price settings. Regarding bank-specific 
factors, bank size appears to be positive and significant, suggesting large banks enjoy 
economies of scale and earn higher profits. The results also suggest that income 
diversification has a robust link with profitability, venturing into non-traditional activities, 
such as fee-based income in conjunction with traditional lending practices yielding higher 
returns for Indian banks. It appears that in order to be competitive and profitable, Indian 
banks have not only to improve their costs efficiency through reducing operating expenses 
but also to improve credit risk management through reducing NPLs, especially for the 
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private foreign banks which are saddled with, on average, a high level of operating 
expenses and NPLs (see Das and Ghosh, 2009). Meanwhile we find a negative relationship 
between capitalisation and profitability which is in line with the theoretical relationship 
between risk and returns: higher capital is a sign of banks being overcautious and ignoring 
potentially profitable trading opportunities, and thereby reaping lower profits (e.g., 
Goddard, Molyneux and Wilson, 2004).  
 Similar to other countries, bank profitability is strongly subject to cyclical 
developments. Given the negative relationship between GDP growth rate and profitability, 
anti-cyclical behaviour appears to be the case for Indian banks. Moreover, the estimation 
results show a significant negative influence of inflation and real interest rates on bank 
profitability. Regarding ownership structure, though Bhaumik and Dimova (2004) did not 
find evidence of a performance gap between ownership groups, our result seems to suggest 
that state-owned banks have had a positive impact on profitability. However, with respect 
to our second profitability measure we did not find any statistically significant relationship 
with ownership.  
Our results on the issue of whether credit risk and income diversification interact 
with bank size affecting profitability, suggest that the negative impact of credit risk in the 
form of NPLs diminishes as bank size increases, and the significant negative impact 
disappears once bank size crosses a threshold point (i.e., Rs. 32/76 billion). Similarly, the 
interaction between income diversification and bank size suggests that large banks are 
better able to diversify their income towards non-interest sources and earn higher profits 
than their smaller counterparts. It appears that bank size does matter in the impact of credit 
risk and income diversification on profitability.    
On the other hand, ownership also seems to have substantial influence on the 
impact of credit risk and income diversification. Our results show that credit risk is 
negative and significantly associated with bank profitability for foreign banks, but not for 
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state-owned and private domestic banks. Similarly, we find that banks of all three 
ownership types enjoy higher profitability as non-interest sources of income increase but 
the effect is stronger for the public banks. Overall, it suggests that ownership does matter 
in the impact of credit risk and income diversification on the profitability of Indian banks.  
The results of this study have some policy implications for the Indian government, 
the central bank of Indian–RBI, regulatory authority and bank managers due to improved 
bank performance: (I) given the robust impact of market concentration while controlling 
for other variables, the regulators should take precautionary measures in order to allow 
further M&As in the market; (II) to increase competitive conditions, more banking licenses 
should be given to private domestic and foreign banks while also reducing government 
ownership in the banking sector by considerable dilution of capital in order for yielding a 
level-playing field for all; (III) bank managers should emphasise further improvement of 
asset quality and cost efficiency and undertake prudential measures to utilise equity capital 
that is well in excess of a regulatory minimum without impairing bank stability; (IV) bank 
managers can reap the diversification benefit if they pursue cautiously by considering their 
sizes, strengths, capabilities and risk level, and embarking on the areas they are good at; 
and (V) the robust link between macroeconomic indicators and banking profitability found 
in this study implies that regulators should pay considerable attention to create a congenial 
environment for a profitable and stable banking sector.  
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Table 2.1  
Definitions, notations and expected effect of explanatory variables on profitability 
Variable Measure Notation 
Expected 
Effect  Source 
Dependent variables 
Return-on-equity Net Income / Equity ROE n/a RBI 
Return-on-assets Net Income / Total Assets ROA n/a RBI 
Market Structure Specific  
Market Share Market Power of Individual Bank MS - RBI 
Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index 
Squaring the market share of each bank and then summing 
the squares.  HHI + RBI 
5-bank concentration 
 
Market share of 5-largest banks CR5 + RBI 
Bank-Specific  
Bank Size Logarithm of Total Assets Size + RBI 
Credit Risk Net non-performing Loans over Net Loans NPL - RBI 
Diversification Non-interest Income/Total Income  DIV + RBI 
Capitalisation Equity / Total Assets EQA + RBI 
Liquidity Risk Loans over Total Assets LTA ? RBI 
Operating Inefficiency Operating Expenses/Total Assets OPT - RBI 
Growth of Assets Annual Growth Rate of Assets GTA + RBI 
Industry/Market-specific 
Public bank Dummy Equal to 1 for public-owned banks otherwise 0 Public ? RBI 
Private Bank Dummy Equal to 1 for public-owned banks otherwise 0 Private ? RBI 
Foreign Bank Dummy Equal to 1 for foreign-owned banks otherwise 0 Foreign ? RBI 
Old Bank  Equal to 1 if bank established before liberalisation (1991) 
  
Old 
 
+ BankSco
  % of Government  The % of Government ownership in public banks %Govt. - BankSco
 Macroeconomic 
Real GDP Annual Real GDP Growth Rate GDP ? World 
 Inflation Consumer Price Index CPI ? World 
 Real Interest  Annual Real Interest Rate INT ? World 
 Note: The expected relationship between profitability and explanatory variable is indicated by Positive and Negative signs. ‘?’ indicates 
that the relationship is ambiguous (Positive or, Negative) with profitability. The Reserve Bank of India is denoted by RBI.   
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Table 2.2  
Descriptive Statistics of Indian Banking Industry (2004-2011) 
  N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variables      
Return on equity (ROE) 568 13.5 9 -46.9 38.32 
Return on assets (ROA) 568 1.26 1.04 -2.1 6.71 
Market-specific Variables      
Concentration (HHI) 568 582 12 562 602 
Concentration (CR5) 568 40.71 1.39 38.61 42.57 
Market Share (MS) 568 1.41 2.5 0 18.64 
Bank-specific Variables      
Bank Size (Log. total assets) 568 11.77 2.24 5.71 16.32 
Credit Risk (NPL) 568 2 6.07 0 76 
Diversification (DIV) 568 19.13 14.25 -12.66 83.22 
Capitalisation (EQA) 568 13.53 15.27 1.01 98.05 
Liquidity (LTA) 568 48.52 15.97 0 75.77 
Operational inefficiency (OPT) 568 2.31 1.23 0.32 10.6 
Growth Rate (Total assets) 568 26.04 64.28 -76.89 917.47 
Macroeconomic Variables      
Inflation 568 7.62 2.77 3.77 11.99 
Real Interest Rate (INT) 568 4.19 2.31 -0.48 6.87 
GDP Growth Rate 568 8.18 2.03 3.89 10.55 
Note: HHI and CR5 denote the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and 5-largest bank concentration ratio, 
respectively. HHI is multiplied by 10,000. All variables are expressed in percentages except Bank Size and 
HHI. 
 
Table 2.3  
Profitability, Bank Size, Credit Risk and Diversification by Bank-size Groups and 
Ownership Types 
Panel A: Bank-size Group ROE (%) ROA (%) Size (Log) NPL (%) DIV (%) 
Small Banks (Small) 6.49 1.58 8.53 3.74 25.49 
Medium-sized Banks (Medium) 15.18 1.18 12.19 1.56 17.99 
Large Banks (Large) 17.15 1.1 14.17 1.13 15.06 
Mean-comparison Tests 
Small vs. Medium 8.69*** -0.39*** 3.65*** -2.18*** -7.51*** 
 [9.68] [-3.33] [35.25] [-3.07] [-4.73] 
Small vs. Large 10.7*** -0.47*** 5.63*** -2.62*** -10.4*** 
 [13.54] [-3.24] [46.49] [-3.11] [-5.13] 
Large vs. Medium -1.97** 0.08 -1.98*** 0.44 2.93*** 
 [-2.37] [1.07] [-25.55] [1.11] [3.43] 
Panel B: Ownership Type ROE (%) ROA (%) Size (Log) NPL (%) DIV (%) 
Public banks (S) 18.32 0.99 13.56 1.66 13.53 
Private domestic banks (P) 12.89 1.01 11.73 1.57 15.1 
Private foreign banks (F) 8.71 1.79 9.82 2.78 29.09 
Total (All Banks) 13.5 1.26 11.77 2 19.13 
Mean-comparison Tests 
S vs. P -5.42*** -0.02 -1.83*** -0.09 1.57*** 
 [-6.32] [-0.33] [-15.12] [-0.21] [2.92] 
S vs. F -9.61*** 0.80*** -3.74*** 1.12 15.6*** 
 [-13.35] [7.50] [-22.37] [1.56] [10.78] 
P vs. F -4.18*** 0.78*** -1.91*** 1.21* 14.0*** 
  [-4.56] [6.20] [-9.45] [1.78] [8.68] 
Note: t statistics in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate significant level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table 2.4  
Correlations between Independent Variables 
             
 HHI MS SIZE NPL DIV EQA LTA OPT GTA INF INT GDP 
HHI 1.00            
MS 0.00 1.00           
Size -0.14** 0.58*** 1.00          
NPL 0.18*** -0.04 -0.19*** 1.00         
DIV 0.08 -0.13** -0.39*** 0.03 1.00        
EQA -0.04 -0.26*** -0.68*** 0.09* 0.39*** 1.00       
LTA -0.20*** 0.24*** 0.62*** -0.23*** -0.37*** -0.53*** 1.00      
OPT 0.05 -0.13** -0.33*** 0.08 0.63*** 0.16*** -0.24*** 1.00     
GTA 0.03 0.01 0.07 -0.07 0.03 -0.02 0.06 0.03 1.00    
INF -0.54*** -0.01 0.15*** -0.20*** -0.06 0.03 0.18*** -0.09* -0.06 1.00   
INT 0.53*** 0.00 -0.10* 0.07 0.02 -0.04 -0.09* 0.07 0.06 -0.61*** 1.00  
GDP 0.53*** -0.00 -0.05 0.05 0.01 0.01 -0.06 0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Notes: HHI and MS are calculated based on total loans. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 2.5  
Market Structure and Determinants of Indian Banking Profitability 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
  ROE ROE ROE ROA ROA ROA 
Concentration (HHI)  5.81** 29.3*** 29.1*** 0.023 1.42** 1.40** 
 [2.55] [4.55] [4.51] [0.34] [0.55] [0.55] 
Market Share -0.24 -0.17 -0.25 -0.019 -0.016 -0.011 
 [0.20] [0.21] [0.19] [0.017] [0.018] [0.019] 
Bank size 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.014*** 0.00075 0.00069 0.00065 
 [0.0048] [0.0044] [0.0046] [0.00046] [0.00047] [0.00057] 
Credit Risk -0.12** -0.14* -0.13* -0.024** -0.024** -0.024** 
 [0.059] [0.071] [0.066] [0.010] [0.011] [0.011] 
Diversification 0.22*** 0.21*** 0.22*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 
 [0.052] [0.052] [0.054] [0.0056] [0.0060] [0.0064] 
Capitalisation -0.083** -0.079** -0.068** 0.015** 0.015** 0.016** 
 [0.042] [0.039] [0.031] [0.0062] [0.0063] [0.0067] 
Liquidity Risk -0.022 -0.0072 -0.029 -0.005 -0.0047 -0.0055 
 [0.035] [0.034] [0.032] [0.0038] [0.0037] [0.0041] 
Operating inefficiency -1.19** -1.07* -0.98* -0.13* -0.13 -0.13 
 [0.54] [0.57] [0.53] [0.078] [0.083] [0.082] 
Growth rate (Assets) 0.0035 0.0015 0.003 0.0004 0.00025 0.00035 
 [0.0043] [0.0043] [0.0047] [0.00033] [0.00035] [0.00033] 
Time Trend -0.0033 0.0052** 0.0067*** 0.0003 0.00088** 0.00089** 
 [0.0021] [0.0026] [0.0026] [0.00024] [0.00037] [0.00039] 
Inflation  -0.32* -0.30*  -0.0048 -0.0041 
  [0.18] [0.18]  [0.027] [0.027] 
Interest Rate  -0.42*** -0.39***  0.012 0.013 
  [0.14] [0.14]  [0.014] [0.013] 
GDP  -1.23*** -1.24***  -0.086*** -0.086*** 
  [0.18] [0.18]  [0.023] [0.023] 
Public Dummy   0.17***   0.0033 
   [0.046]   [0.0034] 
Foreign Dummy    -0.017   0.0011 
   [0.019]   [0.0022] 
% Govt.    -
 
  -0.000073 
   [0.00065]   [0.000049] 
Old Bank   0.032   0.0034* 
   [0.020]   [0.0018] 
Constant -0.44*** -1.69*** -1.62*** -0.0034 -0.079*** -0.080*** 
 [0.16] [0.26] [0.27] [0.021] [0.031] [0.031] 
Observations 568 568 568 568 568 568 
No. of Banks 73 73 73 73 73 73 
R2 0.14 0.23 0.23 0.3 0.33 0.33 
P[HT] 0.12 0.71 - 0.18 0.71 - 
Decision RE RE RE RE RE RE 
F/Wald Test 149.3*** 231.4*** 372.4*** 116.6*** 141.9*** 175.3*** 
Note: (1) All estimations were carried out using Stata 11.1. (2) We estimate all regressions using bank 
fixed/random effects and clustering the errors at the bank level. (3) Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
corrected robust standard errors are reported in bracket. (4)***, ** and * indicate significant level of 1%, 
5% and 10% respectively. (5) P [HT] denotes the p-value of the Hausman test. (6) The F-test and Wald-test 
represent the fixed effects and random effects methods respectively. 
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Table 2.6a 
The Influence of Bank Size in the Impact of Credit Risk and Diversification 
 (1)  (2)  
 ROE  ROA  
Credit Risk -0.19 (0.24) -0.048 (0.034) 
Bank Size 0.012 (0.017) 0.00058 (0.00064) 
Credit Risk*Size 0.0061 (0.029) 0.0025 (0.0035) 
Diversification -0.42** (0.17) 0.044** (0.022) 
Diversification*Size 0.073*** (0.019) 0.00018 (0.0021) 
Capitalisation -0.026 (0.051) 0.015** (0.0066) 
Liquidity Risk 0.0046 (0.049) -0.0046 (0.0039) 
Op. Inefficiency -1.23* (0.71) -0.12 (0.085) 
Growth Rate (Assets) 0.00078 (0.0046) 0.00026 (0.00035) 
Concentration (HHI) 27.7*** (4.40) 1.48*** (0.53) 
Market Share  0.35 (0.75) -0.015 (0.017) 
Inflation -0.37** (0.18) -0.0053 (0.027) 
Real Interest Rate -0.28** (0.12) 0.012 (0.014) 
GDP Growth Rate -1.13*** (0.18) -0.088*** (0.024) 
Time Trend 0.0072* (0.0041) 0.00092** (0.00038) 
Constant -1.56*** (0.30) -0.081*** (0.031) 
Observations 568  568  
No. of Banks 73  73  
R2 0.27  0.33  
P[HT] 0.00  0.53  
Decision FE  RE  
F/chi2 11.1***  161.1***  
See note of table 2.5. Robust standard error is in parenthesis.  
 
Table 2.6b 
Marginal effects of Credit Risk and Diversification on Profitability at different 
levels of Size Index 
 Credit Risk (NPL) 
1 3/ *npl Sizeβ β∂Π ∂ = +  
Diversification (DIV) 
54
/ *div Sizeβ β∂Π ∂ = +  
Evaluated at various values of Size 
Values of 
Size Index 
Percentile of 
Size 
ROE ROA ROE ROA 
8.423 10th -0.143*** 
(0.055) 
-0.026*** 
(0.009) 
0.200*** 
(0.037) 
0.045*** 
(0.006) 
10.455 25th -0.130 
(0.087) 
-0.021** 
(0.010) 
0.349*** 
(0.049) 
0.046*** 
(0.005) 
12.381 50th -0.118 
(0.135) 
-0.017 
(0.014) 
0.491*** 
(0.078) 
0.046*** 
(0.007) 
13.437 75th -0.112 
(0.164) 
-0.014 
(0.017) 
0.568*** 
(0.096) 
0.047*** 
(0.009) 
14.165 90th -0.107 
(0.183) 
-0.012 
(0.019) 
0.621*** 
(0.109) 
0.047*** 
(0.010) 
14.634 95th -0.104 
(0.196) 
-0.011 
(0.021) 
0.656*** 
(0.117) 
0.047*** 
(0.011) 
11.769 Mean -0.122 
(0.119) 
-0.018 
(0.013) 
0.446*** 
(0.068) 
0.046*** 
(0.006) 
Note: Π  denotes the measures of profitability (i.e., return on equity and return on assets).  
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Table 2.7  
The Influence of Ownership on the Impact of Credit Risk and Diversification 
  (1)  (2)  
  ROE  ROA  
Public Bank (Dummy)  0.019 (0.037) -0.0022 (0.0022) 
Foreign Bank (Dummy)  0.014 (0.033) -0.0028 (0.0030) 
Public*Credit Risk  -0.058 (0.12) -0.0012 (0.0053) 
Private*Credit Risk  -0.84 (0.51) -0.035 (0.054) 
Foreign*Credit Risk  -0.14*** (0.052) -0.034*** (0.010) 
Public*Diversification  0.56*** (0.16) 0.036*** (0.011) 
Private*Diversification  0.50** (0.20) 0.029*** (0.011) 
Foreign*Diversification  0.18*** (0.052) 0.047*** (0.0071) 
Bank Size  0.012** (0.0049) 0.00072 (0.00056) 
Capitalisation  -0.085** (0.034) 0.015** (0.0063) 
Liquidity Risk  -0.0013 (0.031) -0.0048 (0.0039) 
Operational Inefficiency  -1.13** (0.56) -0.14 (0.083) 
Growth Rate (Assets)  -0.00045 (0.0046) 0.00033 (0.00033) 
Concentration (HHI)  28.3*** (4.64) 1.71*** (0.52) 
Market Share   -0.32* (0.17) -0.012 (0.017) 
Inflation  -0.34* (0.18) -0.0067 (0.027) 
Real Interest Rate  -0.29** (0.14) 0.0015 (0.014) 
GDP Growth Rate  -1.15*** (0.18) -0.097*** (0.024) 
Time Trend  0.0089*** (0.0025) 0.00084** (0.00038) 
Constant  -1.59*** (0.27) -0.092*** (0.029) 
Observations  568  568  
No. of Banks  73  73  
R2  0.26  0.34  
Wald Test  387.4***  204.0***  
See note of table 2.5. Robust standard error is in parenthesis.  
 
Table 2.8  
Robustness: Market Structure and Determinants of Indian Banking Profitability 
  Attrition Effect 10% Outlier Correction 
  1   2   3   4   
  ROE   ROA   ROE   ROA   
Concentration ratio (CR5) 1.57** [0.61] 0.16** [0.071] 2.24*** [0.64] 0.20*** [0.072] 
Market Share  0.21 [0.71] -0.018 [0.018] -0.033 [1.58] 0.016 [0.056] 
Bank Size 0.028** [0.013] 0.00072 [0.00046] 0.041** [0.018] 0.00066 [0.00066] 
Credit Risk -0.12* [0.067] -0.023** [0.011] -0.17 [0.19] -0.021 [0.016] 
Diversification 0.24*** [0.062] 0.048*** [0.0059] 0.40*** [0.075] 0.050*** [0.0069] 
Capitalisation -0.018 [0.045] 0.014** [0.0063] -0.043 [0.067] 0.013* [0.0078] 
Liquidity Risk -0.067 [0.050] -0.0054 [0.0037] -0.065 [0.064] -0.006 [0.0049] 
Operating inefficiency -1.04 [0.68] -0.14 [0.084] -1.55 [1.02] -0.22** [0.096] 
Growth rate (Assets) 0.0045 [0.0050] 0.00037 [0.00032] 0.0028 [0.0056] 0.00028 [0.00036] 
Inflation 0.21 [0.18] 0.012 [0.027] 0.11 [0.24] 0.021 [0.027] 
Interest Rate -0.44*** [0.13] -0.006 [0.015] -0.43*** [0.14] 0.0019 [0.016] 
GDP  -0.61*** [0.13] -0.057*** [0.020] -0.66*** [0.15] -0.053*** [0.019] 
Time Trend -0.0035 [0.0039] 0.00093** [0.00046] 0.000039 [0.0051] 0.0012*** [0.00038] 
Constant -0.76** [0.29] -0.067** [0.030] -1.20*** [0.31] -0.083** [0.033] 
Observations 549   549   456   456   
No. of Banks 70  70   66  66  
R2 0.18  0.34   0.25  0.33  
P[HT] 0.05  0.62   0.03  0.39  
Decision FE  RE   FE  RE  
F/Wald test 8.45***   129.1***   14.1***   154.2***   
See note of table 2.5. Robust standard error is in parentheses 
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Chapter III 
 
Corporate Debt Restructuring, 
Bank Competition and Stability: 
Evidence from India 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper estimates the causal effect of a unique programme of corporate debt 
restructuring (CDR) on the stability of Indian banks for the period 1992-2012. The banks 
who participated in the programme were extended regulatory forbearance on asset 
classification and provisioning on the restructured corporate loans. We find that the 
banking stability of the participated banks increases substantially after the implementation 
of the programme. Following the recent development in measuring market power, we 
estimate efficiency-adjusted Lerner indices along with conventional ones using stochastic 
frontier analysis approach, and check for the interactive effect of CDR on bank stability. 
The result shows that the positive effect of CDR on stability declines at the higher degree 
of market power of the participated banks. To provide unbiased treatment effects of CDR 
eliminating any sample selection problem, we confirm our result using a number of 
alternative matching estimators including recently developed bias-corrected covariate 
matching estimator. Investigating the ambiguous trade-off between market power and 
stability, we find that greater pricing power reduces the risk-taking behaviour of banks. It 
also reveals that although the second phase of deregulation improved overall banking 
stability significantly, there is a threshold level of market power below which banks 
experience a higher risk of fragility. Our results remain insensitive to an array of robustness 
tests. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Maintaining a reasonable level of banking competition and stability is the ultimate 
objective of regulators in the world, including central banks such as the Reserve Bank of 
India (henceforth RBI). RBI initiated two phases of banking reforms in the 1990s to reduce 
the market power and risk-taking attitudes of banks. However, in the beginning of the 
2000s, Indian corporates faced increasing challenges in meeting their debt servicing 
obligations to the banks/financial institutions. Since high corporate debt overhang27 poses 
a risk to banks’ balance sheets and financial stability due to increasing nonperforming loans 
(NPLs) and corporate bankruptcies (Goretti and Souto, 2013), RBI introduced an out-of-
court restructuring programme in the form of ‘Corporate Debt Restructuring’ (henceforth 
CDR; see sub-section 3.2.2). The intention was to provide a speedy, cost effective, and 
market friendly alternative to in-court restructuring procedures (Claessens, 2005; Liu and 
Rosenberg, 2013) in order to bring the credit market out of a downward spiral and to assist 
in reviving viable corporates. 
The net effect of CDR emanated in two ways: on the one hand, corporates were 
able to maintain their investments and value and forestall bankruptcy and on the other 
hand, the bank who participated in the restructuring of corporate debts (henceforth member 
banks) under CDR were able to minimise their exposures to those sick corporates and 
maintain banking stability through various channels. In this paper, we therefore are 
interested in the latter aspect of CDR and investigate empirically whether member banks 
have benefited from restructuring corporate debts and enhanced their stability by using the 
largest panel data taken from the RBI for the period 1992-2012. 
 
27 Myers (1977) demonstrated that ‘debt overhang’ is a state when corporates are discouraged from extending 
investments on new productive projects fearing of defaulting on existing outstanding risky debts, and thus 
impair economic growth.  
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 Figure 3.1 
Restructured corporate loans as percentage of total loans after the genesis of CDR. 
 
 
As per CDR norms, member banks could retain the asset classification of 
restructured loans, and even could upgrade nonperforming restructured assets to a standard 
(performing) category after a specified period and charge less to their net income for loan 
loss provisions (Working-Group, 2012 henceforth WG). This special regulatory 
forbearance on asset classification and provisioning gave more opportunities to member 
banks to understate nonperforming loans and overstate net income. Banks benefited more 
after the global financial crisis as they restructured more loans during the post crisis period. 
Figure 3.1 shows that the total restructured corporate loans as a percentage of total loans 
have reached to 12.5% from just 2% in 2006. It is documented both theoretically and 
empirically that by using ex-ante loan loss provisions, banks can reduce the volatility of 
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their current profitability i.e., smoothing income (e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995; Lobo 
and Yang, 2001; Goel and Thakor, 2003; Shrieves and Dahl, 2003). Through income 
smoothing banks can also reduce the possibility of depleting their capital (Laeven and 
Majnoni, 2003). Therefore, we expect a positive correlation between member banks and 
their stability.  
We contribute to the existing literature in several ways. First, we attempt to add 
to the literature on corporate debt restructuring from the creditors’ perspective by 
investigating the impact of the unique institutional mechanism of India on the bank 
stability of the treatment group while using a ‘natural experiment’ type difference-in-
differences (DID) approach (see Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003) and nonparametric 
matching estimators (see Abadie and Imbens, 2006; Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). This 
modeling strategy is appropriate to establish causal claims and to investigate the effects of 
a programme implementation among treated and control groups. This approach allows us 
to capture the mean difference in the outcome variable between treated and control groups 
after implementation of the programme removing biases due to economic trends of the two 
groups. In our case, it captures the mean difference of bank-level stability between member 
banks and non-member banks after the genesis of the CDR programme in India. 
Comparing the performance of the treated group allows us to capture the effect of the 
programme removing any bias due to other omitted time invariant factors (Imbens and 
Wooldridge, 2009; Fang, Hasan and Marton, 2014). As a robustness test, to eliminate any 
sample selection bias, we also employ alternative estimators including the bias-corrected 
covariate matching methods recently developed by Abadie and Imbens (2006). Since the 
matching methods are nonparametric in nature, they can alleviate sample selection bias by 
formally controlling for the non-random selection problem and avoid the specification of 
the functional form (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). Second, from the economic policy 
standpoint, it is important to investigate the impact of the regulatory forbearance under the 
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guise of the CDR system on the member banks’ stability so that appropriate action can be 
taken to reduce excessive risk-taking not only by the Indian policymakers but also in other 
emerging market economies in case of such widespread corporate sickness.  
In the last two decades, the Indian banking sector has undergone numerous 
structural changes. However, studies on the impact of such changes on bank risk-taking 
attitude is limited given that India is one of the fastest growing emerging market economies 
in the world.28 Therefore, we complement the existing literature on market power-stability 
nexus by drawing evidence from India.  The existing literature is divided and yet to reach 
a consensus on the question of whether greater market power is good or bad for banking 
stability. This question has been at the epicenter for the last two decades and recently, after 
the global financial crisis in 2008, it has attracted renewed attention from the academics 
and regulators (Keeley, 1990; Allen and Gale, 2004; Schaeck, Cihak and Wolfe, 2009; 
Martinez-Miera and Repullo, 2010; Beck, De Jonghe and Schepens, 2013; Anginer, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Zhu, 2014). Furthermore, the findings of the existing studies are 
partially contradictory because of cross country variation and the methodology adopted in 
measuring market power.29 Therefore, considering the recent development in measuring 
bank competition, we estimate two variant measures of market power proxied by 
conventional Lerner indices (Berger, Klapper and Turk-Ariss, 2009) and efficiency-
adjusted Lerner indices from a stochastic frontier analysis approach (Koetter, Kolari and 
Spierdijk, 2012). In addition, to eradicate any endogeneity problems between market 
power and bank stability, we also employ an instrumental variable technique with a 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimator using the kernel-based 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) variance estimation of Newey and 
West (1987). All these approaches will allow us to dispel any concern about the incorrect 
28 See for example Tzeremes (2015). 
29 See for example Beck, De Jonghe and Schepens (2013) and Anginer, Demirgüç-Kunt and Zhu (2014). 
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measures of market power/endogeneity problem, and thus provide robust analysis aiming 
at facilitating reliable policy decision making. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 3.2 provides a brief overview 
of the regulatory framework and CDR mechanism in India. In section 3.3, we develop 
theoretical hypotheses. Section 3.4 outlines the empirical models and Section 3.5 describes 
the data and descriptive statistics. Section 3.6 explains the estimation results, discussing 
the effects of competition on the stability of banks, and presents the results of the causal 
effect of CDR on stability with all sensitivity analyses. The concluding remarks are 
provided in Section 3.7. 
3.2 Deregulation and corporate debt restructuring in India 
3.2.1 Deregulation  
The Indian banking sector comprises public sector banks, private sector banks 
and foreign banks. In the 1950s, the limited regulatory control over interest rates and trivial 
pre-emption of funds in the financial system resulted in inequitable distribution and 
misallocation of credit (Das and Kumbhakar, 2012). To ensure proper allocation of credit 
in the priority sectors, the Indian government tightened its control over credit allocation 
and introduced administered interest rates both on deposits and loans, high reserve 
requirements and rigorous statutory liquidity restrictions, which culminated with the 
nationalisation of 20 major commercial banks between 1969 and 1980 (Das, Nag and Ray, 
2005; Bhattacharyya and Pal, 2013). The net effect of this overregulation resulted in an 
inefficient allocation of resources, high operating costs, declining profitability and 
deteriorated asset quality. 
In 1992, the RBI started the liberalisation process stressing deregulation and 
opening up of the banking sector to market forces aimed at providing operational flexibility 
and functional autonomy. Since then it has been consistently working to establish a sound 
 88 
regulatory framework in order to facilitate effective supervision and institutional 
infrastructure. The diversification of ownership through considerable dilution of capital by 
the government reduced overpowering of state-owned banks, and yielded a level-playing 
field for all. This first phase of reforms improved the competitiveness and efficiency in the 
resource allocation process of the banking sector and strengthened the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy including reduction in statutory liquidity ratio (SLR), cash 
reserve ratio (CRR), permission for de novo entry of banks in the private sector, and 
deregulation of interest rates.  
The second phase of reform started in 1998 with the aim of enhancing banking 
stability through improved banking regulation, increasing competitiveness, adoption of 
capital adequacy norms, prudential norms for asset classification and provisions for 
delinquent loans in line with global practices. To adhere to the stipulated capital adequacy 
norms, a substantial amount of capital was injected by the government of India to the 
public sector banks. To this end, there has been a wave of mergers and acquisitions 
conducted both according to the market principles and with the assistance of government 
(Fujii, Managi and Matousek, 2014). In the recent past, the strengthening of Debt Recovery 
Tribunals (DRTs), the inauguration and successful implementation of new institutional 
mechanisms viz. SARFAESI (Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and 
Enforcement of Securities Interest) Act 2002 and CDR system facilitated the expedition of 
recovery of loan arrears. In the case of the DRT Act, special tribunals were set up by the 
government of India to facilitate the speedy recovery of defaulted loans without needing 
Civil Procedure Code. In the case of the SARFAESI Act, the rights of the secured creditors 
were strengthened and thereby banks were allowed to seize and liquidate the assets of the 
defaulted firm without much delay. Visaria (2009) and Vig (2013) provide detailed 
discussion on DRT and SARFAESI Acts, respectively. In the following sub-section we 
discuss the CDR in detail. 
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3.2.2 Corporate debt restructuring 
In the late 1990s, Indian corporates faced unprecedented financial distress to be 
able to meet the repayment obligations. To reduce the ‘debt overhang’ problem of 
corporates as well as bring the credit market out of the downward spiral, RBI sponsored a 
restructuring mechanism in the form of CDR in 2002. However, prior to CDR, in case of 
in-court restructuring of corporate debts, the Board for Industrial and Financial 
Reconstruction (BIFR), an agency of the government of India, similar to the US Chapter 
11 Bankruptcy Code, was set up under the Sick Industrial Companies Act 1985 to 
determine the sickness of industrial companies and to help in reviving the viable 
economically efficient entity and shutting down the economically inefficient ones. In 
recent years, the misuse and the Indian law’s indefinite nature of respite made it a haven 
for promoters of sick companies.  
CDR is an efficient out-of-court institutional mechanism for banks/financial 
institutions to restructure corporate debts (e.g., secured by tangible assets). To participate 
in the restructuring, a bank needs to be a member of the system and sign the debtor-creditor 
agreement (DCA) and inter-creditor agreement (ICA), which extend legal support for the 
CDR.30 The CDR aims at speedy restructuring of the dues of banks/financial institutions 
in a transparent manner to minimise their losses where they have an exposure of Rs. 100 
million and above in the multiple banking/syndicates/consortium accounts.31 It is a three-
tiered mechanism with a standing forum, empowered group and the CDR cell. While the 
standing forum sets comprehensive policies and guidelines, the CDR cell in conjunction 
with the lenders does the preliminary analysis of proposals and provides a detailed 
restructuring plan, and finally, the empowered group deliberates and approves the 
30 In the former case, both debtor and creditor(s) agree to stay away from recourse to any legal action during 
restructuring period of 90/180 days, and in the latter case, all member banks/institutions of the CDR system 
sign an agreement whereby they are legally binding with necessary enforcement and penal clauses. 
31 For more information about corporate debt restructuring please see various circulars of RBI compiled at: 
http://www.cdrindia.org/rbi.htm 
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restructuring proposals. Corporate loans will go ahead for restructuring if they have the 
support of 75% of the creditors by value, and 60% by number (RBI, 2005b). In 2003, in 
order to make the CDR mechanism more efficient and barring the willful defaulters, the 
CDR scope was extended to include ‘standard’ loan assets, ‘doubtful’ loan assets and the 
cases of BIFR of just ‘sub-standard’ loan assets previously.32 
Special regulatory forbearance on asset classification and provisioning was 
extended to the restructured assets. Any standard assets can retain assets classification 
upon restructuring without slipping into the lower asset categories as per the CDR scheme. 
Banks were also allowed to make concessional provisions of 2% on any restructured 
standard assets.33 In addition, if any restructured account had nonperforming assets (i.e., 
sub-standard and doubtful), it can be upgraded into the standard (performing) assets 
category after a specified period (i.e., one year), if it can be shown that the obligations are 
met by the borrowers as per the CDR norm.34 According to the guidelines of RBI, if 
restructured nonperforming assets remain in the same category, provisioning has to be 
made and income can be recognised only on a cash basis (realisation) (Vaidyanathan, 
2013). However, a recent report by Working Group reveals that according to the global 
practice any assets restructured should fall in the lower asset category and loan loss 
provisions should be made accordingly (WG, 2012).  
 
 
 
32 Based on assets classification, accounts classified as ‘standard’ and ‘sub-standard’ were in the Category 1 
CDR and accounts classified as ‘doubtful’ were in the Category 2 CDR. 
33 According to provisioning norms, in respect of sub-standard assets of secured category, banks are required 
to keep 10 per cent provision, and for the unsecured exposures, an additional 10 per cent, totaling 20 per cent 
(for details, Vaidyanathan, 2013).  
34 It is noted that specified period is defined as a period of one year from the date when the first payment of 
interest or instalment of principal falls due under the terms of the restructuring package (WG, 2012). 
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Figure 3.2 
The evolution of CDR in India from 2004 to 2013 
 
We can see from Figure 3.2 that after the global financial crisis in 2008 the 
corporate loan restructured increased by 744% from Rs. 913.4 million in 2008 to Rs. 
7718.5 million at the end of 2012. Against this backdrop of substantial increase of 
restructured loans, on November 2012, RBI raised provision on restructured standard loans 
to 2.75% from just 2% previously. Provisioning on any new restructured standard loan is 
5% from June 1, 2013. It has also decided to do away with the regulatory forbearance on 
asset classification and provisioning from April 1, 2015 (RBI, 2013).  
A plethora of anecdotal evidence suggests that the CDR system has a significant 
effect on the bottom lines of the member banks. A report of Standard Chartered Securities 
published in many local newspapers stated that the increased provisioning requirement is 
likely to erode 18% of profitability from the public sector banks.35 Many critics expressed 
concerns that the CDR system is a conduit for bankers to hide NPLs and hike income, 
which will have a deleterious effect on the impairment of assets in the future. It was also 
35 http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-07-24/news/32828003_1_state-run-banks-cent-
private-sector-banks 
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echoed by the deputy governor of RBI, K.C. Chakrabarty that “If the reason for the recent 
increase in restructured accounts is indeed the economic downturn, it should have been 
reflected across all bank groups and not just public sector banks." It was reported that there 
was forced debt restructuring of loss making public sector entities while retaining those 
potential NPLs as standard restructured assets.  
 
3.3 Review of Related Literature 
The main research questions in this article are whether market power influences 
the risk of banks and whether CDR reduces risk of member banks under the CDR 
mechanism. We develop hypotheses based on the literature regarding market power-
stability nexus and ex-post credit risk and CDR.  
3.3.1 Market power-stability nexus 
From a theoretical and empirical point of view, there is an ambiguous relationship 
between the market power and stability of a bank. The stability in the banking sector 
heavily relies on the degree of competition that the banking sector possesses. The first 
theoretical model in Marcus (1984) shows that if there is competition in the deposit market, 
banks undertake risk taking strategies because of the contraction in the banks’ franchise 
value, which is well-known as the ‘franchise value’ hypothesis in banking. The first 
empirical study of Keeley (1990) on the U.S. banking industry in the aftermath of financial 
deregulation shows that greater competition reduces the franchise value of banks and then 
increases the banks’ incentive to take excessive risk. The advocates of ‘market power-
stability’ view argue that more concentrated and less competitive banking systems are 
more stable because the excessive profit they make provides a “buffer” against fragility 
and provides incentives against excessive risk taking (Beck, 2008).  
However, the relationship between market power and stability can also be 
negative. Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) introduce the ‘competition-stability hypothesis’ and 
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argue that greater competition contributes to sustaining stability in the banking market. 
The basis of their arguments expounds moral hazard and adverse selection problems of 
customers in the deposit market. They argue that higher market power of banks increases 
the borrowing cost for entrepreneurs which induces borrowers to opt for risky projects to 
mitigate the extra repayment they incur from the loans which in turn increases 
entrepreneurial default risk. In other words, this harder repayment strategy exacerbates 
moral hazard incentives of borrowers and banks end up with a riskier set of clients due to 
adverse selection considerations (Berger, Klapper and Turk-Ariss, 2009; Turk Ariss, 2010). 
More recently, using cross-country data, Beck, De Jonghe and Schepens (2013) find a 
negative relationship between bank competition and stability while the finding of Anginer, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Zhu (2014) is completely opposite. Therefore, the findings based on 
cross-country analysis or from developed market economies would be hard to generalise 
in the case of emerging market economies, especially for India, which has undergone 
substantial regulatory changes in the recent past.  
Hypothesis 1: Market power effect can be positively associated with bank stability.  
 
3.3.2 Debt restructuring and banking stability 
In this section, we argue for a positive relationship between banking stability and 
member banks of CDR who relished substantial regulatory forbearance on asset 
classification, provisioning and capital adequacy. We measure bank stability with bank-
specific Z-scores, which are calculated as the sum of the return-on-assets (ROA) and 
capital ratios, scaled by standard deviation of the ROA (for details see section 3.5).  
Since member banks of the CDR system were extended regulatory forbearance 
on asset classification and provisioning, we assume that they reduce risk through changes 
in profitability, capital adequacy, or a combination of both. Unlike the literature on 
performance evaluation of corporates after restructuring debts, no general model exists 
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from the creditors’ perspective (Kang and Shivdasani, 1997). However, existing literature 
implicitly indicates how member banks could affect profitability and capital adequacy via 
loan loss provisioning, and thereby their stability.  
Regarding the profitability channel, member banks may have increased 
profitability and thus stability because they had more opportunities to understate 
nonperforming loans and overstate net income through exploitation of the CDR system. 
As per CDR norms, member banks could retain the asset classification of restructured 
loans and charge less to their net income for loan loss provisions (WG, 2012) which should 
have been higher if they did not have regulatory forbearance on asset classification and 
provisioning, and thus would have lower net income. Previous literature on income 
smoothing argues that banks can use loan loss provisions to increase current profitability 
(e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995; Lobo and Yang, 2001; Shrieves and Dahl, 2003).36 
According to Fudenberg and Tirole (1995), bank managers during lean (fat) years charge 
less (more) loan loss provisions to the net income by shifting future (current) earnings to 
the current (future) period in order to increase (decrease) profitability. Ghosh and Nachane 
(2003) find evidence of income smoothing in India for a sample of state-owned banks for 
the period 1997-2002.  
By smoothing income, banks not only can reduce volatility of their revenue but 
also reduce the possibility that it may have to eat into their capital (Laeven and Majnoni, 
2003). According to the new Basel capital adequacy framework, general provisions are 
included in the calculation of Tier-2 capital not exceeding 1.25 per cent of risk-weighted 
assets. Therefore, if member banks are not capital-constrained they will have less incentive 
to charge higher loan loss provisions to manage regulatory capital. On this issue Bikker 
and Metzemakers (2005) and Bushman and Williams (2012) find a negative relationship 
36 Income smoothing refers to the practice of minimising variations in earnings over time through a deliberate 
damping of fluctuations.  
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between loan loss provisions and capital ratios.  
In the context of multiple/consortium/syndicate accounts, creditors coordinate 
and cooperate regularly and intensively in the restructuring of distressed borrowers (e.g., 
Franks and Sussman, 2005; Brunner and Krahnen, 2008). Vig (2013) did not find any 
evidence of creditor run or coordination problems among Indian banks in the case of 
multiple banking accounts for a sample of banks during 1997-2004. Rajan (1992) shows 
that banks realise more benefits through multiple banking than single banking account 
financing. It is noted that in the CDR mechanism creditors are the close monitors of the 
restructured corporate loans. By using out-of-court restructuring of corporate loans, 
member banks not only get respite from expensive and unending legal proceedings but 
also they can free up additional resources to invest in more productive intermediation 
activities, and thus earn more profits. They can turn potential nonperforming assets (i.e., 
non-income yielding assets) into performing assets (income yielding assets), and by so 
doing, member banks can increase profitability and simultaneously reduce stress on 
provisioning, capital adequacy, liquidity and net interest margin, and thereby increase 
competitiveness with reduced operating costs.37  
Summing up, the increasing profitability because of favorable regulatory 
forbearance on asset classification and provisioning as well as costs savings in managing 
nonperforming loans enable member banks of the CDR system to enhance their stability. 
However, the alluded concessional loan loss provisions on restructured corporate loans 
have direct implications on the mark-up of the banks and their market power. Due to 
increasing market power, member banks may have shown delinquency in determining the 
riskiness of their portfolios. Besides, since the aim of the financial reforms was to enhance 
market mechanism, transparency and banking competition, we may expect individual 
37 See Jensen and Meckling (1979) for details on direct and in-direct costs related to bankruptcy by firms.  
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banks’ pricing power can channel through CDR and induce excessive risk-taking, which 
is an empirical issue. 
Hypothesis 2a: CDR can have a positive effect on stability of member banks. 
Hypothesis 2b: The positive effect of CDR on stability reduces at a higher degree of market 
power. 
 
3.4 Methodology 
3.4.1 The impact of competition on bank risk-taking 
We test whether bank competition impacts the stability of Indian banks using 
bank-level data. To circumvent the potential endogeneity issue with the measure of market 
power we follow recent empirical studies (e.g., Berger, Klapper and Turk-Ariss, 2009; 
Tabak, Fazio and Cajueiro, 2012; Fu, Lin and Molyneux, 2014) and employ an 
instrumental variable technique with a GMM estimator using the kernel-based 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) variance estimation of Newey and 
West (1987). The advantage of using this method is twofold. First, it is robust to the 
presence of some unobserved characteristics, influencing both market power and stability, 
or by reverse causality; and second, it does not require any assumptions about error 
distributions and, therefore, it is robust to the arbitrary heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation of disturbance terms (Hansen, 1982). The regression model is as follows: 
 
1 2 (  )
                         ( )
it i t it t it
it it
Bank risk Lerner dreg Bank Controls
Macro
α α β β γ
δ ε
= + + + +∑ ⋅
+ ∑ ⋅ +
  (2.4) 
 
Where i  denotes individual banks and t  indexes years. The dependent variable is the 
individual bank risk at time t . The main independent variable of interest is the Lerner 
index, a proxy for individual bank market power at time t . We use either conventional 
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Lerner index i.e., C-Lerner or efficiency-adjusted Lerner index i.e., E-Lerner. The second 
variable of interest is the deregulation dummy (i.e., dreg) that takes a value equal to one 
for the year 1998 and thereafter, or else zero. We control for various bank-specific 
characteristics as well as macroeconomic variables. The detailed definition of these 
variables can be found in Table 3.1. 
 
3.4.2 The impact of corporate debt restructuring (CDR) on bank stability 
We examine the effect of CDR on bank stability by using a difference-in-
differences (DID) approach following Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) and Koetter, 
Kolari and Spierdijk (2012).38 This methodology is simple yet powerful enough to identify 
the effect of an event (in our case, it is the emergence of the CDR mechanism) on groups 
who are affected by the institutional mechanism (henceforth treated) with those that are 
unaffected (henceforth control). For our case, the variable of interest is the stability of 
banks. To understand the effect of CDR on stability, we could simply get the difference 
between the stability (i.e., Z-Score) of treated banks before and after the CDR mechanism. 
The difference would suggest the effect of the CDR mechanism increasing/decreasing 
banking stability. However, the factors other than CDR, both observable and non-
observable, potentially impacting banking stability may have changed as well. Therefore, 
the common economic shock warrants having a control group, which is likely to eliminate 
the bias that emanates from changes other than the CDR mechanism that could have 
affected the treated group (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009; Vig, 2013; Fang, Hasan and 
Marton, 2014). The bank-level estimation of this approach is as follows: 
 
38 The key assumption “parallel trends” requires that the average changes of the outcome variable between 
the controls and treated are symmetrical in the absence of treatment. Therefore, following Lemmon and 
Roberts (2010) we run the two-sample Wilcoxon test to check for the parallel trends in the pre-
implementation period of CDR. We cannot reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level that the two samples 
are taken from populations with the same median. 
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The dependent variable is individual banks risk at time t  . The CDR is an 
indicator variable that takes a value equal to one if a bank signs an inter-creditor agreement 
(ICA) and becomes a member of the CDR program in 2003 and thereafter or else zero.39 
Since there is a time lag reaping the benefit of restructured loans we use a lag of one period 
of CDR (see Gertler, Martinez, Premand, Rawlings and Vermeersch, 2011; Fang, Hasan 
and Marton, 2014). We are interested in estimating 1,β which captures the treatment effects 
of CDR on banking stability.40 In other words, it captures the mean difference in the 
stability between member banks and non-member banks after the genesis of the CDR 
system. Lerner is either C-Lerner or E-Lerner for bank i  at time 1t −  to account for any 
endogeneity issue. We specify the analogous bank-specific and macroeconomic control 
variables as in equation (3.1).  
While CDR has direct impacts on bank stability, all things being equal, it may 
also have contingent effects with bank competition. To examine whether Lerner indices 
interact with CDR as a mechanism to induce excessive risk-taking, we use a difference-in-
difference-in-differences (DDD) approach.41 This approach allows us to investigate the 
cross-sectional heterogeneity in the competition of treated and control groups and 
39 47 institutions/banks signed ICA in February 2002, and CDR became operational in March 2002. In 
February 2003, CDR’s scope was widened to include doubtful and BIFR cases and even standard loan assets. 
Therefore, we have constructed the CDR indicator variable based on financial year 2002-2003.  
40 It is important to note that the CDR mechanism only applies to the banks that are signatories of inter-
creditor agreement (ICA). However, there are a small number of banks who adopted a transaction-based 
membership and signed ICA for a single transaction of restructuring of corporate debts at different points in 
time after the genesis of CDR. Since most of the restructuring of corporate debts is undertaken by the ICA 
members (almost 98.3%), in reality, this distinction is trivial. However, we constructed another CDR 
indicator where transaction-based members were also taken into consideration by taking a value equal to one 
for that particular bank for that particular year, and the overall results remain unchanged and are available 
from the authors upon request.  
41 See for example Long, Yemane and Stockley (2010) and Vig (2013). 
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examines the magnitude of the effect of individual bank’s competition on stability since 
the genesis of the CDR mechanism.  
0 1 2 3 ( )
                           (  ) ( )
it t it it it it
it it it
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Bank Controls Macro
α α β β β
γ δ ε
= + + ⋅ + + ⋅ ×
+ ∑ ⋅ + ∑ ⋅ +
  (2.6) 
Where the coefficient 3β  captures the DDD effect and represents the difference 
in the effect of an individual bank’s competition on stability between before and after the 
CDR mechanism and between member and non-member banks.42 This approach captures 
the time change to the average impact of an individual bank’s competition for member 
banks by netting out the change in the average effect for non-member banks.  
 
3.5 Data and descriptive statistics 
To investigate the relationship between CDR, market power, and risk, we draw 
data from a number of sources: (1) the bank level dataset compiled from the RBI, from the 
Reports on trend and Progress of Banking in India for various years, (2) the macro data 
compiled from the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI), and (3) IV 
instrument, the Business Freedom from the Heritage Foundation. Our dataset comprises 
of an unbalanced panel of up to 110 commercial banks from 1992-2012. We dropped banks 
that had information for fewer than three consecutive years, as the risk measures computed 
in this study were based on rolling windows over the past three years. We deflate all 
monetary values to 1994 (1993-94 = 100) prices using the wholesale price index (WPI) 
obtained from the Office of the Economic Advisor, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 
Government of India, and the deflated series are reported in millions of Indian Rupees 
(INR). 
 
42 The advantage of using this approach is that it controls (nonparametrically) for any group-specific trends 
by adding interaction between group and year fixed effects (Vig, 2013).  
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3.5.1 Measuring bank risk 
We follow Turk Ariss (2010) to measure Z score−  which is widely used in the 
literature and considered to be an unbiased and complete indicator of bank riskiness (see, 
for instance, Laeven and Levine, 2009; Fang, Hasan and Marton, 2014). Using assets 
returns, their volatility and leverage, we calculate Z score−  as follows: 
it it
it ROA
it
ROA EQA
Z score
σ
+
− =             (2.7) 
Where ROA  and EQA  are the average return-on-assets and the equity-to-assets 
ratio, respectively and ROAσ  is the standard deviation of return-on-assets. We can interpret 
this score as the number of standard deviations below the mean by which returns would 
have to drop before all equity in the bank gets depleted (Boyd and Runkle, 1993; Beck, De 
Jonghe and Schepens, 2013). If bank profitability is normally distributed, the inverse proxy 
of Z score−  can be considered as a bank’s probability of default (Fu, Lin and Molyneux, 
2014).  In other words, higher returns and capitalisation would increase but volatile returns 
would decrease the stability of banks. It can also be measured by estimating the ratio of 
nonperforming loans and loan loss provision. However, these measures only reflect the 
credit risk of banks (Delis and Kouretas, 2011).  
 
3.5.2 Measuring market power 
We employ the Lerner index as a measure of market power of individual banks 
for the sample. The index is a more accurate measure of bank-specific market power than 
the so-called Panzar-Rosse H-statistics or the asset shares of the three largest banks 
(Brissimis, Delis and Papanikolaou, 2008). The essence of pricing power is reflected 
through the Lerner index because it measures the disparity between price and marginal 
cost expressed as a percentage of price. In other words, it captures the degree to which a 
bank can increase their marginal price beyond their marginal cost. According to Berger, 
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Klapper and Turk-Ariss (2009), the Lerner index is the only measure of market power 
calculated at the bank level as:   
it it
it
it
P MC
Lerner
P
−
=   (2.8) 
Where itP  is the price of total assets proxied by the ratio of total revenue (interest 
and non-interest income) to total assets for bank i  at time t . itMC  is the marginal cost of 
producing an additional unit of output. Following conventional bank efficiency studies, in 
this paper we use stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) to estimate marginal cost and hence 
the Lerner Index. The input and output choices are specified according to the 
intermediation approach of Sealey and Lindley (1977), where a bank uses labour and 
physical capital to accumulate deposits, and deposits are used to fund loans and other 
earning assets. Similar to Koetter, Kolari and Spierdijk (2012), a production technology is 
specified with three inputs (i.e. labour, capital and borrowed funds) and two outputs (i.e. 
loans and securities). Since equity can be used to fund loans it is commendable to include 
equity in the production function to account for various risk attitudes of banks. The 
assumption is that there is perfect competition in the factor markets and banks have no 
other choice but to accept the given factor prices in order to supply a certain number of 
outputs. The following translog total cost function is specified for bank 1,...,i N=  at time 
1,...,t T=  as: 
3 2 3
2
0 , , ,
1 1 1
3 3 2
2 12
, , , 1, 2,
1
3 2 2 3
, , ,
1 1 1 1
ln lnW lnY ln(Z ) ( )(ln )
2
ln ln ( )(lnY ) ( ) ln ln
2 2
ln ln ln
j
it j j it p p it it j it
j p j
p
jk j it k it p it it it
j k p
k
jp j it p it k j j it
j p k j
TOC W
W W Y Y
W Y trend W trend
ς
β β γ δ
θ κ
η
λ ρ ε ω
= = =
=
= = = =
= + + + +
+ + +
+ + + +
∑ ∑ ∑
∑∑ ∑
∑∑ ∑ ∑
2
,
1
lnYp p it it
p
trend ε
=
+∑
  (2.9) 
where itTOC  is the total costs including financial and operating cost; itY  
represents two outputs i.e., total loans 1,itY  and total securities 2,itY  , and ,j itW  ( 3,2,1=j ) are 
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input prices where 1W  is the price of funds; 2W  is the price of labour; 3W  is the price of 
capital of bank i  at time t  ; itZ  is total equity of bank i  at time t  ; and trend  is the time 
trend to capture technical change. We impose homogeneity of degree one on input prices 
and divide all factor prices and itTOC  by  3W  . After estimating cost function, we take the 
first derivative with respect to outputs for each bank in the sample and estimate marginal 
cost as: 
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The Lerner index is interpreted as the inverse of competition; the higher the index 
the greater the pricing power, implying less competitive market conditions. The 
conventional Lerner index estimated above is measured assuming full bank efficiency and 
therefore does not account for the possibilities of bankers failing to exploit output pricing 
opportunities resulting from market power. Following Koetter, Kolari and Spierdijk 
(2012), we estimate efficiency-adjusted Lerner indices from a single structural model as: 
 ( ) /it it itAR MC AR−      (2.11) 
 Where 
itAR  is the average revenue computed as  / ,TR TA  Where,  TR PBT TOC= + . 
In order to obtain efficiency-adjusted Lerner indices we have to estimate expected profit 
PBT  from an alternative profit function43 and expected total costs TOC  from equation (3.6). 
Dissimilar to conventional Lerner indices in equation (3.5), the estimation of efficiency-
adjusted Lerner accounts for both bank efficiency and degree of market power 
simultaneously.     
 
43 To estimate expected profits (PBT ) we use PBT  (i.e. profit before tax) instead of TOC  in equation (3.6) 
as the dependent variable. Following Bos and Koetter (2011), to account for individual bank losses, we use 
a negative profit indicator ( NPI ) in the profit function as many banks in our sample period incurred losses. 
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3.5.3 Bank-specific and macro control variables 
Following recent banking studies, we also control for an array of bank-specific 
characteristics and macroeconomic variables. We control for bank size by using the 
logarithm of total assets to account for potential size effect on risk taking behaviour of 
individual banks. It is argued in the literature that the vanity of being too-big-to-fail can 
invigorate the risk taking attitude of large banks (Iannotta, Nocera and Sironi, 2007). 
However, it is also evident that large banks can exploit economies of scale and enhance 
diversification opportunities, which in turn reduce the riskiness of their operations (Lepetit, 
Nys, Rous and Tarazi, 2008). Illiquid banks assume more risk as they are less aggressive 
towards profitability. To account for liquidity risk of individual banks, we use ratio of net 
loans over total assets (Fang, Hasan and Marton, 2014). To control for individual bank’s 
loan portfolio risk we include the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans. Net interest 
margin is employed in the model to control for individual bank’s lending attitude. The 
impact of income diversification on stability is ambiguous; therefore income 
diversification is used to capture the effect of off-balance sheet activities of banks. It is 
demonstrated in the literature that capital requirement and restrictions on interest rates and 
a bank’s activities are likely to increase bank stability (Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz, 
2000). In addition, a well-capitalised bank is assumed to take less risk; therefore we use 
equity ratio to control for capital risk.  
The study also includes several macroeconomic variables to control for economic 
development and business cycle of the economy. We include GDP per capita to capture the 
level of economic development. Since, in the last two decades, the Indian economy has 
experienced substantial volatility, we use standard deviation of GDP (measured using 5-
year rolling-window period) to control for volatility of economic growth. Lastly, since any 
major fluctuation in inflation can have serious implications towards banking profitability, 
and hence to the banking stability (Revell, 1979), we include inflation (i.e. consumer price 
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index) to control for this economic uncertainty.  
 
 
3.5.4 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3.2 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this study. We 
have 1798 bank-year observations for 110 banks and a 21-year sample. The mean value of 
the Z-score is 3.3, implying that on average, return on assets ( )ROA  would have to fall by 
3.3 times their standard deviation to wipe out bank equity. The mean volatility of return 
( )ROAσ is 0.01. The mean value of conventional Lerner (i.e., C-Lerner) is 32% and 
efficiency-adjusted Lerner (i.e., E-Lerner) is 42%, indicating that banks are pricing their 
product on average 32% and 42% above the marginal costs, respectively. The mean of total 
assets is Rs. 140,139 million; the loan ratio is 43%; LLP is 2% and net interest margin is 
4%.44 The mean of income diversification is 17% where equity ratio is around 12%. 
Regarding macroeconomic control variables, the mean of GDP per capita is Rs. 61,715. 
The mean value of GDP growth rate volatility is 2.08, indicating serious fluctuations in the 
economic growth of India for the last two decades. To control for economic stability, 
inflation is used, which has a mean of 7.4%. To circumvent the issue of endogeneity 
between market power and stability, three instruments are used in the IV regression 
technique: business freedom, merger and lagged Lerner indices. The mean value of 
business freedom is 51.66% with a standard deviation of 6.45%. 
Table 3.A1 reports the pairwise correlations and their significance levels among 
the independent variables used in this paper. Our first research question is whether market 
power is positively related to a bank’s risk taking attitude; the significant positive 
correlation between Lerner indices and equity ratio is evidence to support the competition-
44 Loan ratio is measured as performing loans divided by total assets. Performing loans is the difference of 
total loans and nonperforming loans. Therefore, few banks showed a negative loan ratio.   
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fragility hypothesis for India (see, for example Beck, De Jonghe and Schepens, 2013). The 
variance inflation factors (VIF) are computed for each of our model estimates. The average 
VIF never exceeds 3, indicating that multicollinearity is not a cause for concern in our 
results.45  
 
3.6 Empirical results 
First, we report the specification tests and results for the competition-fragility 
hypothesis based on the IV regression model in equation (3.1). Second, we report the 
treatment effects of the CDR system on bank stability based on difference-in-differences 
estimation in equation (3.2). Finally, we report the contingent effects of the CDR system 
with bank competition on stability based on difference-in-difference-in-differences 
estimation in equation (3.3).  
 
3.6.1 Bank competition and stability 
Table 3.3 reports the impact of competition on a bank’s risk taking attitudes. Two 
different measures of risk indicators are employed as the dependent variables that proxy 
for stability of an individual bank: the distance to default measured by logarithm of Z-
score (columns 1 and 2), and the negative of return volatility measured by the standard 
deviation of ROA (columns 3 and 4). For the latter case, we follow Beck, De Jonghe and 
Schepens (2013) and transform this dependent variable to make it directly proportional to 
banking stability (i.e.,  [ log( )]ROAVolatility σ= − . Before choosing which estimator to use for 
equation (3.1), we conduct an endogeneity test for the competition measures i.e., Lerner 
indices, which is reported at the bottom of Table 3.3. Under conditional homoscedasticity, 
this endogeneity test statistic is equivalent to a Hausman test statistic (Tabak, Fazio and 
45 VIF is equal to 1/ (1-r2), where r2 is from the regression of an independent variable on the rest of the 
independent variables (see Anginer, Demirgüç-Kunt and Zhu, 2014). 
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Cajueiro, 2012). In case of rejecting the null hypothesis of exogeneity, we employ the 
GMM estimator. In case we cannot reject the null hypothesis, we use the OLS fixed effects 
estimator. In both cases, we calculate heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent 
(HAC) standard errors which are reported in square brackets. The relevance and validity 
of the instruments used for the Lerner indices are confirmed by the First Stage F-test (> 
10) and Hansen’s J-test (>0.05), respectively. The goodness of fit of all regression models 
is confirmed by the Second Stage F-test.  
Based on columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.3, we find that both C-Lerner and E-Lerner 
have a significant positive relationship with Z-score, indicating that a higher degree of 
bank pricing power is positively associated with individual bank soundness in India. Since 
the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of Z-score, we can interpret the effect of 
market power on stability as semi-elastic. The highly significant coefficient of the Lerner 
index has substantial economic importance, where a one standard deviation decrease in the 
E-Lerner (0.253) is concomitant with a fall in the Z-score of 70%. In the case of C-Lerner, 
a one standard deviation (0.179) reduction is equal to a 128% drop in the Z-score.  
This result also corroborates with the additional risk measures used in this study. 
The negative of return volatility, in columns 3 and 4, is also positively related to both 
competition measures, suggesting an increase in market power associated with reduction 
in return volatility. These results lend support to the traditional view of the competition-
fragility hypothesis that lower bank pricing power leads to bank fragility. The findings of 
this study are in line with existing literature that uses Lerner index as a proxy for 
competition measure (see, e.g., Berger, Klapper and Turk-Ariss, 2009; Beck, De Jonghe 
and Schepens, 2013; Fu, Lin and Molyneux, 2014). 
 
3.6.2 The impact of deregulation on banking stability 
After the first phase of deregulation in 1992, India initiated a second phase of 
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deregulation in order to augment financial stability. Various financial reforms were 
initiated to improve capital adequacy and to bring forth provisioning norms on a par with 
international best practice. Table 3.3 also reports the impact of deregulation dummy on the 
banking stability. It shows that after 1998, the stability of Indian banks improves 
significantly. This is in accordance with a recent study of Das and Kumbhakar (2012) who 
find a significant impact of second phase deregulation on efficiency and total factor 
productivity. They argue that the substantial increase in the capital adequacy ratio played 
a vital role in the improvement of efficiency.  
 
3.6.3 The impact of CDR on banking stability  
We examine the effect of CDR on bank stability employing a difference-in-
differences approach. The results are reported in Table 3.4a and 3.4b. We start with a 
simple comparison of means of the dependent variables in Table 3.4a. We collapse the data 
(averages) to get two data points per bank; one for the pre-implementation and another for 
the post-implementation of member and non-member banks of CDR. We report the before-
after results for the variable Z-score and return volatility. As can be seen, banking stability 
increased for both groups, but it increased 36.9% (Z-score) more in the member banks. A 
similar result can be seen for the return volatility. We next run ten different regressions 
using analogous dependent variables with both competition measures. In all regressions, 
we include bank fixed effects and year fixed effects to control for bank-specific 
heterogeneity and aggregate economic shocks, respectively. In column 1, we show the 
results of basic regression without using any controls. The positive and significant 
coefficient of CDR indicates that banking stability increased by 43.6% after the 
implementation of the CDR mechanism in India. In columns 2-3, we add all the control 
variables. We also find a positive and statistically significant result at the 10% level. We 
use negative volatility of return and it confirms our results that after implementation of the 
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CDR system, there is a significant improvement in risk-reduction.46  
The results of the interaction between CDR and Lerner indices are reported in 
columns 4, 5 and 9, 10 of Table 3.4b. For column 5, we find a significant negative 
interaction effect (-0.926) on stability. The evidence suggests that the magnitude of the 
positive impact of CDR on stability diminishes for the member banks at a higher degree 
of market power. In terms of economic magnitudes, it implies that a one standard deviation 
reduction in market power (0.253) leads to a 23% increase in the soundness of member 
banks. This finding is corroborated by the significant negative coefficient (-0.776) of the 
interaction terms in column 10. It should be noted that, in the case of multiplicative terms 
in the models, based on simple t-statistics we cannot make accurate inference because the 
model parameter does not provide adequate information (Brambor, Clark and Golder, 
2006). Therefore, following Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006), we use marginal effect to 
show the influence of different levels of market power (competition) on the impact of CDR 
on stability.  
The estimated total marginal effects and standard errors of CDR on stability are 
graphically illustrated in Figure 3.3. The upper (lower) panel, Panel A (Panel B) shows the 
total effect of CDR on Z-score (negative return volatility) for both conventional and 
efficiency-adjusted Lerner indices (i.e. C-Lerner and E-Lerner). The marginal effect of 
CDR on the Z-score is statistically different from zero before a threshold level of E-Lerner 
Index of around 38 points, with stability loss of up to 9% at higher market power levels. 
In other words, the positive impact of restructuring of corporate loans diminishes as market 
46 In DID, the same firm is observed before and after a program, in doing so, we are cancelling out (or 
controlling for) both the effect of observed time-invariant characteristics as well as the effect of unobserved 
time-invariant characteristics (see Gertler, Martinez, Premand, Rawlings and Vermeersch, 2011, p99). For 
example: the SARFAESI Act 2002 strengthened the rights of secured creditors and may have had some effect 
on the stability of banks. Since this legal reform happened at the country level and applied to all banks in 
India, we assume that this time-invariant characteristic does not have any influence on the DID effect in this 
study (see Vig, 2013, for details on SARFAESI Act). However, we check the sensitivity of our results using 
a dummy of the SARFAESI Act (taking a value equal to one for the year 2002 and thereafter, or else zero), 
and the results (unreported) remain unaltered.  
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power increases, and this effect on Z-score becomes insignificant once E-Lerner index 
reaches beyond 38 points. 
 
Figure 3.3 
Marginal effect of CDR on banking stability 
 
Note that it corresponds with our results in Table 3.4b. The graphs on the upper panel display the marginal 
effect of CDR on Z-score at different levels of market power i.e., C-Lerner (left) and E-Lerner (right). It 
shows that the positive impact of CDR diminishes as market power increases with a loss of Z-score at 9%. 
The graphs on the lower panel display the marginal effect of CDR on negative return volatility at different 
levels of market power i.e., C-Lerner (left) and E-Lerner (right). ). It shows that the positive impact of CDR 
diminishes as market power increases with a loss of volatility at 5%. 
 
We find similar results from column 10 that the marginal effect of CDR on 
negative return volatility is statistically different from zero before a threshold level of 
efficiency-adjusted Lerner Index of around 39 points, with loss of stability of up to 5% at 
higher market power levels. Caminal and Matutes (2002) show that banks with greater 
market power tend to incur higher monitoring costs and have risky loan portfolios. 
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Therefore, the probable explanation of our finding is that member banks may have shown 
delinquency in determining the riskiness of their portfolios. It could also be that the de jure 
implementation of the CDR system and benefit through regulatory forbearance on asset 
classification and provisioning de facto impacted the margin of the member banks and 
hence market power (see Figure A3.1); as a result, they could get some extra leeway taking 
excessive risk which resulted in the diminishing benefits of CDR on stability. This 
favorable effect of CDR on the performance of the Indian banking sector remains 
consistent with the increasing efficiency change after 2002 reported in Sahoo and Tone 
(2009), across all ownership groups.  
3.6.4 Sensitivity analysis 
It is possible that the relationship between market power and stability is due to 
poorly specified Lerner indices. According to Maudos and de Guevara (2007), the 
estimated itMC  through equation (3.7), may be prone to some form of monopoly power 
originating from deposit markets due to the bank’s ability to fund at a cheaper rate. Since 
a form of deposit market power is already reflected in the loan pricing, including the factor 
funding cost in equation (3.6) may provide biased results. Therefore, to eliminate the 
deposit market distortions we re-specified equation (3.6) with only two factors (i.e., cost 
of labour and cost of capital) and calculated marginal costs ( itMC ) for bank i  at time t  
following equation (3.7). This Lerner index, which is a ‘raw’ pricing power of an individual 
bank, is then derived from the structural model specified in equation (3.5). Table 3.A2 
shows results of the funding-adjusted Lerner index and risk-taking attitudes. We also use 
ex-post credit risk as a risk indicator and the results remain unaltered, supporting the 
competition-fragility hypothesis.  
To check the sensitivity of these results we also construct three different market 
power dummy variables for the different level of market power of banks following Tabak, 
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Fazio and Cajueiro (2012). These dummies are High Lerner( Lerner+0.5σ )≥ , Average
Lerner Lerner(<Lerner+0.5σ  and >Lerner-0.5σ ) , and Low Lerner( Lerner-0.5σ )≤ . Since we have different 
variants of Lerner indices i.e. C-Lerner and E-Lerner, six market power dummies are 
created in order to check the impact of different levels of market power on stability. The 
results are reported in Table 3.5. Based on the results of market power dummy we can see 
that High and Average market power dummies of both Lerner indices are positively and 
significantly related with Z-score. However, the Low market power dummy is always 
negatively and significantly associated with Z-score. Similar results are obtained when we 
use the negative return volatility as the dependent variable. These results suggest that banks 
with less market power (i.e. <29 points) are likely to take more risk. In other words, banks 
operating with higher competition are likely to adopt more aggressive risk-taking attitudes. 
These findings lend support to our earlier results that greater competition enhances risk-
taking behaviours, alluding to the competition-fragility hypothesis.47  
To alleviate any selection bias, that might yet remain in our DID result, we use 
propensity score matching (PSM) (see Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). This matching 
technique allows us to identify a group of non-member banks which are similar to the 
member banks on the basis of some observable characteristics, and then compare the 
banking stability between the control and treated groups. By doing this, it can avoid any 
selection bias and provide unbiased estimates of treatment effects (Abadie and Imbens, 
2006; Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). In the first stage of PSM, we estimate the probability 
(i.e., propensity score) that a bank enters into the CDR mechanism by using a logit model 
(see Table 3.A3). In the second stage, we match each member bank of CDR with non-
47 In addition, a possible nonlinear relationship between competition and financial stability is also captured 
by using the quadratic term for the Lerner indices following Berger, Klapper and Turk-Ariss (2009). The 
unreported results based on the calculated inflection points remain unchanged.  
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member banks with a similar propensity score. For this procedure, we consider two 
matching techniques that include kernel marching and stratified matching. Furthermore, 
following Abadie and Imbens (2006), we also estimate the average treatment effect using 
the bias-corrected covariate matching estimator adjusted for heteroskedasticity, matching 
on four nearest neighbours as recommended in Abadie, Drukker, Herr and Imbens (2004). 
Unlike PSM, this method uses covariates to match the treatment group and control group, 
corrects for bias when matching is not perfect, makes no assumption about functional form, 
and provides standard errors for matching estimators. The results are reported in Table 3.6, 
and are consistent with the earlier findings. In all matching estimators, the average 
treatment effect for the treated (ATT) remains significant at the 1% level, indicating a 
significant improvement in the stability of member banks of CDR.  
3.7 Conclusions and policy implications 
Following widespread corporate distress in servicing debt obligations to the 
creditors, the Reserve Bank of India implemented a debt restructuring programme in the 
form of ‘corporate debt restructuring’ in 2002. This institutional mechanism was intended 
to mitigate debt overhang of corporates and NPLs overhang of banks. In this paper, we 
contribute to the literature on debt restructuring from the creditors’ perspective by 
investigating the impact of the CDR system on bank stability. We exploit the membership 
variation of banks of the CDR programme to find the causal relations of the treated banks 
on stability while using a ‘natural experiment’ type difference-in-differences (DID) 
approach. To eliminate any sample selection bias, we deploy a number of matching 
estimators including the recently developed bias-corrected covariate matching estimator 
proposed by Abadie and Imbens (2006). Despite the Indian banking sector having 
undergone multiple financial reforms and structural changes in the last two decades, 
studies on the effects of such changes in the context of India is inadequate and mostly 
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limited to productivity and efficiency analyses (e.g., Fujii, Managi and Matousek, 2014; 
Tzeremes, 2015). Therefore, drawing bank-level data from an important emerging market, 
we have also complemented the existing literature on the market power-stability nexus by 
using a sample period (i.e., 1992-2012) that has observed a number of financial reforms 
including the consolidation and liberalisation process.  
The balance of evidence suggests that market power, proxied by two variants of 
Lerner indices i.e. conventional and efficiency-adjusted Lerner indices, enhances the 
stability of Indian banks where greater competition induces excessive risk-taking of 
individual banks, supporting the competition-fragility relationship. It also appears that 
although the second phase of deregulation improved overall banking stability significantly, 
there is a threshold level of market power below which banks experience a higher risk of 
fragility. The result from the DID approach suggests that after the genesis of CDR, member 
banks with generous regulatory forbearance on asset classification and provisioning 
experience an improvement in stability. It indicates that the soundness of member banks 
increased by 43.6% after the implementation of the CDR mechanism. The findings of the 
matching estimators are also consistent with the result of the DID approach and show a 
positive treatment effect of CDR. This finding on the causal relationships point to a channel 
through which timely and efficient out-of-court restructuring mechanism with minimum 
regulatory forbearance can have a positive impact on banking stability. However, the 
finding of the interactive effect is alarming for the regulator as the marginal effect of CDR 
on Z-score is statistically different from zero before a threshold level of E-Lerner Index of 
around 38 points, with stability loss of up to 9% at a higher degree of market power. As 
member banks were able to gain market power substantially (21%)48 due to generous 
regulatory forbearance, it might have provided them some extra leeway to show 
48 Based on preliminary data analysis, we find that the average E-Lerner of member banks for the post-CDR 
period has increased to 41 points compared to 34 in the Pre-CDR period (see Figure 3.A1). 
 114 
                                                        
delinquency in determining the riskiness of their portfolios (see Caminal and Matutes, 
2002).  
The findings of this paper have policy implications for the central bank of India–
RBI and bank managers for improving credit quality and stability: (i) based on the overall 
results, it seems that RBI’s intention of having a stable banking sector has largely been 
achieved in the short-run as creditors were able to get respite from high provisioning on 
the restructured corporate loans, and hence increased their stability. However, the recent 
up-trend in restructuring corporate debt is worrisome and therefore, regulators should 
tighten the macroprudential norms and emphasise international best practice in asset 
classification and provisioning of restructured corporate loans, ensuring there is no scope 
for ever-greening (Peek and Rosengren, 1995); (ii) since it is predicted that at least 20-
30% of restructured standard corporate loans will slip into sub-standard loans eventually 
(WG, 2012), bank managers should increase provisioning on existing restructured loans 
gradually, otherwise any substantial losses might lead them to exhaust the capital base at 
a point where insolvency or illiquidity would be inevitable; and (iii) as most of the state-
owned banks participated in the CDR programme, it is natural that they would be affected 
more in the event of more restructured corporate loans becoming bad eventually. The 
reason being is that due to the CDR mechanism they were able to understate the actual 
state of their risk-weighted assets, and hence keep the required capital. Therefore, in the 
long-run, to have a more stable banking sector, the Indian government should either inject 
more capital in these banks at the expense of taxpayers or take a more sane approach and 
raise some funds by selling the majority shareholdings to private investors.  
The finding of this study also has policy implications for some emerging market 
economies, especially for Brazil. Recently, many Brazilian firms have been facing 
difficulties paying back debt to their creditors partly due to high interest rates and currency 
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devaluation.49 Therefore, to reduce the debt overhang of Brazilian firms, the Central Bank 
of Brazil (i.e., Banco Central do Brasil) can adopt a similar approach to the CDR 
mechanism with reasonable regulatory forbearance in order for the creditors to get some 
respite from accumulating bad debts while also making sure that viable corporates can 
forestall bankruptcy.  
 
 
49 Lucchesi, C. and Levin, L., “Evercore, Rothschild Hiring for Brazil Debt-Restructuring Wave”, 
November 2015 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-03/evercore-rothschild-hiring-for-
brazil-debt-restructuring-wave 
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Table 3.1 
Variable Definitions and Sources 
Variables Notation Definitions Source 
Frontier Arguments 
Costs of funds  w1 Sum of interest expenses on deposits, interest expenses on RBI and inter-bank 
funds divided by sum of deposits and borrowings from RBI and others 
RBI 
Cost of labour  w2 Payments to and provisions for employees divided by total assets RBI 
Cost of capital  w3 Other operating expenses divided by fixed assets RBI 
Total loans  y1 Total loans and advances RBI 
Other earning assets  y2 Total investments  RBI 
Equity z Sum of capital and reserves and surplus RBI 
Operating costs  TOC Sum of Interest Expenses and Operating Expenses  RBI 
Profit before tax  PBT Operating income less TOC RBI 
Negative profit 
  
NPI Takes 1 for the negative profit or else 0 Own 
Bank risk measures 
Z-score Z-score Sum of return-on-assets (ROA), defined as net profit over assets, and equity ratio 
(EQA), defined as equity over assets, divided by standard deviation of (ROA) of 
each bank over past three years (calculated using a rolling window) 
Own 
Return Volatility Sd(ROA) Standard deviation of ROA for each bank, calculated over past 3 years Own 
Credit risk  NPL Non-performing loans divided by total loans RBI 
Market Power 
C-Lerner C-Lerner A bank-level non-structural indicator of bank competition, measured by using 
fixed-effects method, with lower values indicating higher competition in the 
banking sector 
Own 
E-Lerner E-Lerner A bank-level non-structural indicator of bank competition, an efficiency-adjusted 
Lerner index, measured by using a stochastic frontier analysis approach, with 
lower values indicating higher competition in the banking sector 
Own 
Bank characteristics 
Bank Size Size Logarithm of total assets RBI 
Loan ratio  Loan Total performing loans divided by total assets RBI 
Provision ratio LLP Total loan loss provision divided by total assets RBI 
Net interest margin NIM Net interest income to total earning assets RBI 
Income 
  
DIV Non-interest income divided by total operating income RBI 
Equity ratio  EQA Total equity divided by total assets RBI 
IV Instruments 
Merger Merger Takes value equal to one for the year and thereafter if a bank enters into mergers 
and acquisitions activity or else zero 
Own 
Business Freedom BusFree The business freedom is taken from Heritage Foundation, it is a number between 
0 and 100, with 100 equaling the freest business environment 
HF 
Macroeconomic variables 
GDP per capita GDP Logarithm of GDP per capita WDI 
Volatility of GDP sd(GDP) Standard Deviation of real GDP growth rate calculated over past five years using 
a rolling window 
WDI 
Inflation INF Annual growth rate of consumer price index WDI 
Note: RBI, HF and WDI stand for the Reserve Bank of India, the Heritage Foundation and the World Development Indicator, 
respectively. Own stands for author’s own calculation.  
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Table 3.2 
Summary Statistics 
This table shows the total sample summary statistics for the bank-specific variables, macroeconomic variables and the variables that 
are used as instruments in the instrumental variable regressions throughout the paper. Bank-level data is compiled from the RBI, from 
the Reports on trend and Progress of Banking in India for various years. Macroeconomic data is retrieved from the World Bank World 
Development Indicator (WDI). The IV instrument business freedom is obtained from the Economic Freedom Indicators of Heritage 
Foundation (2013). The full sample contains 1798 observations. This table consists of six parts. The descriptive statistics of the variables 
used for translog costs function is in the first part. The dependent variables which are used to proxy for stability of individual banks are 
in the second part of this table. The third part contains market power variables, which is proxied by two variants of Lerner indices: 
conventional Lerner (i.e., C-Lerner) and efficiency-adjusted Lerner (i.e., E-Lerner). Bank-specific variables are in the fourth part. IV 
instruments are in the fifth part of this table followed by the macroeconomic variables in the sixth.   
Variable Mean Median SD Min Max N 
Frontier Arguments 
Costs of funds 0.07 0.06 0.15 0 6.3 1798 
Costs of labour 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0.13 1798 
Costs of capital 0.64 0.33 1.18 0.01 15.58 1798 
Total loans 73096 14129 193917 0.3 2967979 1798 
Other earning assets 43712 11073 102235 3 1207346 1798 
Operating costs 9875 2598 22804 6 305492 1798 
Profits before tax 2775 556 7024 -4422 108013 1798 
Equity 9067 2034 22475 5 287196 1798 
Total revenue 12650 3369 29558 4 413505 1798 
Dependent Variables 
Z-score 3.3 3.29 1.18 -3.84 7.68 1572 
Volatility of ROA 0.01 0 0.01 0 0.16 1578 
Credit risk 0.05 0.02 0.08 -0.45 1.22 1792 
Market Power             
C-Lerner 0.32 0.3 0.18 -1.99 0.9 1798 
E-Lerner 0.42 0.44 0.25 -2.21 0.97 1798 
Bank-specific variables 
Total asset 140139 31628 342239 106 4568799 1798 
Loan ratio 0.43 0.44 0.14 -0.03 0.82 1792 
LLP ratio 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.23 0.28 1786 
NIM 0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.41 0.58 1798 
Diversification 0.17 0.14 0.13 -1.66 0.87 1798 
Equity ratio 0.12 0.07 0.15 0 0.98 1798 
Reregulation 0.73 1 0.45 0 1 1798 
CDR 0.24 0 0.43 0 1 1798 
IV Instruments 
Merger 0.09 0 0.29 0 1 1798 
Business Freedom 51.66 55 6.45 35.5 55 1650 
Macroeconomic variables 
GDP per capita 61715 36189 61301 7093 236651 1798 
Volatility of GDP 2.08 2.03 0.53 0.88 3.07 1798 
Inflation 7.4 7.16 3.07 3.68 13.23 1798 
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Table 3.3 
The effect of bank competition on stability 
The dependent variable is the Z-score, reported in columns 1and 2, standard deviation of return on assets, reported in columns 3 and 4. 
Bank competition is proxied by two variants of the Lerner indices i.e., conventional Lerner (C-Lerner) and efficiency-adjusted Lerner 
(E-Lerner). De-regulation dummy takes one for the year 1998 and thereafter and otherwise zero. Bank size is the logarithm of total 
assets valued in million rupees. Bank’s liquidity is proxied by the ratio of net loan over assets. LLP ratio is measured as loan loss 
provision as a percentage of total assets, where income diversification is the ratio of non-interest income over total income. The 
profitability measure NIM is measured as the net interest income over total earning assets. Banks' equity is the bank total equity to asset 
ratio. To control for economic development, logarithm of GDP per capita is used, and volatility of GDP growth rate, measured as the 
standard deviation of GDP growth rate using 5-year rolling window, is used to account for precariousness of business cycle for the last 
two decades. Inflation is used to capture the economic uncertainty. Before deciding which estimator to apply, we run an endogeneity 
test for the Lerner indices; if we reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity, we use GMM estimator, or else use OLS fixed effects estimator. 
In both cases, we consider heteroskedasticity-autocorrelation robust standard errors (HAC). ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Source: RBI and WDI. Coverage: 1992-2012. 
  1 2 3 4 
VARIABLES Z-score [log(ROA+EQA)/(sd(ROA)] Return volatility [-log(sd(ROA))] 
C-Lerner 7.145*** - 5.371*** - 
  [1.338] - [1.271] - 
E-Lerner - 2.783*** - 1.846*** 
  - [0.640] - [0.531] 
Deregulation 3.652*** 1.567 3.209*** 1.662 
  [1.083] [1.109] [1.080] [1.066] 
Size 0.170** 0.162* 0.215*** 0.223*** 
  [0.079] [0.084] [0.075] [0.075] 
Loan ratio 2.794*** 1.050** 2.472*** 1.333*** 
  [0.358] [0.410] [0.324] [0.367] 
LLP ratio -21.546*** -12.256*** -17.346*** -10.930*** 
  [3.708] [2.935] [3.882] [1.903] 
Diversification -3.400*** 0.238 -2.495*** 0.355 
  [0.955] [0.488] [0.897] [0.431] 
NIM -8.433*** 0.185 -6.040** 0.720 
  [3.006] [1.193] [2.678] [1.025] 
Equity ratio 0.891 -1.019 -1.989*** -3.201*** 
  [0.601] [0.755] [0.574] [0.673] 
GDP Per Capita -2.510*** -0.588 -2.174*** -0.769 
  [0.778] [0.790] [0.777] [0.764] 
Volatility of GDP 1.931*** 0.085 1.578** 0.231 
  [0.691] [0.714] [0.690] [0.690] 
Inflation -0.035 -0.008 -0.038 -0.018 
  [0.047] [0.047] [0.046] [0.045] 
Diagnostic Test         
Estimator GMM GMM GMM GMM 
First Stage F-test 10.54*** 35.81*** 11.23*** 38.60*** 
Hansen’s J Chi2 0.834 0.0330 1.607 0.317 
Hansen’s J [p-value] 0.361 0.856 0.205 0.573 
Second Stage F-test 15.31*** 13.03*** 9.428*** 9.980*** 
No. of Obs. 1,561 1,561 1,566 1,566 
No. of banks 106 106 106 106 
 
 
Table 3.4a 
Basic empirical strategy 
Member banks are those who participated and Non-member banks are those who did not participate in the CDR programme. ‘Before’ 
refers to 1992-2003 and ‘After’ refers to the period from 2004 to 2012. DID refers to Difference-in-Differences. Diff is interpreted as 
the percentage change form period before to after. DID is the percentage change in the member banks compared to non-member banks. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Outcome variable 
Before After  
Non-Member Member Diff Non-Member Member Diff DID 
Z-Score 2.881 3.079 0.197*** 3.407 3.973 0.566*** 0.369*** 
Std. Error 0.051 0.057 0.076 0.059 0.058 0.083 0.113 
Return volatility 5.218 5.984 0.766*** 5.156 6.671 1.516*** 0.75*** 
Std. Error 0.05 0.056 0.075 0.058 0.058 0.082 0.111 
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Table 3.4b 
The effect of corporate debt restructuring (CDR) on bank Stability 
This table reports results from the regression 0 1 2 , ( ) ( ) ( )it t it i t it it itBank risk CDR Lerner Controls Macroα α β β γ δ ε= + + ⋅ + + ∑ ⋅ + ∑ ⋅ +  
And 0 1 2 , 3 , ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )it t it i t it i t it it itBank risk CDR Lerner CDR Lerner Controls Macroα α β β β γ δ ε= + + ⋅ + + ⋅ × + ∑ ⋅ + ∑ ⋅ + . The 
dependent variable is the Z-score, reported in columns 1-5, standard deviation of return-on-assets, reported in columns 6-10. Following 
Beck et al. (2013) we transform the latter to interpret it as an indicator of financial stability. Here, CDR  is an indicator variable equal 
to one in the year and thereafter when bank i  enters an inter-creditor agreement to pursue restructuring of corporate debt (i.e., treated 
group) and otherwise zero (i.e., control group). itLerner  is either conventional Lerner (i.e., C-Lerner) or efficiency-adjusted Lerner 
(i.e., E-Lerner) for bank i  at time t  . The variable of interest is 1β  and 3β  where the former captures the difference-in-differences 
(DID) effect and the latter captures the difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) effects. Bank-level and macroeconomic control 
variables are included in both equations. We clustered standard error at bank-level and reported it in square brackets. ***, **, and * 
implies significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, levels respectively. Source: RBI and WDI. Coverage: 1992-2012. 
  Z-score [log(ROA+EQA)/(sd(ROA)] Return volatility [-log(sd(ROA))] 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
CDR 0.436** 0.322* 0.312* 0.638* 0.657*** 0.682*** 0.346** 0.318* 0.947** 0.608*** 
  [0.183] [0.170] [0.188] [0.365] [0.213] [0.172] [0.171] [0.186] [0.384] [0.191] 
C-Lerner   2.647***   2.723***     1.687***   1.797***   
    [0.305]   [0.314]     [0.222]   [0.240]   
E-Lerner     1.085***   1.307***     0.709***   0.888*** 
      [0.214]   [0.181]     [0.167]   [0.162] 
CDR x C-Lerner       -1.077         -2.043*   
        [1.006]         [1.067]   
CDR x E-Lerner         -0.926***         -0.776*** 
          [0.285]         [0.254] 
Size   0.094 0.126 0.092 0.123   0.154 0.182* 0.150 0.178* 
    [0.087] [0.090] [0.086] [0.091]   [0.093] [0.097] [0.093] [0.097] 
Loan ratio   1.853*** 1.504*** 1.826*** 1.462***   1.714*** 1.563*** 1.657*** 1.522*** 
    [0.367] [0.377] [0.368] [0.379]   [0.346] [0.365] [0.343] [0.363] 
Loan Loss Provision   -10.176* -8.429 -10.226* -8.595   -10.218** -9.205* -10.273** -9.291** 
    [5.522] [6.172] [5.519] [6.106]   [4.272] [4.712] [4.249] [4.636] 
Diversification   0.059 0.753 0.070 0.686   0.306 0.728 0.337 0.672 
    [0.410] [0.490] [0.405] [0.492]   [0.425] [0.469] [0.422] [0.470] 
Net interest margin   -0.131 1.307 -0.096 1.157   0.517 1.552 0.600 1.413 
    [1.137] [1.627] [1.134] [1.555]   [1.167] [1.462] [1.171] [1.398] 
Equity ratio   1.111* 0.846 1.100* 0.771   -1.821*** -1.968*** -1.840*** -2.030*** 
    [0.623] [0.717] [0.628] [0.704]   [0.589] [0.655] [0.588] [0.649] 
GDP per capita   -0.066 0.010 -0.072 0.008   -0.174 -0.131 -0.184 -0.130 
    [0.133] [0.134] [0.134] [0.133]   [0.119] [0.119] [0.119] [0.118] 
Volatility of GDP   0.146* 0.081 0.141* 0.102   0.191** 0.149** 0.180** 0.166** 
    [0.077] [0.075] [0.077] [0.074]   [0.073] [0.072] [0.073] [0.071] 
Inflation   -0.015 -0.024* -0.016 -0.025*   -0.028** -0.034** -0.029** -0.034** 
    [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014]   [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] 
Constant 3.730*** 1.244 0.651 1.333 0.629 5.779*** 4.828*** 4.394*** 4.992*** 4.375*** 
  [0.143] [1.099] [1.205] [1.111] [1.208] [0.120] [1.015] [1.102] [1.018] [1.107] 
Diagnostic Test                     
Observations 1,569 1,564 1,564 1,564 1,564 1,574 1,569 1,569 1,569 1,569 
No. of banks 110 109 109 109 109 110 109 109 109 109 
Bank fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Adj. R2 0.188 0.281 0.246 0.282 0.251 0.121 0.218 0.191 0.221 0.195 
F 14.15*** 22.03*** 18.12*** 23.56*** 19.03*** 9.487*** 12.52*** 10.50*** 14.44*** 10.98*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 120 
Table 3.5 
The relationship between different levels of bank competition and stability 
To check the sensitivity of the earlier results that higher market power is congenial to reducing risk we have constructed three different levels of market power dummies following Tabak et al. (2012) for High
Lerner( Lerner+0.5σ )≥ , Average Lerner Lerner(<Lerner+0.5σ  and >Lerner-0.5σ ) , and Low Lerner( Lerner-0.5σ )≤ . Six market power dummies of C-Lerner and E-Lerner are regressed with Z-score and return 
volatility. Bank fixed effects and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Unreported bank controls and macro controls are also included in all regressions. Result shows that only banks with Low level of market 
power are negatively associated with banking stability. Source: RBI and WDI. Coverage: 1992-2012. 
  Z-score [(ROA+EQA)/(sd(ROA)] Return volatility [-log(sd(ROA))] 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
High C-Lerner 1.064***           0.218**           
  [0.324]           [0.105]           
Average C-Lerner   0.990***           0.977***         
    [0.220]           [0.211]         
Low C-Lerner     -1.626***           -1.305***       
      [0.238]           [0.217]       
High E-Lerner       0.722**           0.074     
        [0.284]           [0.076]     
Average E-Lerner         0.451**           0.306*   
          [0.200]           [0.180]   
Low E-Lerner           -1.068***           -0.600*** 
            [0.250]           [0.228] 
Deregulation 2.167** 3.006*** 3.481*** 1.312 2.676** 2.015* 2.066** 2.888** 3.124*** 1.979* 2.390** 1.968* 
  [1.029] [1.150] [1.247] [1.113] [1.081] [1.089] [1.025] [1.149] [1.184] [1.034] [1.050] [1.043] 
Diagnostic Test                         
Estimator GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM OLS GMM GMM OLS GMM GMM 
Bank controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Macro controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Bank FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
First Stage F-test 24.89*** 47.90*** 57.70*** 27.89*** 60.79*** 57.93***   47.70*** 58.62***   60.73*** 57.78*** 
Hansen’s J Chi2 0.36 0.378 0.126 0.64 0.129 0.00168   1.154 0.65   0.962 0.619 
Hansen’s J [p-value] 0.548 0.538 0.722 0.424 0.72 0.967   0.283 0.42   0.327 0.431 
Second Stage F-test 12.87*** 11.80*** 13.45*** 12.43*** 11.85*** 12.37*** 8.524*** 8.530*** 9.515*** 8.390*** 8.912*** 9.209*** 
Adj. r2 0.136 0.083 0.078 0.134 0.134 0.092 0.113 0.014 0.046 0.110 0.095 0.080 
No. of Obs. 1,561 1,561 1,561 1,561 1,561 1,561 1,569 1,566 1,566 1,569 1,566 1,566 
No. of banks 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 
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 Table 3.6 
Sensitivity analysis of the impact of CDR using matching techniques 
VARIABLES Z-score [(ROA+EQA)/(sd(ROA)] Return volatility [-log(sd(ROA))] 
Matching  
estimators 
Kernel  
matching 
Stratified 
Matching 
Abadie 
and  
Imbens 
Kernel  
matching 
Stratified 
Matching 
Abadie 
and  
Imbens 
ATT 0.58**
* 
 
0.48**
* 
 
0.84**
* 
 
0.57**
* 
 
0.45**
* 
 
0.70**
* 
 
SE [0.08] 
 
[0.09] 
 
[0.13] 
 
[0.09] 
 
[0.09] 
 
[0.13] 
 
t-statistics 7.04 5.13 6.59  6.18 4.94 5.19  
Observations 1,403 
 
1,403 
 
1,240 
  
1,403 
 
1,403 
 
1,241 
  Common support 
condition √  
√  
√  √   √  √  
Note: Three matching methods are used: Kernel matching, Stratified matching and the nearest-neighbour 
bias-corrected matching estimators proposed by Abadie and Imbens (2006). Abadie and Imbens’ method 
adjusts the differences within the matches for the differences in covariate values. Following Abadie et al. 
(2004), we use four matches per observation. The variables that are used for the matching (or bias-adjusted 
variables) include the age of the bank, listed bank dummy (equal to one if a bank is listed in the stock market, 
or else zero), the number of employees, the number of branches and the logarithm of total assets. ATT is the 
average treatment effect for the treated. The standard errors in Abadie and Imbens are heteroskedasticity-
consistent, and Z-stats are reported. For the rest, we report absolute values of bootstrapped t-stats in brackets. 
Observation size is reduced as we do not have information on the number of employees for all banks prior 
to 1997. The number of observations also differs due to the difference in the underlying matching approaches. 
We run balancing test on all the independent variables included in the logit regression which have been 
satisfied. Hosmer–Lemeshow test confirmed goodness-of-fit of the logit model (unreported but available 
upon request).  
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Appendix 3.A 
Table 3.A1 
Correlation table 
This table provides information on the correlation between the market power, bank-specific and macroeconomic variables used throughout the paper. It contains pairwise 
correlation coefficients and the indication of their significance in the correlation. 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
C-Lerner  1 1                     
E-Lerner 2 0.56*** 1          
Size 3 -0.32*** -0.22*** 1         
Loan ratio 4 -0.13*** 0.12*** 0.35*** 1        
LLP ratio 5 0.28*** 0.19*** -0.20*** -0.08*** 1       
NIM 6 0.42*** 0.32*** -0.42*** -0.26*** 0.22*** 1      
Diversification 7 0.54*** 0.30*** -0.21*** -0.20*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 1     
Equity ratio 8 0.35*** 0.37*** -0.53*** -0.24*** 0.13*** 0.52*** 0.31*** 1    
Per Cap. GDP 9 0.10*** 0.13*** 0.28*** 0.27*** -0.12*** -0.15*** 0.19*** 0.20*** 1   
GDP Volatility 10 0.08** 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.15*** -0.02 -0.06* 0.03 -0.01 0.28*** 1  
Inflation 11 0.02 0.19*** 0.03 0.16*** -0.01 0.03 -0.06* -0.04 0 0.26*** 1 
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Table 3.A2 
Competition-Fragility: Fund-adjusted Lerner with 1% outlier correction 
The dependent variable is the Z-score, reported in columns 1, 2 and 3; standard deviation of return on assets, 
reported in columns 3, 4 and 5; and nonperforming loans are reported in 7, 8 and 9. Bank competition is 
proxied by three variants of the Lerner indices i.e., conventional Lerner (C-Lerner), efficiency-adjusted 
Lerner (E-Lerner) and funding-adjusted Lerner (F-Lerner). De-regulation dummy takes one for the year 1998 
and thereafter and otherwise zero. Bank size is the logarithm of total assets valued in million rupees. Bank’s 
liquidity is proxied by the ratio of net loan over assets. LLP ratio is measured as loan loss provision as a 
percentage of total assets, where income diversification is the ratio of non-interest income over total income. 
The profitability measure NIM is measured as the net interest income over total earning assets. Banks' equity 
is the bank total equity to asset ratio. To control for economic development, logarithm of GDP per capita is 
used, and volatility of GDP growth rate, measured as the standard deviation of GDP growth rate using 5-
year rolling window, is used to account for precariousness of business cycle for the last two decades. Inflation 
is used to capture the economic uncertainty. Before deciding which estimator to apply, we run an endogeneity 
test for the Lerner indices; if we reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity, we use a GMM estimator, or else 
use OLS fixed effects estimator. In both cases, we consider heteroskedasticity-autocorrelation robust 
standard errors (HAC). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. Source: RBI and WDI. Coverage: 1992-2012. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
VARIABLES Z-score [(ROA+EQA)/(sd(ROA)] Return volatility [-log(sd(ROA))] NPL [log(NPL)] 
C-Lerner 6.195***     4.247***     -2.276***     
  [0.735]     [0.663]     [0.517]     
E-Lerner   2.905***     1.663***     -0.384   
    [0.546]     [0.478]     [0.247]   
F-Lerner     6.256***     4.396***     -1.836*** 
      [0.675]     [0.621]     [0.478] 
Deregulation 3.571*** 1.576 2.690*** 3.075*** 1.755* 2.490** -1.685*** -1.567*** -1.590*** 
  [1.025] [1.090] [0.982] [1.022] [1.048] [0.987] [0.427] [0.433] [0.424] 
Diagnostic Test                   
Estimator GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM FE FE FE 
First Stage F-test 84.95*** 45.65*** 85.87*** 84.64*** 46.37*** 84.59*** - - - 
Hansen’s J Chi2 0.661 0.0591 1.530 0.964 0.539 1.666 - - - 
Hansen’s J [p-value] 0.416 0.808 0.216 0.326 0.463 0.197 - - - 
Second Stage F-test 16.42*** 13.68*** 17.32*** 10.56*** 9.848*** 11.29*** 54.32*** 51.80*** 54.62*** 
Adj. r2 0.218 0.142 0.237 0.148 0.107 0.160 0.469 0.454 0.465 
No. of Obs. 1,561 1,561 1,561 1,566 1,566 1,566 1,567 1,567 1,567 
No. of banks 106 106 106 106 106 106 105 105 105 
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Figure 3.A1 
Evolution of market power and banking stability 
 
 
Note: figure on the left (right) shows that after the implementation of corporate debt restructuring mechanism 
in India, member banks increase market power (bank stability) substantially.  
 
Table 3.A3 
Propensity to participate in CDR–Logit model and descriptive statistics 
 Panel A: Logit model Panel B: Descriptive statistics of matched sample 
Dependent variable: CDR Coefficient S.E. Member banks Non-member banks p-value t-stats 
Log of Age 0.887*** [0.343] 4.23 4.16 0.28 1.08 
Log of number of employee -2.434*** [0.713] 9.18 9.28 0.50 -0.67 
Log of number of branches 1.272** [0.519] 6.54 6.65 0.42 -0.80 
Listed bank dummy 1.879* [0.963] 0.89 0.92 0.35 -0.94 
Bank size (log total assets) 2.265*** [0.368] 12.10 12.15 0.65 -0.46 
Observation 1,340           
Note: In Panel A, the dependent variable CDR is an indicator variable that takes value 1 for banks which participated in Corporate Debt 
Restructuring Mechanism in 2003 and thereafter or else zero. We use the logarithm of total age of individual banks, the number of 
employees, branches, listed dummy and banks size of each bank in the Logit model in order to measure the propensity score where 
standard errors are clustered at the bank level and reported in brackets. Since information on bank employees are missing prior to 1997, 
our total number of observations is reduced to 1340. The Hosmer–Lemeshow test (p-value = 0.62) confirms the goodness-of fit of the 
Logit model. In Panel B, we show the descriptive statistics of the matched sample for which p-values are reported.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Genesis of CDR
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Year
Member bank Non-Member bank
[E-Lerner]
Evolution of Market power
Genesis of  CDR
2
2.
5
3
3.
5
4
4.
5
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Year
Member bank Non-Member bank
[Z- Score]
Evolution of Banking Stability
Figure A1: Evolution of market power and banking stability
Evolution of market power and banking stability
 125 
 
 
Figure A3.2 
Propensity score matching blocks and matched distribution 
 
Graph on the left shows several blocks where member and non-member banks were matched. Graphs on the 
right show the Kernel distribution of the matched and unmatched banks. 
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Chapter IV 
 
 
Is financial inclusion good for bank 
stability? International evidence 
Abstract 
We offer the first empirical evidence on the complementary effect of inclusive financial 
sectors on soundness of individual banks. Using a unique financial access survey database, 
we construct a composite index of financial inclusion for 87 countries for the period 2004-
2012, and then investigate a new research question as to whether the global policy drive 
towards greater financial inclusion is good for bank stability in a sample of 2,913 banks. 
We find that a higher level of financial inclusion leads to greater bank stability. This 
complementary effect is more pronounced when banks have higher market power and 
operate in countries where the political stability, rule of law, regulatory quality as well as 
the overall institutional quality are greater. Exploiting the cross-country, cross-year 
variation in the timing of pro-access policies of countries that are members of a global 
network of policymakers, we further corroborate our claims and uncover new causal 
evidence to show that enabling an inclusive financial environment indeed increases bank 
soundness by almost 36% in the treated countries. Our results highlight that the importance 
of ensuring an inclusive financial system is not only a development goal but also an issue 
that should be prioritised by the financial institutions as such a policy drive is good for 
banks in terms of their stability. Our results remain insensitive to an array of robustness 
tests. 
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“What improves the circumstances of the greater part can never be regarded as 
inconveniency to the whole. No society can surely be flourishing and happy, of which by 
far the greater part of the numbers are poor and miserable”. 
Adam Smith (1776) 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
While the recent empirical literature provides evidence on the positive role of  
financial inclusion in promoting wellbeing of households and economic growth through 
extending the access of the disadvantaged groups to basic financial services in the form of 
greater use of formal bank account and savings, little attention has been devoted to 
investigating whether such a development goal has ramifications on the soundness of 
banks.50,51 The most challenging issues for the financial institutions to facilitate access to 
finance are the high operating costs and the risk associated with servicing, monitoring and 
administering loans to individual households and small and medium enterprises (SMEs) 
who often lack required documentations, collateral and credit histories (e.g., Conning, 
1999; Demirgüç-Kunt, Beck and Honohan, 2008, henchforth DBH; Hermes, Lensink and 
Meesters, 2011). Broadening the access of the low income groups to formal financial 
services has therefore always been perceived as an antagonistic strategy that might dampen 
the performance of banks.52 Using a large sample of bank-level data on 2913 banks across 
87 countries over the period 2004 to 2012, this paper focuses on a specific dimension of 
financial development – financial sector inclusiveness – and an important regulatory issue 
at the micro level – bank stability; it supports the opposing view that inclusive financial 
50 See, for example: Wurgler (2000); Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000); Klapper, Laeven and Rajan (2006); 
Demirgüç-Kunt, Beck and Honohan (2008); Burgess and Pande (2005), and Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster 
and Kinnan (2013), in India; Bruhn and Love (2009), and Bruhn and Love (2014), in Mexico; Karlan and 
Zinman (2010), in South Africa; Dupas and Robinson (2009), in Kenya. 
51 The degree of financial intermediation causally impacts economic growth and employment (see a survey 
in Pasalı, 2013).  
52 A recent study suggests that almost 2.5 billion adults, just over half of the world’s adult population, do not 
use any form of formal financial services, where 19% and 72% of them are from developed and developing 
countries, respectively (Kendall, Mylenko and Ponce, 2010).  
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sectors and bank performance are, indeed, complementary.53  
In recent years, formal financial institutions have been increasingly searching for 
new opportunities and markets and seeing the benefits of a micro-finance style of 
operations.54 Since formal financial institutions have superior scale, skill and technological 
capacity (Peachy and Roe, 2006; DBH, 2008; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Martínez Pería, 
2011), many of them have extended their networks towards poor households and SMEs 
for higher profitability (Hermes, Lensink and Meesters, 2011). By exploiting technological 
advancements they can provide basic financial services to a large number of customers, 
especially those on the lower rung of the income ladder potentially at a reduced cost. With 
a supportive regulatory environment, by exploiting scale economies banks can not only 
ease financial constraints to marginalised groups and small firms, but also reduce risk and 
be more profitable at the same time (see e.g., De la Torre, Martínez Pería and Schmukler, 
2010; Montgomery and Weiss, 2011).  
Furthermore, over the past few decades, the central banks both in emerging and 
developed countries have taken many initiatives in conjunction with multilateral agencies 
including the IMF, G20, the Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI), and the Consultative 
Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) to enhance the inclusive banking agenda (see DBH, 
2008). Furthermore, in the last two decades, the banking sectors in the developing 
countries experienced increasing presence from foreign-owned banks, which are more 
sophisticated and equipped to attract larger firms and high-net-worth individuals, leading 
domestically owned banks to search for new markets that were previously underserved 
and/or excluded (See DBH, 2008, p.78). A more recent study by Beck and Brown (2014) 
use survey data for over 16,500 households from 19 emerging economies and confirm this 
53 Throughout this paper, we use the term “bank performances” and “bank stability” interchangeably.  
54 See a detailed survey in Harper and Arora (2005) on why commercial banks are so interested in micro-finance style 
of operations. 
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notion that foreign banks “cherry pick” financially transparent customers. At the same 
time, over the past decade, many countries have undertaken a large number of banking 
regulatory reforms (Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2008), which perhaps have had a 
meaningful effect on levels of financial inclusion and hence to the soundness of financial 
institutions. Given the changed regulatory environment, it therefore would be interesting 
to investigate how financial inclusion impacts banking stability. 
To our knowledge, there is no direct empirical evidence on the channels through 
which financial inclusion affects bank stability. Existing literature implicitly indicates 
several potential channels through which financial inclusion may have significant 
influence on the soundness of banks or risk-taking (see section 4.2). The modern portfolio 
theory suggests that diversification (geographic/sectoral) enables banks to reduce earnings 
volatility and adverse risk-taking incentives through cross-subsidization (Boot and 
Schmeits, 2000). It also allows banks to reduce distance to a large number of customers. 
By reducing distance to customers, banks can improve efficacy of services while dealing 
with informationally opaque ones (e.g., Degryse and Ongena, 2005; Hauswald and 
Marquez, 2006; Mian, 2006; Deng and Elyasiani, 2008). Hauswald and Marquez (2006) 
develop a model and show that a bank can get a precise signal about a borrower’s quality 
if it decreases distance from the borrower. Therefore, geographical outreach associated 
with financial inclusion should facilitate lender-borrower proximity, reducing the adverse 
selection problem and cost of monitoring, which in turn should improve banking stability. 
Recent evidence suggests that retail deposits are sluggish, insensitive to risks and 
provide a stable cheaper source of long term funding (see Song and Thakor, 2007), 
compared to wholesale funding which is extremely volatile and often costly (Huang and 
Ratnovski, 2011). Empirical studies also support this notion that banks relying more on 
retail deposits rather than on wholesale financiers were more stable during the recent 
financial crisis (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; Poghosyan and Čihak, 2011). 
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While banks extend deposit facilities to a large pool of customers, they are able to attract 
a large number of small retail deposits which are often cheaper than wholesale funding. 
Therefore, greater diversification in funding strategy associated with financial inclusion in 
mobilising deposits should reduce risks and funding costs of banks, enhancing bank 
stability.55 Again, recent evidence, with respect to Chilean banks, suggests that tail risks 
on large loans are greater compared to small loans (Adasme, Majnoni and Uribe, 2006).56 
In addition, disbursing small loans is always a routine and standard task, which involves 
less monitoring and screening cost. While banks extend credit to customers, they are able 
to obtain proprietary information about borrowers (e.g., Black, 1975; Fama, 1985; Rajan, 
1992), which is indispensable in reducing asymmetric information (cf. Nakamura, 1994). 
Therefore, by extending the access of a large pool of customers to small credits, banks can 
decrease potential monitoring costs and losses compared to large loans, enhancing the 
soundness of banks. Therefore, financial inclusion is the key ingredient to financial 
development strategies that can have a substantial impact on inclusive economic growth 
enhancing social stability and equity, and  should be correlated with efficient financial 
intermediation and stability (Hawkins, 2006; Khan, 2011; Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Lyman, 2012).  
Despite the remarkable benefits of access to finance on financial development and 
hence to inclusive economic growth, there is no empirical literature on the issues related 
to bank stability. Perhaps the most closely related paper is the seminal work by Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Martínez Pería (2007), henchforth BDM) who investigate the 
55 Several governments, especially in the developing countries, are making financial inclusion an essential 
part of their national plans. For example, on 28 August 2014, the government of India launched the ‘Pradhan 
Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana’ (Prime Minister's People Money Scheme), with the explicit aim of removing 
financial exclusion. Though this scheme has an option for opening new bank accounts with zero balance, 
banks were able to garner deposits of INR1500 crore (US$240 million) within two weeks of the launch of 
the scheme, with around 30.2 million new accounts. 
56 Using randomized experiments, De Mel, McKenzie and Woodruff (2008) in Sri Lanka and McKenzie and 
Woodruff (2008) in Mexico, estimate capital returns to investment in microenterprises, and find that micro-
entrepreneurs are indeed able to pay the high interest rates charged by microfinance institutions. 
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determinants of financial sector outreach, and its role on a firm’s financing obstacles. They 
find that firms report less severe financing obstacles in countries with better outreach. 
More recently Beck, Lin and Ma (2014) investigate the link between bank branch outreach 
and a firm’s tax avoidance. The limited research in this area is somewhat obvious given 
the limitations of supply- and demand-side data availability on access. In addition, the lack 
of development of a reliable quantitative index of financial inclusion hitherto restricts 
explicitly analysing the effects of inclusive financial systems on various aspects of banking 
performances.  
This study fills a gap and makes several contributions to the literature. First, while 
most of the empirical papers assess the effect of financial inclusion on various socio-
economic indicators (e.g., Butler and Cornaggia, 2011; Allen, Carletti, Cull, Qian, Senbet 
and Valenzuela, 2013; Demirgüç-Kunt, Klapper and Randall, 2013; Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Klapper and Singer, 2013), or use a disaggregated single indicator of financial inclusion 
(e.g., BDM, 2007), this paper constructs a multidimensional index of financial inclusion 
at country level, to see the effect on bank-level stability in a cross-country analysis, 
including developed, developing and transition economies while controlling for bank-
specific, country-specific and institutional characteristics that one typically encounters in 
financial development literature. Our financial inclusion index has some advantages over 
the measures used in literature. Specifically, we use an IMF Financial Access Survey (FAS) 
dataset to construct a composite index of financial inclusion incorporating three different 
dimensions, accessibility, availability and usage, which are deemed to have a substantial 
impact on inclusiveness in the financial sector (see sub-section 4.3). As these dimensions 
are highly correlated with each other, we capture common variation among them using 
principal component analysis (PCA). Then, we develop an index of financial inclusion 
deriving the weight of each dimension, which is useful because it allows us to construct a 
composite index that enables comparison across countries— minimising concerns about 
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measurement error. The time series dimension of this index allows us to exploit within 
country variation in the inclusiveness of the financial sector, and explore the effect on bank 
stability in a systematic way. We also test the validity and robustness of our index using 
data from the World Bank global financial inclusion index (henceforth Global Findex) and 
World Bank Enterprise Surveys (WBES). 
Second, addressing the impact of financial inclusion on bank stability is non-
existent both in academic and regulatory circles.57 This paper is the first, to our knowledge, 
to address this research agenda in a cross-country setting to contribute to the contemporary 
policy issue related to financial development and financial inclusion using bank level data 
of 2913 banks across 87 countries for the period 2004-2012. Most of the evidence is either 
anecdotal58 and/or uses simple analyses at the macro-level (e.g., Hannig and Jansen, 2010; 
Han and Melecky, 2013; Morgan and Pontines, 2014). Third, we use instrumental variable 
(IV) estimator to extract the exogenous component of financial inclusion while controlling 
for unobserved bank characteristics that might affect both financial inclusion and stability, 
reducing concerns about endogeneity. Fourth, our paper contributes to the literature that 
explores the determinants of banking stability (e.g., Berger, Klapper and Turk-Ariss, 2009; 
Laeven and Levine, 2009; Houston, Lin, Lin and Ma, 2010; Beck, De Jonghe and 
Schepens, 2013; Anginer, Demirgüç-Kunt and Zhu, 2014). Fifth, our study offers in-depth 
evidence of the impact of financial inclusion on banking stability for a large number of 
developed and developing countries over a period that comprises the recent global 
financial crisis. During this period, regulators of most of the financial systems emphasise 
broadening the access of the marginalised groups to formal financial services while also 
57 Throughout this paper, we use the term “access-stability” and “financial inclusion-bank stability” 
interchangeably.  
58 Tetangco, A., “Philippines CBG: the positive influence of financial inclusion”, the Banker, October 1st 
2013,  
http://www.thebanker.com/Comment/Viewpoint/Philippines-CBG-the-positive-influence-of-financial-
inclusion?ct=true 
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keeping balance between the soundness of banks, especially in the post crisis era. 
Therefore, understanding the link between these two variables is important and should be 
useful to researchers and policymakers for articulating policies that are mutually 
reinforcing in order for ushering inclusive economic growth. Sixth, the cross-country 
nature of our dataset allows us to explore the role of bank competition and the institutional 
environment on the access-stability relationship, which are of particular interest for policy.  
Finally, we run an array of sensitivity checks using other proxies of financial inclusion, 
bank competition and stability, by executing alternative estimation approaches (panel data 
vs. cross section) and by employing different sample specifications, particularly running 
regression for the sample of developing countries. We also exploit the variation in the 
membership timing of countries of a network of financial inclusion policymakers and 
explore the causal effects of financial access policies on banking stability using a “Quasi-
natural experiment” approach. To alleviate any selection bias and confounding factors in 
the treatment effects, we employ both parametric, difference-in-differences as well as non-
parametric, matching estimators.  
 Our results indicate that there is a strong link between financial inclusion and 
bank stability. In particular, the higher the degree of financial inclusion, the better the bank 
performance is, in terms of reducing risks. The evidence also suggests that any beneficial 
effects of financial inclusion on bank stability tend to be more pronounced in banking 
sectors with less competition. As banks expand their operations towards areas that were 
previously underserved and/or excluded, they are able to reduce excessive risk taking when 
they have higher market power. We also investigate the influence of institutional settings 
on the access-stability relationship, and find that the institutional environment in which 
banks operate reinforces the complementarity effects of financial inclusion on the 
soundness of banks. Specifically, greater freedom of expression, political stability, 
regulatory quality, rule of law and less corruption enhances the positive relationship 
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between financial inclusion and bank stability.  
Before proceeding, we would like to add an important caveat to our results. We 
derive our financial inclusion measure from the IMF’s FAS dataset by using supply side 
data at the macro level. Though we tried to add as many dimensions as possible to get a 
comprehensive picture of overall financial inclusion of a country, we acknowledge that 
there must be other factors contributing to financial inclusion. However, we have checked 
the robustness of our results running the same regressions using different measures of 
financial inclusion, and found unambiguously similar results. 
The remaining part of the paper is organised as follows: Section 4.2 reviews the 
literature on financial inclusion and its potential relationship with bank stability. Section 
4.3 outlines the empirical models and Section 4.4 describes the data and descriptive 
statistics. Section 4.5 discusses the empirical results with sensitivity analyses, while 
Section 4.6 concludes with some policy implications.  
 
4.2 Related Literature and Hypothesis Development 
We hypothesise that broadening access of all economic agents to formal financial 
services – greater financial inclusion – is likely to have an important influence on the 
degree of bank stability.  From a theoretical perspective, it is a priori not clear whether an 
inclusive financial sector is good for bank stability (i.e., less risk taking). Through financial 
outreach–geographical and demographical bank branch network penetration– banks can 
serve a wide range of customers potentially at a reduced cost once necessary infrastructures 
are in place (see Berger, Hasan and Zhou, 2010). By exploiting expertise i.e., managerial 
and technical expertise, they can improve operating efficiency and revenues as they have 
cheaper funding, new lending and investment opportunities (see e.g., Saunders, 1994; 
Berger and DeYoung, 2001; Deng and Elyasiani, 2008; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 
2010).  
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It is argued in the literature that retail deposits are sluggish, insensitive to risk and 
provide a stable cheaper source of long term funding (e.g., see  Calomiris and Kahn, 1991; 
Song and Thakor, 2007), compared to wholesale funding which is extremely volatile and 
often costly (e.g., see Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; Huang and Ratnovski, 2011; 
Poghosyan and Čihak, 2011).59 Huang and Ratnovski (2011) show that wholesale 
financiers are prone to very mild negative information or rumours, and most of the time 
they are reluctant to rollover short-term funding as they have access to information on the 
quality of bank projects. While comparing informed and arm’s length debt, Rajan (1992) 
finds that the informed debt holders (i.e., wholesale funders) could discontinue funds for a 
project with negative present value unless they are compensated with higher interest rate. 
Recent empirical studies also show that banks relying more on retail deposits rather than 
on wholesale funding were more stable during the recent financial crisis (e.g., Demirgüç-
Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; Poghosyan and Čihak, 2011). Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga 
(2010), using a sample of listed banks in 101 countries for the period 1995-2007, also find 
that a higher level of non-deposit funding shares increases banking fragility. Ratnovski and 
Huang (2009) show that the ample retail depository funding was the key factor behind the 
relative resilience of Canadian banks during the 2008 turmoil. Moreover, during the recent 
credit crunch when the wholesale funding dried up it was the diversified retail deposit base 
that cushioned financial institutions from fragility (see Hannig and Jansen, 2010). While 
banks extend deposit facilities to a large pool of customers they are able to attract a large 
number of small retail deposits which are often cheaper than wholesale funding.60 
59 The retail deposits are sluggish because the withdrawals of them are motivated by the individual 
depositors’ liquidity need, and thus it is predictable based on the law of large numbers. In addition, they are 
insensitive to risk partly because of the deposit insurance provided by the government (e.g., Kim, Kliger and 
Vale, 2003; Song and Thakor, 2007). For example, in all recent bank failures (e.g., Continental Illinois, 
Northern Rock, IndyMac), it was short-term wholesale financiers who exited faster than retail depositors 
without having significant losses. In the case of Northern Rock, retail depositors’ run on the bank took place 
after it had nearly exhausted its liquid assets to pay short-term wholesale financiers (Shin, 2009; Goldsmith-
Pinkham and Yorulmazer, 2010). 
60 Several governments, especially in the developing countries, are making financial inclusion an essential 
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Therefore, greater diversification in funding strategy associated with financial inclusion in 
mobilising deposits should reduce the risks and funding costs for banks, enhancing bank 
stability; for example, during financial distress when panic gets into depositors, they run 
on banks to withdraw their savings (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Shin, 2009). Recently, 
Han and Melecky (2013) found international evidence for the period 2006-2010 that, by 
dint of the law of large numbers, correlated deposit withdrawals (i.e., bank runs) could be 
mitigated during stressful times if bank deposits are more diversified i.e., held by more 
individuals and firms.  
The greater financial inclusion is also likely to influence the overall level of 
lending opportunity for banks. By reaching out to unbanked/underbanked areas while 
extending small credits, banks can reduce distance and build strong relationships with 
customers. Recent literature shows that a large distance between lender and borrower 
undermines the efficacy of banking services through intensification of the asymmetric 
information problem (Degryse and Ongena, 2005; Hauswald and Marquez, 2006; Mian, 
2006; Deng and Elyasiani, 2008). Hauswald and Marquez (2006) develop a model and 
show that lenders can get precise signals about a borrower’s quality if they decrease the 
distance from the borrower. In addition, banks can also reduce informational asymmetry 
by obtaining proprietary information about borrowers while providing access to basic 
financial services (e.g., Black, 1975; Fama, 1985; Rajan, 1992). To deal with less 
creditworthy clients and those who often lack collateral, banks need to adopt lending 
techniques that are based on soft information (i.e., relationship lending). Exploiting this 
lending technology, they can also reduce moral hazards and adverse selection problems, 
part of their national plans. For example, on 28 August 2014, the government of India launched the ‘Pradhan 
Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana’ (Prime Minister's People Money Scheme), with the explicit aim of removing 
financial exclusion. Though this scheme has an option for opening new bank accounts with zero balance, 
banks were able to garner deposits of ₹1500 crore (US$240 million) within two weeks of the launch of the 
scheme, with around 30.2 million new accounts. 
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and get comparative advantage over other financial institutions seeking informational rents 
(see Sharpe, 1990; Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Buch, Koch and Koetter, 2012).61 For 
example, using US bank holding companies, Akhigbe and Whyte (2003) and Deng and 
Elyasiani (2008) find that geographic diversification enhances bank value and risk 
reduction. Deng and Elyasiani (2008) also find that diversification across more remote 
areas (in our case, the areas where financial services are hardly available) is associated 
with greater value enhancement and a slighter risk-reduction effect. Therefore, when banks 
diversify to regions where a greater unbanked population is located, they are better able to 
understand the nuances of the local household/firm environment, which should reduce the 
probability of default rates, cost of monitoring and enhance lender-borrower proximity, 
and relationship, which in turn enhances risk-reduction.62  
In contrast, if banks attract a large pool of extremely low creditworthy borrowers 
due to financial inclusion, it can derail banking stability as they need to extend small credits 
to a wider set of borrowers.63 In a recent study, Adasme, Majnoni and Uribe (2006) with 
respect to the portfolio of Chilean banks, show that losses on large loans are greater and 
more unpredictable than losses on small ones.64 It suggests that by providing access to 
credit to a large number of small borrowers, banks should be able to reduce monitoring 
costs and volatility of earnings. In addition, disbursing small loans is always a routine and 
61 Linking three unique data sets, in a more recent study, Beck, Degryse, De Haas and Van Horen (2014) 
show that relationship lending alleviates SMEs’ credit constraints during a cyclical downturn, and this effect 
is strongest for smaller and more opaque firms, and in regions where the downturn is more severe. 
62 It may also be the case that geographic diversification is associated with banking stability loss due to 
informational asymmetries binding with poor households or small firms. It may also occur due to lack of 
managerial and technical expertise, agency problems related to complex organisational and product structure 
(Acharya, Hasan and Saunders, 2006). Investigating the impact of geographic diversification, Acharya, 
Hasan and Saunders (2006) on Italy and Goetz, Laeven and Levine (2013) on the U.S., did not find any 
improvement in the risk-return trade-off and market valuations, respectively.  
63 Regarding the recent subprime crisis, Rajan (2011) elucidates that “easy credit” as a mechanism to reduce 
income inequality can create a “fault line” along the financial system undermining the financial stability 
owing to enormous stresses. 
64 Using randomized experiments, De Mel, McKenzie and Woodruff (2008) in Sri Lanka and McKenzie and 
Woodruff (2008) in Mexico, estimate capital returns to investment in microenterprises, and find that micro-
entrepreneurs are indeed able to pay the high interest rates charged by microfinance institutions. 
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standard task, which involves less monitoring and screening cost. Moreover, according to 
portfolio theory, diversified banks can decrease earning volatility and adverse risk-taking 
incentives through cross-subsidisation (Boot and Schmeits, 2000). Rossi, Schwaiger and 
Winkler (2009) with Austrian banking data find that increased diversification of loan 
portfolio requires banks to keep lower future provisioning, which in turn results in a 
reduction of realised risk. Using conventional and Islamic banks for the period 2002-2010, 
Shaban, Duygun, Anwar and Akbar (2014) find that profitability is one of the main reasons 
for Indonesian banks to lend to small businesses. They also find that greater diversification 
of loans towards small businesses is associated with lower risk provisions for Indonesian 
banks. Therefore, by extending the access of a large pool of customers to small credit, 
banks can decrease potential monitoring costs and losses compared to large loans, which 
in turn improves the soundness of banks.  
Above all, since greater financial inclusion increases the supply of bank credit, 
which is always the vital and cheaper source of external finance for SMEs (e.g., Petersen 
and Rajan, 1997; Berger and Udell, 1998), it also aids in the growth of small firms, and 
firms that need external finance. Literature evokes that financial development (i.e., 
financial inclusion) disproportionately helps industries with a technologically larger share 
of small firms, and also the industries with higher dependence on external finance (Rajan 
and Zingales, 1998; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven and Levine, 2008). Since more 
inclusive financial systems will ameliorate market frictions–i.e., informational opacity and 
transaction costs–small firms and firms that rely more on external finance in the economy 
will grow faster because of relatively easier access to credit. With the increasing supply of 
credit, borrowers will get favourable loan contracts, which is vital to disincentivise 
borrowers from asset substitution–where borrowers utilise the funds to invest in riskier 
projects, which in turn enhances bank stability as the borrower’s default probability 
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decreases.  
Apart from the channels discussed above, there are some exogenous risks (i.e., 
natural disasters, social and political disruptions) that can undermine efficient financial 
intermediation and stability (Hawkins, 2006). Therefore, our final channel is social and 
political stability. A number of recent studies find that greater financial inclusion reduces 
income inequality and poverty (e.g., Burgess and Pande, 2005; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine, 2007; Bruhn and Love, 2014); increases employment (e.g., Prasad, 2010); 
improves mental well-being (e.g., Karlan and Zinman, 2010; Angelucci, Karlan and 
Zinman, 2013); favours education (e.g., Flug, Spilimbergo and Wachtenheim, 1998); helps 
with better decision-making (e.g., Mani, Mullainathan, Shafir and Zhao, 2013); and 
enhances new firm creation (e.g., Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2004; Klapper, Laeven 
and Rajan, 2006; Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster and Kinnan, 2013).65 For example, using 
state-level data in India, Burgess and Pande (2005) find that expanding bank branches in 
rural areas had a significant positive impact on poverty alleviation.66 Similarly, recently, 
Bruhn and Love (2014) provide evidence from Mexico using randomized evaluation 
suggesting that facilitating better access to finance to the poorest of the poor has a positive 
impact on poverty alleviation. They also find that access to financial services has a positive 
impact on economic development through the channel of keeping individuals employed 
and fostering the survival and creation of informal business. As the nature of SMEs 
business operations is labour intensive, Prasad (2010) observes that financial constraint to 
SMEs has adverse effects on employment growth. On a study of Compartamos borrowers 
65 Bauchet, Marshall, Starita, Thomas and Yalouris (2011) summarize evidence from randomized evaluations 
of microfinance. The general findings of these studies are that financial services have a positive impact on 
numerous microeconomic indicators, including self-employment, business activities, household 
consumption, and well-being. 
66 Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), using branching deregulation implemented by different U.S. states between 
the mid-1970s and mid-1990s, find that the relaxation of intra- and interstate branching had a positive impact 
on economic growth.  
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in Mexico, Angelucci, Karlan and Zinman (2013) find that access to credit does have a 
positive impact on mental well-being. Therefore, the positive effect of financial inclusion 
on various key socio-economic indicators is indispensable to inclusive economic growth 
and sociopolitical stability, which in turn could lead to greater efficiency in the financial 
intermediations and soundness of banks (see e.g., Hannig and Jansen, 2010; Khan, 2011; 
Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt and Lyman, 2012). 
Overall, since providing access to finance seems to have multiple positive effects 
on many aspects of the economy including banking operations, we therefore view the link 
between financial inclusion and bank stability as ultimately an empirical question. 
Hypothesis 1: financial inclusion is positively associated with bank-level stability.   
 
4.3 Methodology 
We examine the impact of financial inclusion on banking stability using bank-
level data from 87 countries. It is possible that the results of the study may be biased 
because of the endogeneity problem between financial inclusion and bank stability. 
Endogeneity can arise if a bank engages in risky activities in the current set-up and ventures 
into rural areas to offset high risk and/or if they self-select into inclusive financial activities 
because these reward them with greater market power and profitability. Therefore, we use 
an instrumental variable technique with a two-step generalized method of moments 
(GMM) estimator using the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) 
variance estimation of Newey and West (1987).67 This estimator extracts the exogenous 
component of financial inclusion, reducing concerns about endogeneity. We run several 
regressions using the following baseline model: 
67 Since GMM accounts for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation it is more efficient than 2SLS (Hall, 2005).  
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Where the i, j and t subscripts indicate bank, country and year, respectively. Bank 
stability is ln(Z-score), measured at the bank level. We control for various bank-specific 
and country-specific characteristics, and the detailed definitions of them are presented in 
Table 4.1. Our main explanatory variable of interest is the financial inclusion index, 
measured at the country level. To control for time invariant bank heterogeneity and time 
varying global business cycle effects, we include bank fixed effects iα  and year fixed 
effects tYear , respectively. As a robustness test, we use standard deviation of return-on-
assets (ROA). Since expanding the access of the low yield clienteles to basic financial 
services may have a negative impact on the bottom line of banks, it is natural to check the 
robustness of our results using income volatility of individual banks as an alternative 
measure of banking stability. Furthermore, considering the recent development on the 
measures of bank competition, we employ both conventional and efficiency adjusted 
Lerner indices as measures of Bank Competition, which should also provide robustness to 
our results.68   
4.4 Data and descriptive statistics 
To investigate the relationship between financial inclusion and bank stability, we 
draw data from a number of sources: (1) the bank level dataset compiled from the 
BankScope database provided by Bureau van Dijk and Fitch Ratings, that contains detailed 
balance sheet and income statement information for both public and private banks in any 
68 We use lagged values of Lerner indices to mitigate any remaining endogeneity issues that may be 
associated with market power and stability (see e.g., Turk Ariss, 2010; Love and Martínez Pería, 2014). 
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given country; (2) the macro data compiled from the World Bank World Development 
Indicators (WDI); (3) the instruments for IV regressions collected form the Heritage 
Foundation, Doing Business database, and Entrepreneurship database; (4) the variables 
used to construct financial inclusion index compiled from the IMF’s FAS database; and 
(5) six indicators of institutional quality taken from the Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 
(2010) Governance Index. Our dataset comprises 2,913 commercial banks, cooperative 
banks and Islamic banks (13,836 bank-year observations) in 87 countries over the time 
period 2004-2012, which represent, respectively 57.4%, 41.3%, and 1.3% of the sample. 
Since the objective of this study is to investigate the impact of financial inclusion on bank 
stability, we apply a number of selection criteria to obtain our sample. First, we exclude 
countries for which we have no information on different dimensions of the financial 
inclusion index. Second, we discard unconsolidated reports of banks whenever 
consolidated ones of the same group are available to offset double counting. Third, we 
drop banks that had information for fewer than three consecutive years, as the bank 
stability measures computed in this study are based on rolling windows over the past three 
years. We deflate all monetary values to 2005 (2005 = 100) prices using the GDP deflator 
of the U.S. obtained from the WDI. The deflated series are reported in millions of U.S. 
dollars ($). 
 
4.4.1 Measuring bank risk 
We follow Laeven and Levine (2009) to measure the Z-score which is widely used 
in the literature and considered to be an unbiased and complete indicator of bank riskiness 
(see, for instance, Houston, Lin, Lin and Ma, 2010; Turk Ariss, 2010; Fang, Hasan and 
Marton, 2014). Using assets returns, their volatility and leverage, we calculate the Z-score 
as follows: 
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Where ROA  and EQA  are the average return-on-assets and the equity-to-assets 
ratio, respectively and ( )ROAσ  is the standard deviation of return-on-assets. We can 
interpret this score as the number of standard deviations below the mean by which returns 
would have to drop before all equity in the bank gets depleted (Boyd and Runkle, 1993; 
Beck, De Jonghe and Schepens, 2013). If bank profitability is normally distributed, the 
inverse proxy of the Z-score can be considered as the bank’s probability of insolvency. In 
other words, higher returns and capitalisation would increase but volatile returns would 
decrease the stability of banks.  
 
4.4.2 Measuring financial inclusion index 
4.4.2.1 Financial inclusion index 
In an inclusive financial sector, any member of the economy, irrespective of 
background, should enjoy the ease of access, availability, affordability and usage of the 
basic financial services provided. Therefore, while measuring an index of financial 
inclusion one should incorporate as many dimensions as possible that may have an impact 
on inclusiveness of the financial sector. Information on various dimensions may be 
obtained from demand-side surveys, such as the World Bank’s Global Financial Inclusion 
(Global Findex) database, an individual-level database comprised of survey data collected 
over the 2011 calendar year covering more than 150,000 adults in 148 economies. Since 
the costs and collection of survey data are demanding, and the availability of such data for 
a longer period is unreasonable, we therefore focus on supply-side data that were collected 
by BDM (2007) with the joint effort of the World Bank for 2003-2004, and later on 
extended by the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) and by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF).  
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In this study, we use the IMF Financial Access Survey (FAS) dataset to measure 
the index of Financial Inclusion for 87 countries for the period 2004-2012. Unlike Global 
Findex, the time-series dimension of this index allows us not only to explore the 
relationship between financial inclusion and bank stability over time but also to exploit the 
within-country variation in financial inclusion of any given banking system. In general, 
there is a consensus, at least from the regulator’s perspective, that financial inclusion can 
be measured using four dimensions, namely the penetration/accessibility, availability, 
affordability and usage. Given the data availability constraint, the variable we use for each 
dimension often requires proxies. For the penetration dimension, we use the number of 
bank accounts per 1,000 people in order to integrate the depth of the financial access.69 
The availability dimension is used to account for the pervasiveness of the outreach of the 
financial sector in terms of banks’ physical outlets, as physical distance to physical point 
of financial services  is considered an important impediment to financial inclusion (see 
Allen, Carletti, Cull, Senbet and Valenzuela, 2014). We use two classes of penetration of 
banking services i.e., demographic and geographic penetration of bank branch and ATM 
(see BDM, 2007). For the demographic penetration, we use the number of bank branches 
and number of ATMs per 100,000 people, and for the geographic penetration we use the 
number of bank branches and number of ATMs per 1,000 square kilometres.70 The 
affordability dimension can also be classified into various sub-categories that include 
“transaction costs” and “ease of transaction”.71 Since the data on the affordability 
69 The actual representation of penetration dimension would have been the number of people having banking 
accounts rather than the number of accounts per capita. The caveat is that in the latter case the “banked” 
population might be overestimated due to dormant accounts and/or double count of accounts of the same 
person.  
70 As the distribution of bank branches and ATMs is not always uniform and often concentrated in urban 
areas of the country and provides access to only some individuals, using area- and population-based ratios 
may undermine the true penetration of banking services (BDM, 2007). 
71 Having information on affordability dimension would certainly improve the quality of financial inclusion 
index, but comparable macro data for a large number of countries is hard to get. For example, the annual 
fees charged to customers for ATM cards and/or accounts i.e. “transaction costs” and the minimum amount 
and/or document requires opening savings or checking accounts i.e. “ease of transaction”.  
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dimension is rather scarce, this dimension is not considered in the computation of the 
financial inclusion index. For the usage dimension, we use the volume of credit plus 
deposit relative to the GDP (see Table 4.1 for details).  
BDM (2007) investigate financial sector outreach and its determinants by using 
cross-country data to identify common trends across the abovementioned indicators. It is 
easier for the general public to comprehend and compare an indicator across countries that 
is composite in nature, engrained with many correlated indicators (OECD, 2008).  In this 
paper, we overcome the shortcomings, and build upon BDM (2007) to introduce a 
multidimensional weighted index of all variables as a measure of financial inclusion.72  
The indicators used in the construction of financial inclusion are highly correlated 
with each other. To sufficiently capture the common variation among these correlated 
indicators of financial inclusion as a single measure, we develop an index that represents 
the overall inclusiveness in the financial sector using principal components analysis (PCA) 
(see Appendix 4.A for details on PCA). The first principal component from PCA has the 
interpretation of being the single linear combination of the financial inclusion indicators 
that explains most of the variations we see in these indicators. This index will sufficiently 
deal with the problem of multicollinearity and over-parameterization as a single measure 
of financial inclusion. Before using PCA, indicators of each dimension are normalised to 
have values of zero and one so that the scale in which they are measured is immaterial.73 
Since the availability dimension is comprised of four variables initially, we capture 
common variation among four outreach variables using the PCA and construct an 
availability dimension. Subsequently, we use the PCA to extract the common principal 
component (PC) of the three dimensions that capture different aspects of the inclusive 
72 Sarma and Pais (2011) measure a weighted index of financial inclusion using manual weights of the dimensions for a 
sample of 49 countries for the calendar year 2004.   
73 Prior to normalising, we winsorise each indicator at the 95th percentile levels to reduce the influence of outliers at the 
upper tail.  
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financial sector: the penetration, availability and usage of the financial services.  
Table 4.A1 shows the results of the PCA. Regarding availability dimension, the 
eigenvalues of the four PCs are 2.81, 0.69, 0.45, and 0.05, respectively, suggesting that the 
first principal component explains about 70% of the corresponding sample variance (see 
Panel A).74 Except for the first PC, no other PCs have an eigenvalue greater than one, so 
we just take the first component and extract the availability dimension using weights (i.e., 
0.52, 0.52, 0.47, and 0.48) assigned to the first principal component. Regarding financial 
inclusion, the eigenvalues of the three PCs are 1.54, 0.99, and 0.45, respectively, indicating 
that the first principal component explains about 51% of the corresponding sample 
variance (see Panel B). Similarly, only the first principal component has an eigenvalue that 
is more than one so we can assume that the first component sufficiently explains the 
common variation among the three dimensions.75 As shown in equation (4.3), we construct 
a multidimensional index for financial inclusion using the factor loadings (weights) of each 
dimension derived from the principal component analysis: 
 
  0.71*  0.71*  0.06*jt jt jt jtFII Penetration Availability Usage= + +   (3.3) 
 
Equation (4.3) indicates that the financial inclusion index (FII) has somewhat 
higher weights on the penetration and availability dimensions, but relatively lower weights 
on the usage dimension.76 In order to facilitate analysis and interpretation, we further 
normalise this index assigned to each country along a 0-1 scale, where zero indicates 
74 See Vyas and Kumaranayake (2006). 
75 Since we drop a few PCs, it also eliminates part of the noise components from our data, which ultimately 
may yield more reliable estimates. 
76 In order to check the stability and robustness of our financial inclusion index, we also use principal component analysis 
on a year-by-year basis in which loadings are determined annually instead of over the entire sample period. The 
correlation between these two indices (one where the loadings are derived over the entire sample period and the other 
derived annually) is very high (i.e. 0.98), indicating the robustness of our index irrespective of how loadings are 
determined.  
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financial exclusion, and unity indicates financial inclusion.77  
 
4.4.2.2 Verifying the strength of the financial inclusion index 
Although our paper makes the first systematic attempt to construct a composite 
index of financial inclusion for a longer panel and then analyse its impact on banking 
stability, it is not without its limitations. In the construction of the index, affordability 
dimension, marketing exclusion and self-exclusion have not been addressed. However, 
despite these shortcomings, we see this construction of composite index and the associated 
analysis as a useful and important first step towards developing a more robust indicator of 
financial inclusion. In this section, we borrow ideas from BDM (2007), and test the validity 
of the financial inclusion index. First, we use the Global Findex survey database, and check 
the correlation between household-based indicators of financial inclusion and the financial 
inclusion index. In some recent studies (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt, Klapper and Singer, 2013; 
Allen, Carletti, Cull, Senbet and Valenzuela, 2014), the most common variables that are 
used as indicators of financial inclusion are adults with an account at a formal financial 
institution to total adults (%) (i.e., Share of household account) and adults saving at a 
financial institution in the past year to total adults (%) (i.e., Share of household saving). 
We find that our index is positively and significantly correlated at the 1% significance level 
with these Global Findex indicators. We also assess the power of our index to see whether 
our index is useful in predicting these observable micro-level data.  
 
     19.04 (6.81)  92.09 (13.69)*  
     6.59 (3.94)  92.09  (7.65)*  
Share of household account Financial Inclusion
Share of household saving Financial Inclusion
= +
= +
  (3.4) 
We collapse our data at the country level and regress the share of household 
77 The primary intention of constructing this index is to see the impact of financial inclusion on banking 
stability. Therefore, financial inclusion is measured across countries and period in order to take into account 
the evolution of the index.  
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account (the share of household saving) on financial inclusion index using robust standard 
errors. The regression yields R2 of 57% (32%) with 81 observations. T-statistics are 
reported in the parentheses of equation (4.4). Financial inclusion index enters significantly 
at the 1% level, indicating that greater financial inclusion is positively associated with 
more households having accounts (savings) at financial institutions. The correlation 
between predicted share of household account (saving) and the actual share of household 
account (saving) at a financial institution is 76% (56%). 
Second, so far we have seen that our index is powerful enough in predicting the 
household-based measure of financial access. Now, we use firm-level data taken from the 
World Bank Enterprise Surveys (WBES) in order to gauge the relationship between 
financial inclusion index and firms’ access to finance, while controlling for firm-specific 
characteristics. WBES contains an expansive array of economic data on 130,000 firms in 
135 countries over the period 2002-2014.78 We run the following estimations at the firm-
level:  
 
c,k,t 0 1 , 2 , , , , c t c k t c k tF Financial Inclusion Xβ β β ε= + + +    (3.5) 
 
Where F is the rating of financing obstacles reported by firm k  in country c  at 
time t  and X  is a set of control variables, which include firm size (employee), a dummy 
variable for manufacturing firms, a dummy for the firms that are involved in exporting, 
dummy variables for government and foreign-owned firms, age of the firms in years, GDP 
growth rate and regional dummies (see Table 4.1 and 4.2A for details). We run an ordered 
probit model to estimate equation (4.5), as financing obstacle is a polychotomous 
dependent variable with natural order where higher values indicate greater financing 
78 See Love and Martínez Pería (2014) for details on this database. In addition, out of 87, we could only match 64 
countries’ financial inclusion indices with the WBES database for the period 2004-2012.   
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constraints. It is expected that the greater the financial inclusion the less financing 
constraints there would be for firms to get access to credit. In addition, following Love and 
Martínez Pería (2014), we also use an alternative measure of access to finance. In this case, 
we construct an indicator variable that takes one if firm k  in country c  at time t  has a bank 
loan, line of credit, or overdraft.79 A positive relationship between financial inclusion index 
and access to finance is expected as a more inclusive financial system would alleviate 
financing constrains disbursing more credit to firms.    
The results are reported in Table 4.A2. The findings confirm the expectation that 
firms tend to report lower (higher) financial constraints (access) in those countries where 
financial inclusion is greater. In particular, we find that financing obstacles are negatively 
related to an inclusive financial system, whereas access to finance is positively associated 
at the 1% significance level. Therefore, it once again assures the robustness of our index.  
 
4.4.3 Measuring bank competition 
Lerner index is used to measure the degree of bank competition. It is considered 
to be a more accurate measure of bank-specific competition than the so-called Panzar-
Rosse H-statistics or the asset shares of the three largest banks (Carbó-Valverde, 
Rodriguez-Fernandez and Udell, 2009). The essence of pricing power is reflected through 
the Lerner index because it measures the disparity between price and marginal cost 
expressed as a percentage of price. In other words, it captures the degree to which a bank 
can increase their marginal price beyond their marginal cost. According to Berger, Klapper 
and Turk-Ariss (2009), the Lerner index is the only measure of market power calculated at 
the bank level as:   
79 Since there is some disparity between the Old (2002-2005) and the New core modules of the surveys, we 
follow BDM (2007) to construct Financing Obstacle, and Love and Martínez-Peria (2014) to construct 
Access to Finance.  
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Where itP  is the price of total assets proxied by the ratio of total revenue (interest 
and non-interest income) to total assets for bank i  at time t . itMC  is the marginal cost of 
producing an additional unit of output. The Lerner index is interpreted as the inverse of 
competition; the higher the index the greater the pricing power, which implies less 
competitive market conditions. Following conventional bank efficiency studies, in this 
paper we use stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) to estimate marginal cost and hence Lerner 
Index. The shortcoming of the conventional Lerner index (C-Lerner) estimated above is 
that it is measured assuming full bank efficiency and therefore it fails to account for the 
possibilities of bankers’ inability to exploit output pricing opportunities resulting from 
market power. Therefore, we also follow Koetter, Kolari and Spierdijk (2012) to estimate 
efficiency adjusted Lerner index (E-Lerner) (as explained in Appendix 4.B). Table 4.B1 
reports the descriptive statistics of the variables included in the cost and profit functions. 
 
4.4.4 Bank-specific and macro control variables 
We control for an array of standard bank-specific characteristics and macroeconomic 
variables. To account for liquidity risk of individual banks, we use ratio of total loans over 
total assets (Fang, Hasan and Marton, 2014). We use logarithm of total assets to account 
for potential size effect on banking stability and efficiency, as the too-big-to-fail attitude 
can destabilize the efficient financial intermediation of the entire banking system. The ratio 
of loan loss provision to total loans is used to account for an individual bank’s loan 
portfolio risk. The ambiguous relation of income diversification on stability necessitates 
considering the effect of off-balance sheet activities of individual banks. The ratio of total 
earning assets to total assets is used as better management quality that can mitigate 
excessive risk-taking. Since, well-capitalised banks are assumed to take less risk, we use 
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the equity ratio to control for capital risk. In this paper, we also use several macroeconomic 
variables to control for economic development and business cycle of the economy. Since, 
in the last decade, World economies have experienced substantial volatility, we use GDP 
to control for economic growth. As the economic development generally coincides with 
an increase in financial inclusion, it is crucial to control for per capita GDP when assessing 
the association between financial inclusion and bank stability. Honohan (2008) argues that 
it would be interesting to see whether the impact of financial inclusion remains significant 
after controlling for per capita GDP.  
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Figure 4.1 
Financial inclusion index of 87 countries 
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4.4.5 Descriptive statistics 
Table 4.2A presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this study. 
The mean value of the Z-score is 3.7 with a standard deviation of 1.3, implying that on 
average, return on assets would have to fall by 3.7 times their standard deviation to wipe 
out bank equity. The fairly high standard deviation suggests that there is considerable 
cross-country variation in the level of bank stability. The mean negative logarithm of return 
volatility is 6.1. For the variable of interest, the mean of the financial inclusion index is 
0.57, where penetration, availability and usage dimensions are 0.51, 0.62, and 0.12, 
respectively. The standard deviation of 0.30 indicates considerable heterogeneity in the 
inclusiveness of financial systems across our broad sample of 87 countries.  
Table 4.2B reports the countries in our sample, ranked according to our index of 
financial inclusion. In terms of financial inclusion, South Korea (0.99), Belgium (0.98) 
and Japan (0.98) have the highest inclusive banking system, whereas Afghanistan (0.01), 
Yemen (0.02) and Malawi (0.03) have the lowest (also see Figure 4.1). On average, 
European countries have the highest financial inclusion (0.53) and banking stability (72.4), 
whereas African countries have the lowest value of 0.11 and 53.3, respectively. The 
average financial inclusion and banking stability of Asian and American countries are 
almost identical. The disparity of individual constituent contributing to the index of 
financial inclusion is also staggering; for example, the United Kingdom ranks 29 in the 
financial inclusion index but it ranks 76 in penetration and 9 in availability dimension. 
Therefore, using individual dimension as a proxy for financial inclusion would provide an 
incomprehensive picture of a country’s overall inclusiveness. Table 4.3 reports the 
correlation matrix of the independent variables used in this paper. The positive correlation 
between institutional quality indexes and financial inclusion in Panel B is an additional 
indication of the robustness of the index measured in this study. The strong positive 
correlation between per capita GDP and financial inclusion further proves the robustness 
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of our index (see Honohan, 2008).80  
4.5 Empirical results 
First, we report the specification tests and results for financial inclusion and 
stability based on the IV regression model in equation (4.1). Second, we report the 
contingent effects of financial inclusion with bank competition on banking stability.  
4.5.1 Financial inclusion and bank stability 
In this section, we examine how financial inclusion affects bank stability after 
controlling for bank and country level variables. The results are reported in Table 4.4, 
where we use two different measures of bank stability. In columns 1-2 and 3-4, we regress 
ln(Z-score) and –ln(sd(ROA)) on financial inclusion, respectively.  For the latter case, we 
follow Beck et al. (2013) and transform return volatility to make it directly proportional to 
banking stability. To check for the robustness of our results, we use two variant measures 
of market power denoted as C-Lerner and E-Lerner. Before choosing which estimator we 
should use for equation (4.1), we conduct an endogeneity test for the financial inclusion 
measures, which is reported at the bottom of Table 4.4. For rejecting the null hypothesis 
of exogeneity, we employ the IV-GMM estimator. In case we cannot reject the exogeneity 
of financial inclusion, we use the OLS estimator as it is more efficient. In both cases, we 
calculate heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors which 
are reported in square brackets. We test the validity of our instrumental variables as in 
GMM procedures using the under-identification LM test by Kleibergen and Paap (2006) 
and the over-identification test by Hansen (1982). The results on these tests show that the 
80 Since financial inclusion is generally related to per capita income, these two variables tend to be correlated. 
We computed the variance inflation factors (VIF) for each of our model estimates. VIF is equal to 1/ (1-r2), 
where r2 is from the regression of an independent variable on the rest of the independent variables. The 
average VIF never exceeds 3, indicating that multicollinearity is not a cause for concern for our results 
(Anginer, Demirgüç-Kunt and Zhu, 2014). Furthermore, following previous studies on the determinants of 
financial development (e.g., La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Levine, 2003), as a robustness test we exclude per capita GDP in all estimations and the results are 
broadly consistent with the main findings of this study. The results are available from the authors upon 
request.   
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instruments used are valid as the p-value of the former (latter) requires a value lower 
(higher) than 0.05 to reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level.  
Table 4.C1 shows the First-stage regressions of financial inclusion on instruments 
used in this study.81 We find that all instruments have statistically significant effects on 
financial inclusion- the direct effect and interaction. Moreover, the signs and magnitudes 
of the coefficients are economically important, as financial inclusion increases more in 
markets with greater financial freedom and higher density of newly registered companies. 
A system with higher financial freedom and entry density would facilitate access to finance 
through augmenting banking competition and create a milieu for efficient financial 
intermediation between households, financial institutions, firms and entrepreneurs.82 For 
example, to assess the economic significance of a whole set of instruments, consider 
column 4, at the mean for entry density (2.61), the marginal effect of financial freedom 
equals 0.002 (0.002-0.0001*2.61 = 0.002). This effect implies that one standard deviation 
above average increase in financial freedom (70.83) leads to a 0.14 unit increase in 
financial inclusion (equals a little less than ½ standard deviation of financial inclusion).  
It is clear from the results that a more inclusive financial system is associated with 
greater banking stability, as indicated by its positive and significant (at the 1% level) 
coefficients (once again, a greater estimated Z-score indicates more stability i.e., less risk 
taking). Since we use the natural logarithm of Z-score, the coefficients can be interpreted 
as semi-elastic. In column 1, a one standard deviation increase in the index of financial 
inclusion, which equals 0.30, is associated with an increase in the ln(Z-score) of 189% 
(6.3*0.30). Put differently, our financial inclusion index lies between zero and unity, where 
81 The significant negative relationship between market power and financial inclusion in Table 4.A3 is 
consistent with the existing literature and should serve as another indication of the robustness of our index 
(see for example Carbó-Valverde, Rodriguez-Fernandez and Udell, 2009; Ryan, O’Toole and McCann, 
2014). 
82 Entry density is one of the channels through which financial development fosters economic growth 
(Klapper, Laeven and Rajan, 2006). 
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a one standard deviation increase would be a substantial increase for any given economy; 
for a ¼ standard deviation increase in the index of financial inclusion leads to a 45% 
(6.4*0.07) increase in the ln(Z-score) (based on averaging the results across columns 1 and 
2). The effect is economically important as it suggests that financial inclusion enhances 
banks to have a secure deposit base as well as wider lending opportunities. Therefore, with 
the inclusive financial sector, banks enjoy greater financial stability. This result also 
corroborates with the additional risk measures used in this study. The negative of return 
volatility –ln(sd(ROA)), in columns 3 and 4, is also positively related to financial 
inclusion, suggesting that an increase in the index of financial inclusion is associated with 
a reduction in return volatility.  
These results are consistent with the view that a system with inclusive financial 
services tends to reinforce banking stability (e.g., Han and Melecky, 2013; Khan, 2011; 
Morgan and Pontines, 2014) and that a higher degree of financial inclusion mitigates 
excessive risk-taking of an individual bank. Since greater financial inclusion reduces 
distance between financial institutions and low-end customers it is able to decrease the 
probability of loan defaults, and hence bank fragility. This result is also supported by 
Agarwal and Hauswald (2007) and DeYoung, Glennon and Nigro (2008), who use US data 
and find that loan default probability increases with the distance between lender and 
borrowers. Recent empirical evidence also finds positive impacts from geographic 
diversification and reducing distance between banks and borrowers (e.g., Berger and 
DeYoung, 2001; Bos and Kolari, 2005; Deng and Elyasiani, 2008; Rossi, Schwaiger and 
Winkler, 2009). One would also expect that when financial institutions expand activities 
towards areas where more unbanked populations are located, they may be more likely to 
engage in diversified lending and have a wider source of cheaper funding through retail 
deposits rather than relying on volatile wholesale funding thus increasing the soundness of 
banks. Therefore, it can be argued that financial inclusion is good for banking stability. 
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Our results on control variables are also consistent with existing literature. As 
might be expected, larger banks, and banks with better management, higher equity capital 
and pricing power are more stable. Regarding country-level macro controls, the results 
show that banks operating in countries with higher economic growth and less income level 
significantly increase banking stability.  
 
4.5.2 The interactive effect of bank competition and financial inclusion 
We have shown in the previous section that financial inclusion is good for banking 
stability, consistent with the notion that an inclusive financial sector mitigates excessive 
risk taking of banks. Since the impact of lack of access to finance may rely on the 
competitiveness in the markets, and bank competition being one of the important 
determinants through which banking soundness gets affected, it is imperative to investigate 
how the relationship between financial inclusion and bank stability changes due to 
competitiveness in the markets.83  
Recent studies show that bank competition is instrumental in broadening financial 
access (e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2004; 
Carbó-Valverde, Rodriguez-Fernandez and Udell, 2009; Chong, Lu and Ongena, 2013; 
Love and Martínez Pería, 2014; Ryan, O’Toole and McCann, 2014).84 The literature is 
divided into two streams. The information hypothesis argues that greater market power 
may persuade banks to establish relationship lending and internalise benefits of supporting 
83 Numerous studies investigate the relationship between bank competition and stability with little consensus 
about the unambiguous direction of the relationship. Literature argues about two offsetting effects of bank 
competition on stability. On the one hand, the traditional competition-fragility hypothesis argues that greater 
competition increases banking fragility as it induces excessive risk-taking due to reduced profit margins 
(Keeley, 1990; Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz, 2000). On the other hand, competition-stability hypothesis 
argues that greater competition increases banking stability because it facilitates low interest rates for 
smoother repayment of loans, and decreases default risk of borrowers and thereby bank losses (Boyd and De 
Nicolo, 2005). However, we do not test the validity of either of these hypotheses, rather we investigate the 
relative importance of bank competition on the financial inclusion-stability relation. See Beck, De Jonghe 
and Schepens (2013) for detailed discussion on bank competition and stability. 
84 See DBH (2008). 
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informationally opaque or risky customers, and hence lead to more credit availability 
(Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Di Patti and Dell'Ariccia, 2004). In addition, when banks enter 
into a new market to facilitate access to finance, in a competitive environment, they tend 
to earn lower informational rents from their relationship with borrowers, decreasing 
incentives to monitor borrowers, which in turn leads to banking fragility (see e.g., Boot 
and Thakor, 1993; Allen and Gale, 2004). Recent theoretical models show that fiercer 
competition not only induces banks to acquire less information on borrowers (Dell'Ariccia 
and Marquez, 2004) but also persuades them towards more risky and opaque customers 
(Hauswald and Marquez, 2006). Therefore, if there is more interbank competition in an 
unbanked area, banks should have a portfolio of risky borrowers, again undermining their 
stability.  
On the other hand, based on the traditional industrial organisation theory, the 
market power hypothesis argues that higher competition results in more loan supply 
ensuring lower lending rates, thereby improving credit availability (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt 
and Maksimovic, 2004; Carbó-Valverde, Rodriguez-Fernandez and Udell, 2009; Ryan, 
O’Toole and McCann, 2014). When a bank enters into a new market with high market 
power they may charge a higher interest rate on loans which may incentivise households 
and small firms to search for higher returns and make risky investments, increasing the 
probability of default, and hence losses for the banks. Again, it may be the case that fewer 
large banks with high market power in a banking system enjoying “too-big-to-fail” 
subsidies from safety net policies, may induce them to take excessive risk and thus 
destabilise the entire financial system (cf. Anginer, Demirgüç-Kunt and Zhu, 2014, and 
references therein). Regarding financial inclusion, this situation may get worse when large 
banks pursue an inclusive banking agenda without adhering to proper screening and 
monitoring procedures while serving low-end customers who often lack collateral and 
credit histories, increasing banking fragility. Therefore, in this section, we introduce an 
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interaction term between financial inclusion and bank competition in equation (4.1), and 
examine whether competition reduces or reinforces the positive relationship between 
financial inclusion and bank stability.  
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In equation (4.7), all other variables remain unchanged as in equation (4.1) except 
the interaction term, where we are interested in the coefficient 9β . The results of the 
interaction between financial inclusion and bank competition are reported in Table 4.5. 
Consistent with the earlier regressions, we also use IV estimator where both financial 
inclusion and interactive terms (i.e., financial inclusion and Lerner indices) are treated as 
endogenous variables, and instrumented via analogous instruments as in Table 4.4. For 
column 1 of Table 4.5, we find a significant positive interactive effect on banking stability. 
The positive coefficient suggests that the complementary effect of financial inclusion on 
bank stability is more pronounced in less competitive markets. Using the coefficients 
estimated in column 2, our result suggests that for a banking system with average market 
power (0.12), the marginal effect of financial inclusion is 6.6, whereas for a banking sector 
with market power of one standard deviation above average (0.36), the impact reaches 6.9. 
Translating these into changes in the banking stability, we find that a banking sector with 
average market power, ¼ standard deviation increase in the financial inclusion (0.07), 
results in an approximately 46% increase in the banking stability; whereas it is 48% if 
market power increases by one standard deviation above average. This finding is 
corroborated by the significant positive coefficients of the interaction terms in column 3 
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and 4. The evidence suggests that the magnitude of the positive impact of financial 
inclusion on banking stability increases if banks have higher market power. In other words, 
financial inclusion has a significant positive impact on banking stability but greater 
competition affects this relation adversely.  
This result is not only significant statistically but also economically important as 
greater financial inclusion may limit the extent to which banks can or will engage in 
correlated risk taking activities in the absence of competition because they are able to 
venture into new markets, or seek new lines of business or clients. By dint of higher 
financial inclusion, banks have ample opportunities to offer many small loans, for which 
losses are negligible and predictable (see Adasme, Majnoni and Uribe, 2006), indicating 
an imperfect correlation of loan defaults. Recently, Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) 
show that at a lower correlation of loan defaults, greater bank competition is detrimental 
to bank stability, supporting our result of a positive coefficient on interaction term. Petersen 
and Rajan (1995) and Agarwal and Hauswald (2010) show that “relationship banking” 
and/or “borrower proximity” is the efficient method through which banks can collect soft 
information to reduce asymmetric information. As financial inclusion reduces distance and 
informational asymmetry, banks with market power can provide finances to less 
creditworthy households/firms and monitor carefully to reduce loan default rates, and thus 
enhance banking stability.   
 
4.5.3 Institutional quality and financial inclusion 
The impact of greater financial inclusion may depend on the larger institutional 
environment in which banks operate, and can potentially be fortified through better 
institutional quality. For example, freedom of expression, political stability, regulatory 
quality and rule of law may limit the extent to which banks can engage in correlated risk 
taking activities where the financial inclusion is lower. In this section, we examine how 
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the interaction between financial inclusion and each country’s institutional environment 
affects the positive role of financial inclusion on banking stability as follows:  
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In equation (4.8), we add six indicators of institutional quality taken from 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi's (2010) Governance Index. As these indicators are highly 
correlated, we run regression using each indicator and its interaction term with financial 
inclusion one at a time to avoid the multicollinearity problem. However, we capture 
common variation among these six governance indicators using the principal component 
analysis and construct a composite index of institutional quality (IQI). For the sake of 
simplicity, we use logarithm of Z-score as the dependent variable keeping all other bank 
and macro controls analogous.85 The financial inclusion and the interaction term are treated 
as endogenous and instrumented via variables that are reported at the bottom of Table 4.6 
with the main results. For expositional brevity, and because we are interested in the 
interaction effects, the results of the controls are not reported.  
Most of the interaction terms enter positively and significantly at the 5% level. 
Columns 1, 2, 4, and 5 of Table 4.6 suggest that the benefit of having greater freedom of 
expressions and free media (Voice), political stability (Political), regulatory quality 
(Regulatory), and rule of law (Law) in reducing bank risk-taking is more pronounced in 
the markets where financial inclusion is higher. At the bottom of the table, we report the 
85 In all these regressions, we use efficiency adjusted Lerner indices as the proxy of bank competition. 
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marginal effect of financial inclusion at the mean of each indicator. Column 6 shows that 
at the mean value of control of corruption greater financial inclusion reduces banking 
fragility. In column 7, we use the first principal component (the only component that has 
an eigenvalue of more than one i.e., 5.27 with 87% variation) of all institutional variables 
(e.g., Voice, Political, Government, Regulatory, Law and Corruption) and create a 
composite index of ‘Institutional Quality’ and run the regression. The interaction term in 
column 7 also confirms our results that the positive impact of institutional quality on 
reducing risk is higher if banks operate in an inclusive financial system.   
In terms of the economic significance, the magnitude of the coefficient suggests 
that there is a significant effect of financial inclusion on banking stability in the countries 
with the highest levels of institutional development. For instance, using estimated 
coefficients in column 7, the derivative (partial) of bank stability with respect to financial 
inclusion at the mean level of our composite institutional quality index (IQI) is 10.88 
(significant at the 1% level). The same derivative evaluated at the 25th percentile (lower) 
of institutional quality index is 6.24 (significant at the 1% level). On the other hand, when 
the institutional quality index is at the 75th percentile (higher), it increases by more than 
two factors (15.22) (significant at the 1% level). Translating these into changes in the 
banking stability, we find that in a country with lower institutional quality, ¼ standard 
deviation increase in the financial inclusion (0.07) results in an approximately 46% 
increase in the banking stability. However, in a country with higher institutional quality, 
we observe a substantial increase of 112% on banking stability. These findings are 
consistent with existing empirical literature as Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(2005) show that greater institutional development (e.g., financial, legal and corruption) 
facilitates better access to finance especially for the smallest firms. For example, a more 
effective rule of law provides more flexibility in terms of contract enforcement without 
much delay. Overall, the positive interactive effects seem to suggest that the beneficial 
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effects of financial inclusion on banking stability reinforces if the market within which 
banks operate have greater quality of institutional settings.86 
 
4.5.4 Additional sensitivity analysis 
 In this section, we discuss the various additional robustness tests of our study. In 
each specification, we conduct an endogeneity test. In case it is not statistically significant 
at the 5% level, we use ordinary least squares regression as it is more efficient. The 
definitions of the rest of the variables are the same as in equation (4.1). At the bottom of 
each table, we report the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) test for weak instruments and the 
Hansen over-identification test.  
4.5.4.1 Alternative financial inclusion index 
Although we construct a financial inclusion index incorporating as many 
dimensions as possible, given the data availability constraints it is possible that our results 
are inferred incorrectly because of a poorly constructed index. Therefore, we use an 
alternative financial inclusion index that is taken from the Global Findex Database, which 
collects information on how people in 148 countries manage their financial activities. The 
variable we use as the financial inclusion proxy is the percentage of adults that had savings 
at a financial institution in the year prior to the survey (see e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt, Klapper 
and Singer, 2013; Allen, Carletti, Cull, Senbet and Valenzuela, 2014). This database is new 
and just covers the year 2011. We had to collapse our dataset at bank-level to run two-stage 
cross-sectional instrumental variable regressions.  Global Findex and its interaction with 
Lerner indices are treated as endogenous variables. These variables are instrumented via 
the financial freedom, entry density and their interactions. The regression results are 
86 Interestingly, we find that the derivative of ln(Zscore) with respect to financial inclusion at the minimum 
level of institutional quality (i.e., -6.30) is -3.89, whereas the  derivative of ln(Zscore) with respect to 
institutional quality at the minimum level of financial inclusion (i.e., 0.008) is  -0.59, suggesting institutional 
quality has a greater impact on banking stability than financial inclusion (see Baltagi, Demetriades and Law, 
2009, p295). 
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presented in Table 4.7, showing that the relationship between Global Findex and bank 
stability is still positive and statistically significant. Regarding the interactive effect, it also 
corroborates with the earlier finding that the positive impact of financial inclusion on bank 
stability is robust in less competitive markets. It reiterates that financial inclusion is good 
for banking stability.  
 
4.5.4.2 Alternative banking stability measure  
Following Beck, De Jonghe and Schepens (2013), we use an alternative measure 
of bank stability in which the denominator in equation (4.2) is calculated using five year 
rolling windows. As usual, financial inclusion is instrumented via the financial freedom, 
entry density and their interactions. The results are reported in Table 4.8. The main results 
remain unaltered with a slight increase in the magnitude of the coefficients.   
 
4.5.4.3 Split samples based on financial inclusion 
We split our sample into terciles according to the financial inclusion index and re-
run six regressions.87 The results are reported in Table 4.9 (column 1-6). The low, medium 
and high terciles of financial inclusion are instrumented via the investment freedom 
(ranges 0-100, higher value implies less constraint on the flow of investment capital) entry 
density and investment freedom times entry density (the result of the first-stage regression 
is available from the authors). The result indicates that the effect of financial inclusion at 
the lower terciles is negative with banking stability. It becomes significant at the medium 
terciles. We can see that the magnitude of the coefficient of the highest terciles is twofold 
higher than medium terciles. This is consistent with our argument that a greater inclusive 
87 The summary statistics of the group with the lowest financial inclusion index has an average (median) 
bank stability (Z-score) of 70.2 (34.3), the group with the medium financial inclusion index has an average 
(median) bank stability of 94.8 (45.9), and the group with the highest financial inclusion index has an average 
(median) bank stability of 138.8 (56.1). 
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banking sector is good for the soundness of banks. 
4.5.4.4 Different sample selection 
We also conduct a battery of sensitivity checks using different sample selection 
criteria such as excluding cooperative and Islamic banks, excluding Japan and Italy, and 
finally excluding developed countries. Our dataset comprises 1549 commercial banks, 
1084 cooperative banks and 37 Islamic banks. We drop all cooperative and Islamic banks 
from our dataset and keep only commercial banks. The result of the regressions, which is 
reported in Table 4.9 (columns 7 and 8), shows that the magnitude of the positive effects 
of financial inclusion on banking stability is even higher in the case of only commercial 
banks, reiterating the beneficial effect of financial inclusion on the soundness of banks. 
The number of banks in Japan and Italy is 457 and 489 respectively, which constitutes the 
lion’s share of our sample. We drop these two countries and re-run regressions, which are 
reported in Table 4.9 (columns 9 and 10). Dropping Japan and Italy does not alter the main 
findings of this study. Finally, we also drop all banks of the developed countries keeping 
only 708 banks that operate in developing countries, and re-run regressions. The result also 
corroborates the earlier findings that financial inclusion is good for banking stability.  
 
4.6 Enabling inclusive financial environment: difference-in-differences approach 
In this section, we exploit the exogenous variation of developing countries’ 
membership timing into a global network of policymakers with an inclusive finance 
agenda, and evaluate the effects of enabling an inclusive financial environment on banking 
stability by using both parametric (difference-in-differences) and non-parametric matching 
estimators while employing bank— and country—level data.  
 
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis that took place in 2008, the leaders 
of the Group of Twenty (G20) recognised the mutually reinforcing policy objectives of 
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financial inclusion, stability and consumer protection.88 They committed to increasing the 
access of the disadvantaged groups to financial services through principles for innovative 
financial inclusion at the Pittsburgh Summit in 2009. These principles were drafted by 
three financial inclusion expert groups namely the Alliance for Financial Inclusion (funded 
by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation), the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor 
(CGAP), and the World Bank Group’s private financing arm, the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) (Soederberg, 2013). Among these expert groups, AFI was founded in 
2008 and known as the first global knowledge sharing network for policymakers on 
financial inclusion. At present, AFI’s network is composed of central banks and other 
financial institutions from more than 90 countries. In 2011, to complement G20 principles, 
the Maya Declaration was signed by a group of developing country regulatory institutions 
at the third Global Policy Forum of the AFI held in Mexico to strengthen and expand 
financial inclusion policy (see Table 4.D1 for details on the G20 principles and Maya 
Declaration commitments). However, we find 30 out of 87 countries in our sample became 
members of the AFI network after the first Global Policy Forum of AFI held in Nairobi 
in 2009. Since they had become members of this network, they could share knowledge on 
financial inclusion as well as develop and implement policies designed to expand the 
access of the poor people to financial services. Since then, broadening financial inclusion 
has become an important policy objective for these member countries and has set the stage 
for many enabling laws and regulations to support the poor.89  
88 http://www.afi-global.org/sites/default/files/afi%20g20%20principles.pdf 
89 The list of supporting laws and regulations that have been taken by developing countries to broaden 
financial inclusion is exhaustive and not limited to the following selective instances. In 2009, Pakistan 
created a consultative group on branchless banking and launched a risk sharing facility for small and rural 
enterprises; Fiji established a national taskforce on financial inclusion and agreed on a medium-term 
financial inclusion strategy to reach 150,000 unbanked. In 2010, Bangladesh established microcredit 
regulatory authority regulations; Ethiopia developed a growth and transformation plan that includes a 
national financial inclusion strategy; and Morocco implemented a financial inclusion strategy. In 2011, El 
Salvador passed a law appointing the Central Bank the head of public policies on the financial system, 
including financial inclusion; Mexico created the National Council for Financial Inclusion (CONAIF) 
through Presidential Decree; Democratic Republic of Congo launched mobile banking services. In 2012, 
Bangladesh began licensing mobile banking; Brazil launched an action plan for the national partnership for 
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Since the banks of these member countries are exposed to various financial access 
policies, we assume that the changing inclusive financial environment will have a 
discernible effect on the risk-taking of the banks. Therefore, using bank- and country-level 
data, we investigate whether the financial access policies have any effect on banking 
stability applying a difference-in-differences approach as follows:  
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where i  indexes bank, j  indexes countries, and t  indexes years.  ijtBank stability  is 
the financial stability of banks as defined earlier. The country and year fixed effects are 
denoted as jα  and tα , respectively (we also use bank fixed effects as a robustness test in 
Table 4.10). The analogous bank—and country—specific controls are used as in equation 
(4.1). Lagged values of efficiency adjusted Lerner indices are used as the proxy for bank 
competition in order to eliminate any endogeneity issue. -1 jtFinancial Access Policy  is an 
indicator variable that takes a value equal to one if the bank is in a country that became a 
member of AFI’s network in 2009 and thereafter or else zero (see Table 4.D2 for 
membership timing across countries). In this case, our variable of interest is γ . If exposure 
to AFI’s network (i.e., becoming a member of the AFI network) is congenial to broadening 
financial inclusion, then the estimated coefficient of banking stability will show a positive 
outcome. This coefficient captures the sensitivity of the dependent variable to the changes 
in financial inclusion between a group of countries that is exposed to a treatment 
financial inclusion; Colombia undertook a massive expansion of mobile financial services and expanded the 
number of banking agents; India, issued policy guidelines for expanding the banking network to unbanked 
customers.  
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(henceforth treated) and a group that is not exposed to the treatment (henceforth control) 
after becoming a member of the AFI network.90 This approach is particularly suitable for 
identifying causal effects of an exposure (in our case, the exogenous variation in the timing 
of membership of AFI) on groups that are affected by the institutional settings with those 
that are not affected. Since we are controlling both groups before and after the events and 
the same group is acting as control and treated in this methodology we are able to control 
for both observable and unobservable factors that may have changed over time as well. By 
doing so, we are able to eliminate any bias that emanates from changes other than the AFI’s 
network that could have affected the treated group (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). A 
similar type of regression is used by Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) and Koetter, Kolari and 
Spierdijk (2012) on cross-state setup for the US banking sector, and Haselmann, Pistor and 
Vig (2010) on cross-country setup for East European countries. 
For the DID approach to be meaningful, there are two aspects that should be taken 
into consideration. First, the changes in the efforts of broadening financial inclusion need 
to be exogenous and second, comparison groups should be homogeneous. The first issue 
of whether changes in the efforts of financial inclusion are exogenous or endogenous has 
little effect on our DID result as most of the policy suggestions were encouraged by various 
multilateral organisations (e.g., G20, AFI and World Bank). This shows the exogenous 
nature and randomness in embracing innovative access policy initiatives. In addition, 
endogeneity is less of a concern for our analysis as we investigate the impact of a country-
level indicator on bank-level stability. We are mostly concerned with the second issue of 
getting a comparison group that should serve as a valid counterfactual. To eradicate 
selection bias and confounding factors, in the spirit of Ho, Imai, King and Stuart (2007), 
we use propensity score matching, developed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) to get a 
90 For details on this methodology see Haselmann, Pistor and Vig (2010). 
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matched comparison group and then run difference-in-differences regression on the 
matched sample. This doubly robust technique provides unbiased estimates of the 
treatment effects even if either or both of the procedures are correctly specified and could 
be considered exposure similar to that from a randomised trial (Funk, Westreich, Wiesen, 
Stürmer, Brookhart and Davidian, 2011). This approach also allows us to estimate the 
treatment effects while controlling for both observed and unobserved bank- and country-
specific characteristics. First, we adopt a nearest-neighbor logit propensity score matching 
strategy to identify non-member countries of AFI which are similar to the member 
countries on the basis of observable characteristics.91 Second, each member country of AFI 
is matched with a non-member country that has the closest propensity score within a given 
caliper (i.e., threshold). Third, regressions are run on the matched sample using difference-
in-differences approach.  
Panel A of Table 4.10 reports the results of DID estimation on a matched sample. 
In all specifications, year dummies are included to control for the business cycle. Standard 
errors are clustered at the country-level as omitted country characteristics might cause error 
terms to be correlated for banks within the same country. While we control for country 
fixed effects in columns 1-4, we consider bank fixed effects in columns 5-8. The result 
shows that financial stability of the banks that operate in the treated countries has increased 
substantially following the changes in financial access policies. As columns 1 and 3 show 
that the indicator  Financial Access Policy  is positive and significantly related with banking 
stability, to reduce the residual variance while increasing efficiency of the DID results, we 
use the analogous controls as in equation (4.1) in columns 2 and 4. The outcomes are robust 
even after controlling for bank- and country-specific control variables. The economic 
91 Observable characteristics are the industry average total asset, GDP per capita, GDP growth rate, financial 
freedom, and regulatory quality. Balancing tests are satisfied and reported along with the Logit model in 
Table 4.D3. Figure 4.D1 shows the propensity score matching blocks and matched distribution. 
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impact of the financial access policies on banking stability is considerable. The increasing 
efforts of having an inclusive financial system have improved the soundness of the banks 
that operate in the treated countries by 36%.92 The results also corroborate when we control 
for unobserved bank-specific characteristics in columns 5-8.   
To further alleviate any potential selection bias and confounding in the treatment 
effects, that might yet remain in the DID results, we use two other matching techniques 
(i.e., kernel and stratification) and the recently developed covariate matching estimator of 
Abadie and Imbens (2006) to estimate the average treatment effect for the treated (ATT).93 
For the latter case, ATT is estimated to match on four nearest neighbours (Abadie, Drukker, 
Herr and Imbens, 2004). The advantage of this approach is that it employs covariates to 
match treatment group and control group.94 It also corrects for bias if matching is 
imperfect, and calculates heteroskedasticity robust standard errors of the treatment effects 
without making any assumption about the functional form. 
 Panel B of Table 4.10 reports the results of the matching estimators. In all 
matching estimators, we impose common support condition to restrict control groups to 
fall within the support of the propensity score distribution of the treated groups. The result 
corresponds to the earlier findings that after a change in the effort to have an inclusive 
financial system, the stability of the banks that operate in the treated countries increases 
by 42% (averaging across all matching estimators). The results once again reiterate that an 
inclusive financial sector has causal effects on the soundness of banks. The result is also 
consistent with the economic rationale that greater institutional pursuit of financial 
92 We follow Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980), and calculate the effect of the indicator variable (i.e., AFI) 
averaging across columns 1-4 as (exp( ) -1)γ , where γ  is the coefficient of interest in our semi-logarithmic 
equation.  
93 While kernel matching estimator matches the treated units with weighted average of all control units, with 
weights that are inversely proportional to the distance in terms of their propensity score, stratification 
matching estimator divides the common support into different strata and measures the treatment’s effect 
within each interval. For details on the matching methods see Lin and Ye (2007) and De Mendonça and De 
Souza (2012). 
94 In Abadie and Imbens, we use similar pre-treatment characteristics as in Table 4.D3 for matching. 
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inclusiveness helps reduce the informational asymmetry between borrowers and lenders. 
We subject our findings to a series of additional sensitivity checks. The results are 
robust to (i) using an alternative measure of financial inclusion that is taken from the 
Global Findex database, (ii) using an alternative measure of bank stability, which is 
calculated taking five year rolling windows of standard deviation of return on assets, (iii) 
dropping cooperative banks and Islamic banks from the sample, where regressions are run 
keeping only commercial banks, (iv) dropping countries (e.g., Japan and Italy) that 
constitute the lion’s share of the sample, (v) running regressions only for the sample of 
developing country, and finally (vi) exploiting exogenous variation in the membership 
timing of a network of policymakers embracing financial inclusion, and investigating the 
causal effect of enabling an inclusive financial environment on banking stability. For all of 
these alternative setups the main findings of this study largely remain unaltered. 
 
4.7 Concluding remarks and policy implications 
Broadening the access of the disadvantaged groups to a formal financial system 
has numerous benefits as documented in the literature, including greater efficiency in the 
allocation of resources, social and political stability and more innovation. When the 
financial system becomes more inclusive, this generally results in greater opportunity for 
banks to diversify lending and funding strategies while reducing distance, facilitating a 
strong relationship with customers who were previously excluded from the formal 
financial system. But, since expanding the access of low income groups to financial 
services is perceived as risky, whether financial inclusion is complementary or antagonistic 
to the issue of bank stability remains the subject of a continuing debate among academics 
and policymakers alike both from a theoretical and from an empirical perspective. 
This paper has therefore contributed to this debate addressing a contemporary 
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policy issue related to financial development, financial inclusion and bank stability, using 
an international sample of 2,913 banks in 87 countries for the period 2004-2012. First, we 
constructed a new country-level composite index of financial inclusion using principal 
component analysis, and ranked countries based on the score of this index. Despite the 
shortcomings of data availability, the constructed index has good predictive power in 
tracking the micro-level indicators of global financial inclusion such as the share of 
households with savings and bank accounts at formal financial institutions. Second, given 
the changing milieu of banking operations, where formal financial institutions increasingly 
search for new opportunities and markets and see the benefits of a micro-finance style of 
operations, this is the first study to investigate such an important issue to provide some 
understanding on the access to finance and bank stability nexus. Therefore, considering 
the overriding interest of inclusive economic growth and relatively substantive emphasis 
on the financial stability in the post crisis era,  this study investigated the influence of an 
inclusive financial system on banking stability in a panel setting once other factors are 
controlled for. Third, since one of the tasks of bank regulation is to curb the adverse effect 
of banking competition on stability (see Beck, De Jonghe and Schepens, 2013), we also 
checked whether the relationship between financial inclusion and bank stability changes 
due to higher competition, as measured by the lower level of Lerner indices of two variants. 
Fourth, we checked whether the institutional settings in which banks operate have any 
influence on the access-stability relationship. Finally, we subject our findings to an array 
of sensitivity checks including splitting sample into terciles based on the financial 
inclusion index, using alternative measures of banking stability and financial inclusion, 
and using different sample specifications, particularly running regression on the sample of 
developing countries. We also exploited the exogenous variation in the membership timing 
of developing countries’ network of financial inclusion policymakers and explored 
whether enabling an inclusive financial environment has any causal effect on banking 
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stability, using parametric (difference-in-differences) and non-parametric matching 
estimators.  
Our results indicate that there is a strong link between financial inclusion and 
bank stability; in particular, the higher the degree of financial inclusion the better the 
banking stability. The evidence also suggests that any beneficial effects of financial 
inclusion on bank stability tend to be more pronounced in banking sectors with less 
competition. As banks expand operations towards new markets to serve previously 
underserved and/or excluded adult populations, they are able to reduce excessive risk 
taking if the environment in which they operate is less competitive. Furthermore, 
investigating the influence of institutional settings on the access-stability relationship, we 
also find that the positive impact of financial inclusion on stability reinforces if the country 
in which banks operate has greater institutional quality. Specifically, greater freedom of 
expression, political stability, regulatory quality, rule of law and less corruption enhances 
the positive relationship between financial inclusion and bank stability. The DID approach 
shows that supporting an inclusive financial system increases the soundness of banks of 
the treated countries by almost 36%. 
Our results have important policy implications. The findings suggest that banking 
stability is strongly influenced by the degree to which the poorest of the poor individuals 
and small enterprises have access to basic financial services, which indicates the 
importance of ensuring an inclusive financial system. An inclusive financial system will 
allow banks to exploit the untapped potential of customers who were previously unbanked 
or under-banked, and strengthen their balance sheets making them more resilient against a 
possible future shock. Since expanding access to financial services is a key ingredient of 
financial development strategies, the concerted and sustained efforts of formal financial 
institutions to allocate resources in more productive areas of the economy would make 
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them more profitable. Existing evidence supports this notion that average profitability is 
higher if lenders provide loans repeatedly to the same customer because of less default 
probability associated with experienced borrowers (see Karlan and Zinman, 2010). As only 
41% of people in the developing countries compared to 89% in developed ones have bank 
accounts (see Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper, 2012), additional policies should focus on 
ensuring access for all of the excluded to formal financial services, especially in the 
developing ones.  
Furthermore, our results also stress the importance of the underlying competitive 
and institutional framework. The beneficial effects of financial inclusion on bank stability 
are greater in the countries where the market power of banks and the country’s institutional 
qualities are high. In this respect, since competition is perceived to be instrumental to 
broadening access to finance but detrimental to banking stability, broadening access 
without paying attention to potential negative consequences of competition on financial 
stability is obviously suboptimal.  Therefore, it is important for the authorities to strike the 
right balance between financial inclusion and bank competition while avoiding stepping 
into financial fragility. They should also continue their efforts of establishing an 
institutional environment that will complement the access-stability nexus.  In the end, 
however, only more empirical research using both supply and demand-side data on access 
will provide a comprehensive picture of the effects of financial inclusion on banking 
stability and whether bank competition and institutional quality reduces or reinforces this 
relation.   
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Table 4.1 
 
Variable Definitions and Sources 
Variable Definitions Source 
Dependent Variables   
Z-score Sum of return-on-assets (ROA), defined as net profit over assets, and equity 
ratio (EQA), defined as equity over assets, divided by standard deviation of 
(ROA) of each bank over the past three years (calculated using a rolling 
window) 
BankScope 
Volatility of ROA Standard deviation of ROA for each bank, calculated over the past 3 years BankScope 
Financial Inclusion   
Penetration The number of deposit and loan accounts per 1000 adults IMF 
Availability The outreach dimension constructed using principal component analysis 
(PCA) from the variables related to geographic and demographic availability 
    
Authors’ 
calculation 
Usage Total volume of deposit and loans relative to GDP IMF 
Financial inclusion index Financial inclusion index is constructed using PCA from the penetration, 
availability and usage dimensions. 
Authors’ 
calculation 
Bank competition   
C-Lerner A bank-level non-structural indicator of bank competition, measured by using 
a stochastic frontier analysis approach assuming full bank efficiency, with 
lower values indicating higher competition in the banking sector 
Authors’ 
calculation 
E-Lerner A bank-level non-structural indicator of bank competition, an efficiency-
adjusted Lerner index, measured by using a stochastic frontier analysis 
approach, with lower values indicating higher competition in banking 
Authors’ 
calculation 
Firm-specific variables   
Access to finance Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has access to bank finance (loan, 
overdraft or line of credit) 
WBES 
Financing Obstacle  Financing obstacle is defined on a five point scale of how problematic 
financing is for the operation and growth of business: (0) No obstacle (1) 
minor obstacle (2) moderate obstacle (3) major obstacle, and (4) very severe 
 
WBES 
Firm size (employees) The number of permanent full-time employees WBES 
Manufacturing Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is in the manufacturing sector WBES 
Exporter Dummy variable equal to 1 if 10 percent or more of sales are exported directly 
or indirectly by the firm 
WBES 
Foreign-owned Dummy variable equal to 1 if 50 percent or more of the firm is owned by 
foreign organizations 
WBES 
Government-owned Dummy variable equal to 1 if 10 percent or more of the firm is owned by the 
government 
WBES 
Firm age Age of the firm in years WBES 
Bank-specific variables   
Loan ratio Total performing loans divided by total assets BankScope 
LLP ratio Total loan loss provision divided by total assets BankScope 
Income diversification  Non-interest income divided by total operating income BankScope 
Management quality Total earning assets divided by total assets BankScope 
Equity ratio Total equity divided by total assets BankScope 
IV Instruments   
Financial freedom This indicator shows the degree of openness of the banking system. It is a 
multidimensional index of whether government interference exists in the 
financial sector, such as regulation, financial products, allocation of credit, 
whether foreign banks are free to operate. Higher values indicate fewer 
restrictions on banking freedoms 
Heritage 
Foundation (2014) 
Labor freedom The labor freedom component is a quantitative measure that considers various 
aspects of the legal and regulatory framework of a country’s labor market, 
including regulations concerning minimum wages, laws inhibiting layoffs, 
severance requirements, and measurable regulatory restraints on hiring and 
hours worked. Higher values indicate fewer restrictions on labour freedom 
Heritage 
Foundation (2014) 
Entry density Entry density is a variable referring to the number of newly registered 
companies with limited liability per 1,000 working-age people (those aged 15-
64). 
Doing Business 
database 
Credit information depth Credit information depth is a variable that ranges from zero to six, with higher 
values indicating deeper credit information.  
Entrepreneurship 
Database 
Macroeconomic variables   
GDP growth rate The growth rate of GDP World Bank 
GDP per capita The natural logarithm of per capita GDP World Bank 
Voice and accountability 
(Voice) 
The indicator measures the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, and free media. Higher values mean greater political 
rights 
Kaufmann, Kraay 
and Mastruzzi 
(2010) 
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Variable Definitions Source 
Political stability 
(Political) 
The indicator measures the perceptions of the likelihood that the government 
will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, 
including political violence and terrorism. Higher values mean more stable 
political environment 
Kaufmann, Kraay 
and Mastruzzi 
(2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Government effectiveness 
(Government) 
The indicator measures the quality of public services, the quality of the civil 
service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality 
of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government’s commitment to such policies. Higher values mean higher 
quality of public and civil service 
Kaufmann, Kraay 
and Mastruzzi 
(2010) 
Regulatory quality 
(Regulatory) 
The indicator measures the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote market 
competition and private-sector development. Higher values mean higher 
quality of regulation 
Kaufmann, Kraay 
and Mastruzzi 
(2010) 
Rule of law (Law) The indicator measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence. Higher values mean stronger law and order. 
Kaufmann, Kraay 
and Mastruzzi 
(2010) 
Control of corruption 
(Corruption) 
The indicator measures the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
the ‘‘capture’’ of the state by elites and private interests. Higher values indicate 
better control of corruption. 
Kaufmann, Kraay 
and Mastruzzi 
(2010) 
Institutional quality index 
(IQI) 
Institutional quality index is constructed using principal component analysis 
from the Voice, Political, Government, Regulatory, Law, and Corruption 
indexes of Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010) 
Authors’ 
calculation 
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Table 4.2A 
Summary Statistics 
This table shows the total sample summary statistics for the bank-specific variables, macroeconomic 
variables and the variables that are used as instruments in the instrumental variable regressions throughout 
the paper. Bank-level data is compiled from BankScope. Macroeconomic data is retrieved from the World 
Bank World Development Indicator (WDI). The IV instrument financial freedom and labour freedom are 
obtained from the Economic Freedom Indicators of Heritage Foundation (2013). Entry density and credit 
information depth are taken from Doing Business and Entrepreneurship Database of the World Bank, 
respectively. The full sample contains 13836 observations. This table consists of six parts. The descriptive 
statistics of the dependent variables which are used to proxy for stability of individual banks are in the first 
part. The financial inclusion index and its three dimensions are in the second part of this table. The third part 
contains market power variables, which is proxied by two variants of Lerner indices: conventional Lerner 
(i.e., C-Lerner) and efficiency-adjusted Lerner (i.e., E-Lerner). Bank-specific variables are in the fourth part. 
IV instruments are in the fifth part of this table followed by the macroeconomic variables in the sixth.   
Variable Mean Median SD Min Max N 
Dependent Variables 
Z-score 3.718 3.759 1.345 0.298 7.718 13836 
Volatility of ROA 6.078 6.008 1.414 0.811 12.126 13836 
Financial Inclusion 
Penetration 0.512 0.375 0.349 0 1 13836 
Availability 0.625 0.794 0.339 0.007 0.999 13836 
Usage 0.115 0.004 0.221 0 1 13836 
Financial inclusion index 0.573 0.609 0.296 0.008 0.984 13836 
Market Power             
C-Lerner 0.051 0.086 0.286 -1.39 0.801 13836 
E-Lerner 0.125 0.142 0.243 -0.754 0.876 13836 
Firm-level variables 
Access to Finance 0.607 1.000 0.489 0.000 1.000 38987 
Financing Obstacle 1.538 1.000 1.362 0.000 4.000 38987 
Log Firm Size (employee) 2.548 2.303 1.494 0.000 11.513 38987 
Exporter 0.204 0.000 0.403 0.000 1.000 38987 
Manufacturing 0.578 1.000 0.494 0.000 1.000 38987 
Foreign Owned 0.102 0.000 0.303 0.000 1.000 38987 
Government Owned 0.025 0.000 0.156 0.000 1.000 38987 
Log Firm age 3.006 2.944 0.547 0.693 5.366 38987 
Bank-specific variables       
Loan ratio 0.554 0.569 0.19 0 0.998 13836 
Total assets 7.119 6.958 1.899 -1.834 14.912 13836 
LLP ratio 0.012 0.006 0.037 -0.277 2.693 13836 
Income diversification  0.162 0.135 0.816 -24.25 82.214 13836 
Management quality 0.907 0.947 0.096 0.028 1.105 13836 
Equity ratio 0.109 0.088 0.087 0 0.934 13836 
IV Instruments 
Financial freedom 56.793 60 14.036 10 90 13836 
Labor freedom 67.197 70.4 15.319 20 100 13836 
Entry density 2.613 1.677 3.747 0.027 39.001 11939 
Credit information depth 4.689 5 1.598 0 6 13784 
Macroeconomic variables 
GDP growth rate 0.019 0.018 0.04 -0.18 0.226 13836 
GDP per capita 9.519 10.28 1.349 4.986 11.124 13836 
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Table 2B 
The estimation results for the banking stability and financial inclusion. Source: 
Author’s calculation. 
Country Z-score Financial 
inclusion 
index 
Penetration Availability Usage No. of 
Banks 
Asia       
Afghanistan 16.83 0.012 (87) 0.015 (80) 0.01 (87) 0.015 (37) 9 
Armenia 48.67 0.224 (56) 0.254 (51) 0.187 (51) 0.097 (18) 14 
Azerbaijan 29.07 0.136 (65) 0.121 (61) 0.134 (63) 0 (86) 21 
Bangladesh 79.28 0.46 (23) 0.32 (41) 0.594 (16) 0.08 (19) 12 
Cambodia 42.98 0.072 (74) 0.023 (77) 0.043 (77) 0.906 (4) 12 
Cyprus 27.84 0.365 (37) 0 (83) 0.732 (13) 0.001 (67) 13 
Georgia 21.59 0.285 (47) 0.385 (30) 0.187 (52) 0.001 (69) 12 
Hong Kong SAR, China 81.60 0.389 (31) 0 (83) 0.775 (10) 0.037 (26) 28 
India 94.71 0.373 (35) 0.317 (42) 0.421 (23) 0.025 (33) 62 
Indonesia 59.24 0.233 (54) 0.286 (48) 0.097 (67) 1 (1) 61 
Japan 124.72 0.977 (3) 1 (1) 0.937 (4) 0.195 (14) 457 
Jordan 102.00 0.272 (48) 0.382 (32) 0.167 (54) 0.001 (72) 12 
Kazakhstan 59.26 0.304 (44) 0.488 (23) 0.116 (65) 0.065 (23) 27 
Korea, Rep. 57.60 0.991 (1) 0.927 (6) 0.992 (1) 1 (1) 14 
Kuwait 52.57 0.292 (46) 0.294 (46) 0.292 (32) 0 (87) 12 
Lebanon 109.28 0.496 (18) 0.347 (37) 0.555 (18) 1 (1) 33 
Malaysia 46.29 0.48 (21) 0.709 (13) 0.251 (38) 0.005 (46) 14 
Mongolia 31.58 0.421 (26) 0.336 (39) 0.285 (33) 0.652 (7) 3 
Pakistan 55.04 0.076 (73) 0.079 (64) 0.074 (70) 0.021 (34) 11 
Philippines 68.94 0.116 (66) 0.089 (63) 0.141 (60) 0.032 (30) 22 
Saudi Arabia 55.85 0.271 (49) 0.373 (33) 0.141 (62) 0.002 (63) 12 
Singapore 84.71 0.368 (36) 0 (83) 0.736 (12) 0.003 (50) 13 
Thailand 78.85 0.475 (22) 0.652 (15) 0.295 (31) 0.037 (25) 21 
Turkey 56.40 0.524 (16) 0.812 (11) 0.236 (41) 0.001 (77) 27 
United Arab Emirates 76.16 0.296 (45) 0.345 (38) 0.214 (48) 0.003 (53) 24 
Uzbekistan 85.38 0.138 (64) 0.01 (82) 0.233 (42) 0.404 (9) 9 
Yemen, Rep. 43.20 0.021 (86) 0.02 (78) 0.018 (86) 0.037 (27) 6 
Average/Total 62.58 0.336 0.318 0.328 0.208 961 
Europe       
Austria 112.13 0.354 (39) 0.274 (49) 0.434 (22) 0.001 (79) 158 
Belgium 79.91 0.981 (2) 0.939 (4) 0.961 (2) 0.002 (56) 27 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 91.98 0.312 (43) 0.327 (40) 0.264 (35) 0.001 (73) 19 
Bulgaria 46.98 0.711 (8) 0.835 (9) 0.586 (17) 0.002 (59) 17 
Croatia 81.44 0.386 (33) 0.261 (50) 0.459 (20) 0.003 (49) 29 
Estonia 46.91 0.618 (11) 0.931 (5) 0.3 (30) 0.008 (40) 7 
Finland 53.05 0.542 (15) 0.885 (8) 0.252 (37) 0.001 (78) 10 
Greece 59.62 0.545 (14) 0.627 (17) 0.457 (21) 0.001 (66) 10 
Hungary 49.68 0.417 (27) 0.412 (28) 0.407 (24) 0.186 (15) 22 
Iceland 26.78 0.206 (58) 0 (83) 0.401 (25) 0.139 (17) 5 
Ireland 38.98 0.489 (20) 0.368 (35) 0.611 (15) 0.001 (64) 8 
Italy 92.70 0.564 (12) 0.184 (54) 0.944 (3) 0.001 (82) 489 
Latvia 22.59 0.393 (30) 0.482 (24) 0.305 (29) 0.001 (75) 19 
Macedonia, FYR 52.70 0.492 (19) 0.685 (14) 0.247 (39) 0.027 (32) 13 
Malta 131.28 0.921 (4) 1 (1) 0.841 (7) 0.001 (65) 7 
Moldova 34.96 0.327 (42) 0.528 (20) 0.126 (64) 0.005 (45) 12 
Montenegro 64.28 0.386 (32) 0.429 (26) 0.307 (28) 0.001 (71) 7 
Netherlands 67.89 0.83 (5) 0.913 (7) 0.747 (11) 0.001 (74) 27 
Norway 40.00 0.089 (69) 0 (83) 0.179 (53) 0.015 (38) 12 
Portugal 31.27 0.785 (7) 0.647 (16) 0.923 (5) 0.002 (61) 18 
Serbia 36.48 0.385 (34) 0.401 (29) 0.337 (27) 0.073 (21) 28 
Spain 115.74 0.816 (6) 0.752 (12) 0.879 (6) 0.001 (68) 89 
Switzerland 330.24 0.694 (9) 0.585 (18) 0.803 (8) 0.002 (54) 124 
Ukraine 38.50 0.52 (17) 0.824 (10) 0.202 (50) 0.004 (48) 14 
United Kingdom 62.97 0.405 (29) 0.026 (76) 0.785 (9) 0 (83) 95 
Average/Total 72.36 0.527 0.533 0.510 0.019 1266 
Americas       
Argentina 38.53 0.256 (51) 0.373 (34) 0.141 (61) 0.001 (81) 50 
Bahamas, The 98.50 0.429 (25) 0.522 (21) 0.34 (26) 0.001 (80) 11 
Bolivia 42.00 0.083 (70) 0.071 (67) 0.075 (69) 0.003 (51) 10 
Brazil 38.95 0.455 (24) 0.357 (36) 0.467 (19) 0.002 (55) 104 
Chile 81.40 0.622 (10) 0.995 (3) 0.222 (46) 0.31 (12) 24 
Colombia 68.90 0.414 (28) 0.545 (19) 0.149 (58) 0.77 (6) 21 
Costa Rica 66.25 0.362 (38) 0.417 (27) 0.264 (36) 0.512 (8) 42 
Dominican Republic 45.88 0.184 (61) 0.132 (59) 0.228 (45) 0.007 (42) 57 
Ecuador 76.19 0.191 (60) 0.175 (56) 0.209 (49) 0 (84) 19 
El Salvador 56.15 0.206 (57) 0.182 (55) 0.232 (43) 0 (85) 13 
Honduras 81.41 0.143 (63) 0.142 (58) 0.144 (59) 0.009 (39) 15 
Jamaica 79.12 0.343 (41) 0.471 (25) 0.229 (44) 0.019 (35) 5 
Nicaragua 37.53 0.081 (71) 0.108 (62) 0.055 (71) 0.006 (43) 5 
Panama 67.11 0.258 (50) 0.3 (45) 0.216 (47) 0.002 (62) 41 
Peru 60.55 0.24 (52) 0.244 (52) 0.238 (40) 0.002 (58) 15 
Trinidad and Tobago 72.20 0.345 (40) 0.382 (31) 0.273 (34) 0.002 (57) 9 
Venezuela, RB 27.79 0.236 (53) 0.306 (44) 0.15 (57) 0.001 (70) 27 
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Country Z-score Financial 
inclusion 
index 
Penetration Availability Usage No. of 
Banks 
Average/Total 61.09 0.285 0.337 0.214 0.097 468 
Africa       
Algeria 52.52 0.079 (72) 0.127 (60) 0.028 (82) 0.051 (24) 12 
Angola 29.28 0.047 (80) 0.04 (70) 0.05 (73) 0.065 (22) 12 
Botswana 31.01 0.199 (59) 0.307 (43) 0.086 (68) 0.002 (60) 7 
Burundi 22.35 0.051 (79) 0.027 (75) 0.043 (76) 0.387 (10) 5 
Cameroon 56.97 0.033 (83) 0.015 (81) 0.047 (75) 0.077 (20) 8 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 52.70 0.102 (68) 0.155 (57) 0.05 (74) 0.004 (47) 21 
Ghana 41.46 0.059 (76) 0.072 (66) 0.041 (78) 0.019 (36) 17 
Kenya 63.71 0.055 (77) 0.072 (65) 0.037 (79) 0.034 (29) 29 
Libya 151.23 0.051 (78) 0.053 (69) 0.051 (72) 0.001 (76) 6 
Malawi 57.49 0.027 (85) 0.028 (73) 0.025 (83) 0.032 (31) 5 
Mauritius 59.91 0.557 (13) 0.497 (22) 0.616 (14) 0.036 (28) 12 
Mozambique 35.35 0.03 (84) 0.027 (74) 0.034 (80) 0.008 (41) 10 
Namibia 108.44 0.231 (55) 0.292 (47) 0.109 (66) 0.003 (52) 6 
Rwanda 20.65 0.112 (67) 0.06 (68) 0.151 (56) 0.186 (16) 7 
South Africa 43.07 0.182 (62) 0.209 (53) 0.155 (55) 0.006 (44) 14 
Tanzania 74.09 0.034 (82) 0.028 (72) 0.02 (85) 0.27 (13) 21 
Uganda 35.78 0.044 (81) 0.036 (71) 0.025 (84) 0.341 (11) 14 
Zambia 22.05 0.071 (75) 0.018 (79) 0.032 (81) 0.837 (5) 12 
Average/Total 53.23 0.109 0.115 0.089 0.131 218 
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Table 4.3 
Correlation matrix of bank- and country-level variables 
Panel A: Correlation matrix of bank level variables 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8     
1 C-Lerner 1          
2 E-Lerner 0.34*** 1         
3 Loan Ratio 0.12*** 0 1        
4 Bank Size 0.04*** -0.07*** 0.02* 1       
5 Loan Loss Provision 0.01 0 -0.05*** -0.03** 1      
6 Income Diversification 0.05*** 0.03** -0.05*** -0.01 0.02* 1     
7 Management Quality -0.03*** -0.10*** 0.21*** 0.10*** -0.13*** -0.08*** 1    
8 Capitalisation 0.07*** 0.09*** -0.06*** -0.37*** 0.11*** 0.07*** -0.29*** 1   
Panel B: Correlation matrix of country level variables 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Findex 1          
2 Voice 0.58*** 1         
3 Political Stability 0.57*** 0.75*** 1        
4 Government effectiveness 0.66*** 0.80*** 0.80*** 1       
5 Regulatory quality 0.60*** 0.86*** 0.80*** 0.92*** 1      
6 Rule of law 0.63*** 0.84*** 0.82*** 0.97*** 0.94*** 1     
7 Control of corruption 0.62*** 0.79*** 0.80*** 0.97*** 0.89*** 0.97*** 1    
8 Institutional Quality 0.65*** 0.89*** 0.88*** 0.97*** 0.96*** 0.98*** 0.96*** 1   
9 GDP Growth Rate -0.43*** -0.41*** -0.36*** -0.33*** -0.42*** -0.35*** -0.29*** -0.38*** 1  
10 Per Capita GDP 0.70*** 0.77*** 0.80*** 0.82*** 0.85*** 0.82*** 0.79*** 0.86*** -0.51*** 1 
Note that this table provides information on the correlation between the market power, bank-specific and macroeconomic variables used throughout the paper. 
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Table 4.4 
The effect of financial inclusion on banking stability 
The dependent variable is the Z-score, reported in columns 1-4, the negative return Volatility i.e., standard 
deviation of return on assets, reported in columns 5-8. Bank competition is proxied by two variants of the 
Lerner indices i.e., conventional Lerner (C-Lerner) and efficiency-adjusted Lerner (E-Lerner). Loan ratio is 
measured as loans as a percentage of total assets. Bank size is the logarithm of total assets valued in U.S. 
dollars (millions). Loan loss provision ratio is measured as a percentage of total assets, where income 
diversification is the ratio of non-interest income over total income. The management quality is measured as 
the total earning assets over total assets. Capitalisation is the bank total equity to asset ratio. To control for 
economic development, logarithm of GDP per capita is used, and GDP growth rate is used to account for 
condition of business cycle in each country. We employ instrumental variable (IV) technique with a GMM 
estimator. All regressions include year and bank fixed effects. Financial Inclusion is treated as an endogenous 
variable, and it is instrumented via financial freedom, entry density and financial freedom times entry density. 
We report heteroskedasticity-autocorrelation robust standard errors (HAC). ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Source: BankScope and WDI. Coverage: 2004-
2012. 
Variables  
ln(Z-score) -log[sd(ROA)] 
1 2 3 4 
C-Lerner E-Lerner C-Lerner E-Lerner 
Loan Ratio 0.115 0.074 -0.06 -0.09 
 [0.230] [0.232] [0.219] [0.221] 
Bank Size 0.397*** 0.440*** 0.420*** 0.452*** 
 [0.080] [0.080] [0.076] [0.076] 
Loan Loss Provision -2.102 -2.032 -2.091 -2.039* 
 [1.448] [1.336] [1.300] [1.220] 
Income Diversification 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.005 
 [0.014] [0.013] [0.015] [0.014] 
Management Quality 1.432*** 1.474*** 1.242*** 1.277*** 
 [0.343] [0.347] [0.335] [0.337] 
Capitalisation 4.110*** 3.900*** 1.264*** 1.135*** 
 [0.495] [0.496] [0.433] [0.435] 
C-Lerner (-1) 0.714***  0.527***  
 [0.072]  [0.066]  
E-Lerner (-1)  1.331***  0.929*** 
  [0.135]  [0.127] 
Financial Inclusion 6.272*** 6.518*** 6.299*** 6.489*** 
 [1.795] [1.810] [1.715] [1.731] 
GDP Growth Rate 5.253*** 5.269*** 5.062*** 5.090*** 
 [0.881] [0.881] [0.842] [0.843] 
Per Capita GDP -2.137*** -2.565*** -2.551*** -2.854*** 
 [0.702] [0.721] [0.676] [0.696] 
Observations 11,499 11,499 11,499 11,499 
2nd-stage F-test 41.95*** 42.34*** 41.58*** 40.73*** 
Under id test: KP LM statistic 80.54*** 77.81*** 80.54*** 77.81*** 
Hansen J-test (p-value) 5.12 (0.08) 3.33 (0.19) 5.31 (0.07) 3.98 (0.14) 
Endogeneity test 31.35*** 31.28*** 31.49*** 31.71*** 
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Table 4.5 
Interactive result of financial inclusion and bank competition on stability 
The dependent variable is the Z-score, reported in columns 1-4, the negative return Volatility i.e., standard 
deviation of return on assets, reported in columns 5-8. Bank competition is proxied by two variants of the 
Lerner indices i.e., conventional Lerner (C-Lerner) and efficiency-adjusted Lerner (E-Lerner). Loan ratio is 
measured as loans as a percentage of total assets. Bank size is the logarithm of total assets valued in U.S. 
dollars (millions). Loan loss provision ratio is measured as a percentage of total assets, where income 
diversification is the ratio of non-interest income over total income. The management quality is measured as 
the total earning assets over total assets. Capitalisation is the bank total equity to asset ratio. To control for 
economic development, logarithm of GDP per capita is used, and GDP growth rate is used to account for 
condition of business cycle in each country. We employ instrumental variable (IV) technique with a GMM 
estimator. All regressions include year and bank fixed effects. Financial Inclusion and Financial Inclusion 
times C-Lerner (E-Lerner) are treated as endogenous variables, and they are instrumented following Table 
4.4. We report heteroskedasticity-autocorrelation robust standard errors (HAC). ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Source: BankScope and WDI. Coverage: 
2004-2012. 
Variables 
ln(Z-score) -log[sd(ROA)] 
1 2 3 4 
C-Lerner E-Lerner C-Lerner E-Lerner 
Loan Ratio 0.119 0.058 -0.055 -0.101 
 [0.231] [0.232] [0.220] [0.221] 
Bank Size 0.404*** 0.441*** 0.428*** 0.453*** 
 [0.081] [0.080] [0.077] [0.076] 
Loan Loss Provision -2.104 -2.051 -2.095 -2.053* 
 [1.451] [1.336] [1.303] [1.220] 
Income Diversification 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.005 
 [0.014] [0.013] [0.015] [0.014] 
Management Quality 1.460*** 1.480*** 1.271*** 1.282*** 
 [0.343] [0.348] [0.335] [0.338] 
Capitalisation 4.146*** 3.880*** 1.302*** 1.120** 
 [0.497] [0.497] [0.435] [0.436] 
C-Lerner (-1) 0.334  0.089  
 [0.209]  [0.186]  
E-Lerner (-1)  1.135***  0.786*** 
  [0.153]  [0.142] 
Financial Inclusion 6.418*** 6.552*** 6.454*** 6.519*** 
 [1.787] [1.813] [1.709] [1.733] 
Financial Inclusion X C-Lerner 0.543**  0.626***  
 [0.258]  [0.233]  
Financial Inclusion X E-Lerner  0.410***  0.298** 
  [0.139]  [0.117] 
GDP Growth Rate 5.367*** 5.315*** 5.190*** 5.127*** 
 [0.871] [0.880] [0.834] [0.842] 
Per Capita GDP -2.257*** -2.649*** -2.685*** -2.917*** 
 [0.689] [0.719] [0.664] [0.694] 
Observations 11,499 11,499 11,499 11,499 
2nd-stage F-test 41.63*** 40.72*** 41.15*** 39.03*** 
Under id test: KP LM statistic 80.82*** 77.44*** 80.82*** 77.44*** 
Hansen J-test (p-value) 5.44 (0.07) 3.59 (0.17) 5.68 (0.06) 4.19 (0.12) 
AR chi-squared test 28.28*** 25.54*** 30.75*** 28.18*** 
Endogeneity test 33.74*** 32.02*** 34.04*** 32.35*** 
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Table 4.6 
The impact of financial inclusion and institutional quality interactions on banking 
stability 
This table reports IV-GMM regressions of banking stability (i.e., ln(Zscore)) on financial inclusion, six measures of institutional quality 
and their interactions. The analogous bank and macro controls are used as in equation (4.1). We use lagged values of efficiency adjusted 
Lerner index as the proxy for market power. Each interaction and its constituents are entered one at a time. For the sake of brevity, the 
results of the controls are not reported in this table but available upon request. Financial inclusion and financial inclusion times each 
institutional quality variable are treated as endogenous variables. The variables that are used as instruments are reported at the bottom 
of this table. The institutional variables are collected from the Kaufmann et al. (2010) dataset. The variable Voice and accountability 
(Voice) measures the degree of freedom of expressions and free media in a country. Political stability (Political) captures the perception 
of probability that the government is destabilized or overthrown by nonviolent or non-constitutional means. The variable Government 
effectiveness (Government) measures the quality in formulation and implementation and the commitment of the government with 
related policies. The regulatory quality (Regulatory) indicates the perception ability of a government to formulate and to implement 
political regulations that allow promoting development of the private sector. The variable rule of law (Law) measures the perception of 
agents about its confidence in the existing norms and the degree in which they can rely that the contracts will be fulfilled and the 
property rights will be protect by the courts. The variable control of corruption (Corruption) indicates the perception on magnitude in 
which the public power is exerted to obtain private gain. These six indicators are measured in units ranging from about -2.5 to 2.5, with 
higher values corresponding to better governance and institutional quality. In column 7, we capture common variation among these six 
governance indicators using the principal component analysis and construct a composite index of institutional quality (IQI). 
  log(Zscore
 
log(Zscore
 
log(Zscore
 
log(Zscore
 
log(Zscore
 
log(Zscore
 
log(Zscore
 Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Financial inclusion index (FII) 3.426*** 8.197*** 5.298*** 1.277 5.804*** 6.216*** 10.878*** 
 [1.275] [2.413] [1.580] [2.213] [1.714] [1.947] [2.977] 
Voice and accountability (Voice) -2.135*       
 [1.162]       
FII x Voice 7.391***       
 [2.105]       
Political stability (Political)  -2.228**      
  [1.127]      
FII x Political  5.946**      
  [2.677]      
Government effectiveness (Government)   0.744     
   [1.402]     
FII x Government   -2.697     
   [3.161]     
Regulatory quality (Regulatory)    -10.640**    
    [5.118]    
FII x Regulatory    21.321**    
    [10.272]    
Rule of law (Law)     -2.792***   
     [0.980]   
FII x Law     5.983**   
     [3.008]   
Control of corruption (Corruption)      0.639  
      [0.862]  
FII x Corruption      0.207  
      [1.436]  
Institutional quality index (IQI)       -0.606 
       [0.477] 
FII x IQI       2.347** 
        [1.139] 
Observations 11,450 11,499 11,499 11,499 11,499 11,499 11,499 
Bank and Macro controls √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Bank and year fixed effects √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
2nd-stage F-test 42.66*** 36.51*** 40.37*** 26.08*** 38.85*** 42.58*** 39.56*** 
Under id test: KP LM statistic 54.32*** 46.39*** 63.11*** 9.28*** 74.99*** 85.81*** 71.97*** 
Hansen J-test (p-value) 1.19 (0.28) 0.02 (0.90) 4.57 (0.10) 0.62 (0.43) 1.07 (0.30) 4.72 (0.09) 1.62 (0.44) 
AR chi-squared test 29.05*** 21.32*** 24.04*** 25.25*** 24.72*** 27.75*** 26.75*** 
Endogeneity test 29.04*** 31.18*** 21.47*** 31.67*** 20.77*** 23.82*** 38.23*** 
Instruments        
Financial freedom √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Labour freedom  √ √ √  √ √ 
Entry density √  √ √ √ √ √ 
Entry density * Financial freedom   √  √ √  
Entry density * Labour freedom       √ 
Credit information depth √       
Marginal effect 8.42*** 10.13*** 2.97 16.46** 9.44*** 6.34* 10.88*** 
One standard deviation above average ↑ 13.61*** 14.95*** 0.01 32.01*** 14.88*** 6.54** 16.29*** 
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Table 4.7 
The effect of Global financial inclusion (GFI) on banking stability 
In this table we use Global Financial Inclusion Index (Global Findex) based on World Bank. Since this 
measure is only available for the year 2011, we had to collapse our dataset at bank-level to run cross-sectional 
regression. Initially we conduct endogeneity test for the Global financial inclusion index, which is reported 
at the bottom of the table. In case of rejecting the null hypothesis of exogeneity, we employ the instrumental 
variable (IV) estimator; otherwise we use the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator with robust standard 
error. When we added interaction with GFI (e.g., columns 3, 4, 7 and 8), we treated both GFI and its 
interaction as endogenous variables. We used financial freedom, entry density and their interactions as 
instruments. The underidentification (UT) and over identification (OT) tests are reported by the Anderson 
canonical correlations LM statistic and Sargan’s J-test, respectively to show the relevance and validity of the 
instruments used for the Global financial inclusion index. The definitions of the rest of the variables are the 
same as Table 4.4. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Source: BankScope and World Bank. 
  log(Zscore) -log[sd(ROA)] 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
  C-Lerner E-
 
C-
 
E-Lerner C-
 
E-
 
C-
 
E-Lerner 
Loan Ratio 0.310* 0.188 -0.009 0.364 0.019 0.115 -0.036 0.776* 
 [0.182] [0.131] [0.129] [0.275] [0.123] [0.124] [0.123] [0.407] 
Bank Size 0.030** 0.047**
 
0.038**
 
0.122** 0.064**
 
0.071**
 
0.063**
 
0.146**
  [0.012] [0.011] [0.011] [0.055] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.045] 
Loan Loss Provision -
 
-6.510* -6.375* -
 
-
 
-6.463* -
 
-
 
 [0.605] [3.454] [3.281] [1.379] [3.163] [3.315] [3.131] [1.383] 
Income Diversification -0.016 0.01 -0.067 0.034 -0.07 -0.027 -0.094 0.027 
 [0.058] [0.065] [0.054] [0.104] [0.066] [0.061] [0.063] [0.112] 
Management Quality 2.121**
 
2.288**
 
2.051**
 
1.508* 2.320**
 
2.355**
 
2.204**
 
1.056 
 [0.303] [0.326] [0.306] [0.830] [0.297] [0.305] [0.292] [0.833] 
Capitalisation 2.605**
 
2.067**
 
2.104**
 
3.250**
 
-
 
-
 
-
 
-1.198 
 [0.318] [0.313] [0.309] [0.905] [0.273] [0.275] [0.276] [0.914] 
C-Lerner 0.980**
 
 0.337**  0.615**
 
 0.240*  
 [0.103]  [0.146]  [0.077]  [0.131]  
E-Lerner  0.356**
 
 -4.307  0.06  -4.776* 
  [0.101]  [3.177]  [0.092]  [2.537] 
Global financial inclusion 
  
0.018** 0.001 0.005**
 
0.009 0.012**
 
0.010**
 
0.014**
 
0.040** 
 [0.007] [0.002] [0.002] [0.008] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.016] 
GFI x C-Lerner   1.443**
 
   1.086**
 
 
   [0.313]    [0.289]  
GFI x E-Lerner    7.501    8.146* 
    [5.113]    [4.166] 
GDP Growth Rate -
 
-
 
-
 
1.283 -
 
-
 
-
 
-2.618 
 [1.719] [0.999] [0.976] [3.794] [0.929] [0.942] [0.929] [3.706] 
Per Capita GDP -0.181** 0.013 -0.025 0.02 -0.014 0.007 -0.028 -0.204 
 [0.080] [0.027] [0.027] [0.077] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.162] 
Constant 2.396**
 
0.802** 1.447**
 
0.715 3.630**
 
3.374**
 
3.877**
 
4.953**
  [0.675] [0.392] [0.384] [0.734] [0.357] [0.365] [0.362] [1.327] 
Observations 2,238 2,497 2,497 2,238 2,497 2,497 2,497 2,238 
Estimator IV OLS OLS IV OLS OLS OLS IV 
F-statistics 45.80 24.69 36.37 10.06 123.10 114.90 112.80 27.23 
Adjusted R2 - 0.14 0.19 - 0.39 0.37 0.39 - 
UT: Anderson canon. corr. LM 
 
137.60 - - 2.70 - - - 4.53 
OT (Sargan) (p-value) 2.14 
 
- - 1.10 
 
- - - 3.05 
 Endogeneity test 0.04 0.10 0.43 0.04 0.07 0.21 0.23 0.01 
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Table 4.8 
 
The effect of Financial Inclusion on bank stability (Alternative Measure) 
In this table, following Beck et al. (2013), we use an alternative measure of bank stability in which the 
denominator in equation (4.2) is calculated using five year rolling windows. Financial Inclusion and 
Financial Inclusion times C-Lerner (E-Lerner) are treated as endogenous variables, and they are 
instrumented following Table 4.4. The underidentification (UT) and over identification (OT) tests are 
reported by the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) test for weak instruments and Hansen J-test, respectively to 
show the relevance and validity of the instruments used. The Anderson-Rubin Chi2 test shows that Financial 
Inclusion and Financial Inclusion times C-Lerner (E-Lerner) are jointly significant. The definitions of the 
rest of the variables are the same as Table 4.4. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels respectively. Source: BankScope and World Bank. 
  
Variables 
  
log(Zscore5) -log[sd5(ROA)] 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
C-Lerner E-Lerner C-Lerner E-Lerner C-Lerner E-Lerner C-Lerner E-Lerner 
Loan Ratio 0.17 0.109 0.166 0.106 -0.012 -0.058 -0.012 -0.06 
 [0.215] [0.214] [0.216] [0.214] [0.208] [0.208] [0.208] [0.208] 
Bank Size 0.338*** 0.357*** 0.336*** 0.361*** 0.314*** 0.330*** 0.314*** 0.333*** 
 [0.075] [0.075] [0.076] [0.075] [0.071] [0.071] [0.071] [0.072] 
Loan Loss Provision -2.518*** -2.413*** -2.516*** -2.420*** -2.367*** -2.272*** -2.366*** -2.279*** 
 [0.842] [0.805] [0.842] [0.807] [0.748] [0.719] [0.748] [0.721] 
Income Diversification 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.007] [0.008] [0.007] 
Management Quality 1.186*** 1.199*** 1.192*** 1.198*** 0.934*** 0.945*** 0.942*** 0.944*** 
 [0.339] [0.335] [0.337] [0.336] [0.318] [0.314] [0.316] [0.315] 
Capitalisation 2.691*** 2.463*** 2.689*** 2.457*** 1.033** 0.870** 1.037** 0.865** 
 [0.452] [0.448] [0.450] [0.449] [0.409] [0.412] [0.408] [0.413] 
C-Lerner 0.488***  0.541***  0.401***  0.366**  
 [0.062]  [0.202]  [0.055]  [0.181]  
E-Lerner  1.099***  0.956***  0.832***  0.713*** 
  [0.124]  [0.144]  [0.119]  [0.138] 
Financial Inclusion  6.688*** 7.032*** 6.724*** 7.016*** 6.628*** 6.883*** 6.671*** 6.873*** 
 [1.811] [1.812] [1.802] [1.816] [1.711] [1.718] [1.704] [1.721] 
Financial Inclusion X C-Lerner   -0.071    0.05  
   [0.237]    [0.212]  
Financial Inclusion X E-Lerner    0.278**    0.231* 
    [0.133]    [0.127] 
GDP Growth Rate 4.414*** 4.518*** 4.423*** 4.539*** 4.315*** 4.402*** 4.340*** 4.421*** 
 [0.891] [0.889] [0.879] [0.890] [0.855] [0.857] [0.845] [0.858] 
Per Capita GDP -2.125*** -2.524*** -2.132*** -2.562*** -2.404*** -2.697*** -2.431*** -2.729*** 
 [0.806] [0.818] [0.790] [0.818] [0.779] [0.794] [0.766] [0.794] 
Observations 9,338 9,338 9,338 9,338 9,338 9,338 9,338 9,338 
2nd-stage F-test 16.01*** 16.86*** 15.52*** 16.11*** 15.71*** 14.95*** 15.47*** 14.24*** 
Under id test: KP LM statistic 58.79*** 57.42*** 58.78*** 57.20*** 58.79*** 57.42*** 58.78*** 57.20*** 
AR chi-squared test 35.49*** 35.13*** 35.65*** 35.32*** 37.26*** 36.73*** 37.62*** 36.96*** 
Hansen J-test 4.39 (0.11) 3.37 (0.19) 4.37 (0.11) 3.43 (0.18) 4.17 (0.12) 3.32 (0.19) 4.20 (0.12) 3.40 (0.18) 
Endogeneity test 34.11*** 35.02*** 34.52*** 35.19*** 31.99*** 32.75*** 32.47*** 32.89*** 
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Table 4.9 
Financial inclusion and banking stability: robustness checks 
  Tercile 1: the lowest 
financial inclusion 
Tercile 2: medium 
financial inclusion 
Tercile 3: the highest 
financial inclusion 
Commercial banks: 
Cooperative and Islamic 
banks excluded 
Rest of the sample: Japan 
and Italy excluded 
Only Developing 
Countries: Developed 
Countries excluded 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Variables log(Zscore
 
-
 
log(Zscore
 
-
 
log(Zscore
 
-
 
log(Zscore
 
-
 
log(Zscore
 
-
 
log(Zscore
 
-
 Loan Ratio 0.591* 0.341 0.282 0.063 1.626*** 1.760*** 0.462* 0.27 0.339 0.176 0.376 0.113 
 [0.309] [0.308] [0.372] [0.355] [0.483] [0.471] [0.260] [0.249] [0.249] [0.237] [0.315] [0.293] 
Bank Size 0.715*** 0.660*** 0.381*** 0.453*** 0.678*** 0.613*** -0.001 0.049 0.103 0.143 -0.075 -0.037 
 [0.140] [0.131] [0.138] [0.133] [0.202] [0.192] [0.102] [0.097] [0.093] [0.088] [0.137] [0.129] 
Loan Loss Provision -3.722*** -3.286*** -5.561*** -4.944*** -0.366 -0.591 -1.181 -1.237 -1.328 -1.355 -3.770*** -3.451*** 
 [0.926] [0.951] [1.344] [1.228] [0.916] [0.894] [1.036] [0.927] [1.070] [0.950] [0.944] [0.898] 
Income Diversification 0.191 0.173 0.129 0.159 -0.002 -0.001 0.236* 0.228** 0.046 0.071 0.486** 0.461** 
 [0.176] [0.163] [0.146] [0.129] [0.009] [0.010] [0.126] [0.109] [0.069] [0.057] [0.224] [0.190] 
Management Quality 0.337 0.255 1.942*** 1.535** 0.791 0.355 1.346*** 1.111*** 1.502*** 1.243*** 1.864*** 1.700*** 
 [0.424] [0.412] [0.744] [0.754] [1.018] [0.898] [0.406] [0.393] [0.392] [0.378] [0.542] [0.518] 
Capitalisation 2.525*** -0.064 3.883*** 1.233* 7.493*** 3.961*** 1.469*** -1.000** 2.067*** -0.481 1.652*** -0.806* 
 [0.701] [0.635] [0.789] [0.726] [1.859] [1.507] [0.444] [0.407] [0.437] [0.396] [0.527] [0.478] 
E-Lerner 0.196 -0.12 0.31 0.028 2.605*** 1.931*** 1.162*** 0.790*** 1.052*** 0.689*** 1.079*** 0.738*** 
 [0.219] [0.208] [0.213] [0.196] [0.320] [0.290] [0.177] [0.168] [0.164] [0.155] [0.236] [0.226] 
Financial Inclusion  -11.597** -10.137** 13.601*** 12.266*** 26.586*** 24.286*** 8.081*** 7.833*** 7.998*** 7.697*** 6.386*** 6.381*** 
 [4.724] [4.471] [4.720] [4.399] [8.511] [8.019] [2.241] [2.119] [2.166] [2.045] [2.227] [2.110] 
GDP Growth Rate -1.237 -0.942 2.066 1.654 2.688 3.104 5.634*** 5.464*** 6.033*** 5.830*** 3.831*** 3.683*** 
 [1.246] [1.204] [1.413] [1.316] [2.448] [2.305] [0.906] [0.854] [0.810] [0.764] [0.927] [0.880] 
Per Capita GDP 4.154*** 3.613*** -5.649*** -5.542*** -7.808 -7.285 -2.222** -2.287*** -2.677*** -2.654*** -1.454* -1.544* 
 [1.387] [1.339] [2.065] [1.914] [5.156] [4.925] [0.866] [0.825] [0.874] [0.831] [0.838] [0.802] 
Observations 3,223 3,223 4,123 4,123 3,938 3,938 5,516 5,516 6,390 6,390 3,439 3,439 
Number of banks 733 733 995 995 678 678 1,117 1,117 1,283 1,283 708 708 
2nd-stage F-test 10.54*** 9.03*** 14.76*** 17.69*** 33.53*** 31.13*** 17.56*** 15.96*** 20.0*** 18.02*** 12.13*** 11.5*** 
Under id test: KP LM 
i i  
35.69*** 35.69*** 24.14*** 24.14*** 40.69*** 40.69*** 41.32*** 41.32*** 44.4*** 44.4*** 29.2*** 29.2*** 
Hansen J-test 0.21 
(0 90) 
0.21 (0.90) 0.84 
(0 36) 
2.23 (0.14) 0.23 
(0 64) 
1.37 (0.24) 0.38 
(0 54) 
0.75 (0.39) 0.89 
(0 35) 
1.17 (0.28) 0.81 
(0 37) 
1.34 (0.25) 
Endogeneity test 4.71*** 3.87*** 18.73*** 18.67*** 5.11*** 3.76*** 29.14*** 27.63*** 28.85*** 26.97*** 19.27*** 19.61*** 
This table reports robustness tests of financial inclusion and banking stability. We use as usual IV-GMM estimators. In the first six columns, we split the 
sample into three terciles based on financial inclusion and re-run regressions. In this case we use investment freedom, entry density and investment freedom 
times entry density as instruments. The validity of the instruments is confirmed by the under-identification and over-identification tests reported at the bottom 
of the table. In columns 7 and 8, we dropped observations of the cooperative and Islamic banks keeping only commercial banks. In the last two columns, we 
dropped observations of Japan and Italy as they comprise the lion share of our sample and re-run regressions. For the specification of 7, 8, 9 and 10, we use 
financial freedom and entry density as the instruments. The results of the first-stage regressions are available from the author upon request. The analogous 
bank and macro controls are used as in equation (4.1). We use lagged values of efficiency adjusted Lerner index as the proxy for market power.  
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Table 4.10 
The causal effects of enabling inclusive financial environment on banking stability 
Panel A of Table 4.10 reports the results of difference-in-differences (DID) regression estimation on a matched sample. In all 
specifications, year dummies are included to control for the business cycle. Standard errors are clustered at the country-level as omitted 
country characteristics might cause error terms to be correlated for banks within the same country. While we control for country fixed 
effects in columns 1-4, we consider bank fixed effects in columns 5-8. Panel B of Table 4.10 reports the results of the matching 
estimators. we use two other matching techniques (i.e., kernel and stratification) and recently developed covariate matching estimator 
of Abadie and Imbens (2006)) to estimate the average treatment effect for the treated (ATT). In all matching estimators, we impose 
common support condition to restrict control groups to fall within the support of the propensity score distribution of the treated groups. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Source: BankScope and World Bank. 
 Panel A: DID 
 
log(Zscore) -log(sd(ROA) log(Zscore) -log(sd(ROA) 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
AFI 0.314** 0.270* 0.385**
 
0.274** 0.341** 0.311** 0.310* 0.254 
 [0.123] [0.136] [0.124] [0.135] [0.152] [0.148] [0.157] [0.161] 
Loan Ratio  0.793***  0.580**  0.632  0.402 
  [0.243]  [0.226]  [0.566]  [0.625] 
Bank Size  0.066**  0.122**
 
 0.289  0.269 
  [0.029]  [0.022]  [0.188]  [0.171] 
Loan Loss Provision  -7.652***  -
 
 -
 
 -
 
  [1.328]  [1.045]  [1.273]  [1.324] 
Income Diversification  -0.114  -0.453  0.207  0.192 
  [0.345]  [0.296]  [0.498]  [0.522] 
Management Quality  0.232  0.289  0.019  0.157 
  [0.369]  [0.342]  [0.769]  [0.766] 
Capitalisation  1.836***  -
 
 1.535  -1.255 
  [0.515]  [0.433]  [1.326]  [1.306] 
E-Lerner  0.107  -0.334  0.156  -0.165 
  [0.263]  [0.218]  [0.342]  [0.331] 
GDP Growth Rate  0.283  -0.182  0.19  0.117 
  [1.465]  [1.349]  [1.208]  [1.260] 
Per Capita GDP  0.83  1.109  1.633  1.462 
  [1.123]  [1.142]  [1.246]  [1.333] 
Constant 3.381*** -4.184 5.368**
 
-3.916 3.379*** -11.792 5.443**
 
-7.799 
 [0.114] [8.554] [0.108] [8.698] [0.132] [9.368] [0.124] [10.095
 Observations 2,071 2,027 2,071 2,027 2,071 2,027 2,071 2,027 
Bank fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.16 0.23 0.23 0.36 0.61 0.63 0.64 0.65 
F-statistics 5.32 14.71 4.16 24.04 4.80 3.67 2.57 2.44 
 Panel B: Matching 
estimator Kernel Stratified Abadie-Imbens 
Treatment effects Log 
(Zscore) 
-log 
(sd(ROA) 
Log 
(Zscore) 
-log 
(sd(ROA) 
Log 
(Zscore) 
-log 
(sd(ROA) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
ATT 0.109** 0.088** 0.114*** 0.081* 0.889*** 1.267*** 
S.E. [0.045] [0.041] [0.039] [0.043] [0.308] [0.252] 
t-stat [2.430] [2.164] [2.952] [1.871] [2.886] [5.028] 
Observations 13,836 13,836 13,836 13,836 13,524 13,524 
Common support condition Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Appendix 4.A 
Principal Component analysis 
Using individual dimension in an equation may provide an incomprehensive picture of 
financial inclusion. In addition, modelling various dimensions of financial inclusion in the same 
equation would lead to multicollinearity. We use principal component analysis (PCA) to combine these 
dimensions and create an index of financial inclusion. Using PCA to construct indices is well-
documented in several papers (see Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013; Bali, Brown and Caglayan, 2014). It is a 
multivariate statistical technique used to reduce a large number of variables in a data set into a smaller 
number of ‘dimensions’ (i.e., principal components) by parsing any redundancies among the original 
variables while retaining most of the variance in the original variables.95 In mathematical terms, from 
an initial set of n  correlated variables, PCA generates uncorrelated principal components ( )iPC , where 
each component is a linear weighted combination of the original variables and components themselves 
are orthogonal to each other. It can be shown as:  
 
1 11 1 12 2 1
1 1 2 2
  X +  +w
                          
  X +  +w
n n
m m m mn n
PC w X w X
PC w X w X
= +
= +



       (4.A1) 
Which can be re-written as 
1
      (   1, 2, )
n
ij i
i
PC w X for j m
=
= =∑     (4.A2) 
Where 1 2  [ , , , ]mP P P P= …  are the principal components; 
  [ ]   (1, 2, , ) and    (1, 2, , )ijW w for i m j n= = … = …  are component loadings or weights; and 
1 2 = [X , , , ]nX X X are the original variables. The eigenvectors of the correlation matrix are 
proportional to the weights of each principal component, and it reflects the variance contribution of 
principal components to original variables. The eigenvalue of the analogous eigenvector is the variance 
for each principal component. The components are ranked, and they are extracted in decreasing order 
of importance so that the first component 1( )PC  explains the largest possible amount of variations in 
the original data conditional to the constraint that the sum of the squared weights 2 2 211 12 1( )nw w w+ + +  
is equal to one. The second component 2( )PC  is entirely uncorrelated with the first component and 
explains the second largest variations, less than the first component, subject to the same constraint. The 
subsequent components are independent of the previous components and explain smaller and smaller 
proportions of the variation of the original data. The greater correlation among original variables 
necessitates fewer principal components to capture common information.  
 
It is noted that principal component can be extracted by using original variables or by their 
deviations from their averages, or by the standardized variables.96 As the indicators of financial 
inclusion are measured in different units, we deem to follow the latter approach in this study. We use 
the following equation to construct the composite index of financial inclusion (FII):  
1
  
n
ij i
i
FII w X
=
= ∑    (4.A3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
95 See Jolliffe (2002) for a detailed discussion on PCA. 
96 We used standardized variables with mean of zero and standard deviation of one instead of min-max normalisation 
and construct financial inclusion index. These two indices are perfectly correlated, indicating the robustness of our index.  
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Table 4.A1 
Principal component analysis for financial inclusion index 
Panel A Notation PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 
Eigenvalue  2.81 0.69 0.45 0.05 
% of variance  0.70 0.17 0.11 0.01 
Variable 
Geographic penetration of Branches AGB 0.52 -0.46 -0.38 -0.61 
Geographic penetration of ATMs AGA 0.52 -0.50 0.34 0.61 
Demographic penetration of Branches ADB 0.47 0.55 -0.59 0.36 
Demographic penetration of ATMs ADA 0.48 0.50 0.63 -0.35 
Panel B   PC1 PC2 PC3   
Eigenvalue  1.54 0.99 0.46  
% of variance  0.51 0.33 0.15  
Variable 
Accessibility/Penetration Dimension Penetration 0.71 -0.02 -0.71  
Availability Dimension Availability 0.71 -0.06 0.71  
Usage Dimension Usage 0.06 1.00 0.03   
Note: AGB = the number of branches per 1,000 km2; AGA = the number of ATMs per 1,000 km2; ADB = the number of branches per 
100,000 adults; ADA = the number of ATMs per 100,000 adults; Penetration = the number of deposit and loan accounts per 1000 adults; 
Availability = The Outreach Dimension; Usage = Total volume of deposit and loans relative to GDP. 
 
 
Table 4.A2 
Inclusive financial system and firm financing obstacle or access to finance, firm 
level results 
We run ordered probit model when Financing Obstacle is the dependent variable and logit model for the 
case of Access to Finance. In both cases, robust standard errors are reported in brackets. Both dependent 
variables are constructed using the World Bank Enterprise Surveys. In the case of the former, firms were 
asked to rate on a five point scale how much of an obstacle access to finance is for the operation and growth 
of the business: (0) No obstacle (1) minor obstacle (2) moderate obstacle (3) major obstacle (4) very severe 
obstacle. For the latter case, Access to Finance is a dummy variable that indicates whether the firm has access 
to a loan, overdraft, or a line of credit. The firm size is the logarithm of the firms’ total number of permanent 
employees. The dummy variable Exporter indicates that firms are involved in exporting. The Manufacturing 
dummy indicates that a firm is in the manufacturing sector. Government-owned and Foreign-owned are 
dummies that are equal to one if the firm has government or foreign ownership, respectively. Log firm age 
is the logarithm of the firm’s age in years. GDP growth rate is the annual growth rate in percentage. Regional 
dummies are Sub-Sahara Africa, Asia and Pacific, Europe, Americas, and South Asia, with the Middle East 
and North Africa being the omitted category. . ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels respectively. Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys and WDI. Coverage: 2004-2012. 
  Financing Obstacle Access to Finance 
VARIABLES Coef se coef se 
Financial Inclusion -0.361*** [0.040] 2.570*** [0.088] 
Log firm size (employees) -0.046*** [0.004] 0.174*** [0.009] 
Exporter -0.024* [0.015] 0.594*** [0.031] 
Manufacturing 0.143*** [0.012] -0.193*** [0.025] 
Foreign-owned (>=50% shares) -0.250*** [0.020] -0.199*** [0.041] 
Government-owned (>=10% shares) -0.065* [0.037] -0.894*** [0.076] 
Log Firm Age -0.079*** [0.011] 0.370*** [0.022] 
GDP growth rate 0.002* [0.001] -0.066*** [0.003] 
Sub-Sahara Africa 0.374*** [0.057] 0.512*** [0.120] 
Asia and Pacific -0.371*** [0.057] 0.337*** [0.121] 
Europe 0.268*** [0.059] -0.245** [0.125] 
Americas 0.199*** [0.057] 1.109*** [0.121] 
South Asia 0.230*** [0.067] 0.560*** [0.139] 
Observations 38,987   38,987   
No of countries 64  64  
Pseudo R-squared 0.02   0.11   
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Appendix 4.B  
Estimating marginal cost using a translog cost function  
The input and output choices are specified according to the intermediation 
approach of Sealey and Lindley (1977). Following Koetter, Kolari and Spierdijk (2012), a 
production technology is specified with three inputs (i.e., labour, capital and borrowed 
funds) and one output (i.e., total assets). Since the information on the prices of loans and 
deposits are limited, we use total assets as an aggregate measure of banking activity, as 
previously used by Berger, Klapper and Turk-Ariss (2009) and Beck, De Jonghe and 
Schepens (2013). We include equity in the production function to account for various risk 
attitudes of banks. The following translog total cost function is specified for bank 
1,...,i N=  at time 1,...,t T=  as: 
3 3 3 3
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  (4.B1) 
where itTOC  is the total costs including financial and operating cost; itQ  
represents one output i.e., total assets, and ,j itW  ( 3,2,1=j ) are input prices where 1W  is the 
price of funds; 2W  is the price of labour; 3W  is the price of capital of bank i  at time t  ; itZ  
is total equity of bank i  at time t  ; and trend  is the time trend to capture technical change. 
We impose homogeneity of degree one on input prices and divided all factor prices and 
itTOC  by  3W  . The marginal cost is measured by taking the first derivative with respect to 
output for each bank in the sample after estimating cost function as:  
 
3
1 1 1 , 1
1
MC lnQ ln[ ]itit it j j it
jit
TOC
W trend
Q
γ θ λ ω
=
= + + +∑  (4.B2) 
 
 
The shortcoming of the conventional Lerner index estimated above is that it is 
measured assuming full bank efficiency and therefore it fails to account for the possibilities 
of banker inability to exploit output pricing opportunities resulting from market power. 
Following Koetter, Kolari and Spierdijk (2012), we estimate efficiency-adjusted Lerner 
indices from a single structural model as: 
 
 ( ) /it it itAR MC AR−      (4.B3) 
  
Where itAR  is the average revenue computed as  / ,TR TA  Where,  TR PBT TOC= + . 
In order to obtain efficiency-adjusted Lerner indices we have to estimate expected profit 
PBT  from an alternative profit function97 and expected total costs TOC  from equation 
(4.B1). Dissimilar to conventional Lerner indices in equation (4.6), the estimation of 
efficiency-adjusted Lerner accounts for both bank efficiency and degree of market power 
simultaneously.   
 
97 To estimate expected profits (PBT ) we use PBT  (i.e. profit before tax) instead of TOC  in equation (4.B1) as the 
dependent variable. Following Bos and Koetter (2011), to account for individual bank losses, we use a negative profit 
indicator ( NPI ) in the profit function as many banks in our sample period incurred losses. 
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Table 4.B1 
Descriptive statistics of the variables included in the cost and profit functions.  
Source: BankScope 
Region Cost Profit Assets w1 w2 w3 Equity   
Asia 8.9 7.1 7.6 -5.0 -4.7 -5.0 5.0 Mean 
 8.8 6.9 7.6 -5.5 -4.8 -5.2 4.8 Median 
 1.9 2.3 1.7 1.7 0.6 0.7 1.7 SD 
 2.9 -2.6 2.6 -7.6 -8.1 -7.7 0.9 Min. 
 14.4 13.6 12.6 -1.6 -1.4 -0.9 9.7 Max. 
Europe 8.3 6.3 6.8 -3.8 -4.5 -4.6 4.5 Mean 
 7.8 5.9 6.4 -3.7 -4.4 -4.7 4.2 Median 
 2.2 2.3 2.0 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.8 SD 
 2.7 -2.2 2.6 -7.6 -11.6 -9.5 0.9 Min. 
 17.4 14.8 12.6 -1.6 -1.2 0.8 9.7 Max. 
Americas 7.6 5.8 6.3 -3.0 -3.9 -3.7 4.3 Mean 
 7.6 5.9 6.3 -3.0 -3.8 -3.7 4.2 Median 
 2.1 2.5 2.0 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.8 SD 
 3.0 -3.0 2.6 -7.3 -8.8 -8.3 0.9 Min. 
 14.5 13.2 12.6 -1.6 -0.8 -0.5 9.7 Max. 
Africa 7.4 6.1 6.2 -3.5 -4.0 -3.9 4.0 Mean 
 7.2 6.1 6.1 -3.3 -3.9 -3.7 3.9 Median 
 2.0 2.4 1.7 0.9 0.8 0.9 1.6 SD 
 2.9 -2.0 2.6 -7.6 -8.5 -8.4 0.9 Min. 
 14.1 13.4 11.8 -1.6 -1.9 -1.4 9.0 Max. 
Total 8.4 6.5 7.0 -4.0 -4.5 -4.5 4.6 Mean 
 8.1 6.3 6.8 -3.7 -4.5 -4.7 4.4 Median 
 2.1 2.4 1.9 1.4 0.8 0.9 1.8 SD 
 2.7 -3.0 2.6 -7.6 -11.6 -9.5 0.9 Min. 
  17.4 14.8 12.6 -1.6 -0.8 0.8 9.7 Max. 
The dataset comprises 2913 banks in 87 countries. 
Note: All variables are in logarithmic format. 
 
Appendix 4.C 
Table 4.C1 
First-stage regression: Financial inclusion 
Variables Dependent variable: Financial inclusion 
1 2 3 4 
Financial freedom 0.0017*** 0.0018*** 0.0020*** 0.0020*** 
 [6.62] [6.74] [6.98] [7.00] 
Entry density 0.0035*** 0.0034*** 0.0079*** 0.0074*** 
 [6.92] [6.77] [5.80] [5.51] 
Financial freedom x Entry density   -0.0001*** -0.0001*** 
   [-3.39] [-3.13] 
C-Lerner -0.0080**  -0.0083***  
 [-2.55]  [-2.64]  
E-Lerner  -0.0348***  -0.0343*** 
    [-5.42]   [-5.37] 
Observations 11,499 11,499 11,499 11,499 
Bank and Macro controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank and Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 
F-statistics 86.42 86.73 82.21 82.72 
Notes: This table reports regressions of financial inclusion on financial freedom, entry density and financial 
freedom times entry density. In order to make our identification strategy as transparent as possible, we also 
report (in column 1 and 2) the regression results that exclude interaction terms in the specification. All 
regressions include bank-specific and country-specific controls as in equation (4.1), except financial 
inclusion. All regressions also include bank fixed effect and year fixed effects. Unreported heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are calculated. T-statistics are reported in brackets.  
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Appendix 4.D 
 
Table 4.D1 
G20 Principles for Innovative Financial Inclusion and the Commitments of the 
Maya Declaration 
Panel A G20 Principles for Innovative Financial Inclusion 
Leadership Cultivate a broad-based government commitment to financial inclusion to help alleviate poverty 
Diversity Implement policy approaches that promote competition and provide market-based incentives for 
delivery of sustainable financial access and usage of a broad range of affordable services (savings, 
credit, payments and transfers, insurance) as well as a diversity of service providers 
Innovation Promote technological and institutional innovation as a means to expand financial system access 
and usage, including by addressing infrastructure weakness  
Protection Encourage a comprehensive approach to consumer protection that recognises the roles of 
government, providers, and consumers 
Empowerment Develop financial literacy and financial capability 
Cooperation Create an institutional environment with clear lines of accountability and coordination within 
government; and also encourage partnerships and direct consultation across government, business, 
and other stakeholders 
Knowledge Utilise improved data to make evidence-based policy, measure progress, and consider an 
incremental ‘test and learn’ approach acceptable to both regulator and service provider  
Proportionality Build a policy and regulatory framework that is proportionate to the risks and benefits involved in 
such innovative products and services and is based on an understanding of the gaps and barriers in 
existing regulation 
Framework Consider the following in the regulatory framework, reflecting international standards, national 
circumstances, and support for a competitive landscape: an appropriate, flexible, risk-based Anti-
Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism ML/CFT) regime; conditions for the 
use of agents as a customer interface; a clear regulatory regime for electronically stored value; and 
market-based incentives to achieve the long-term goal of broad interoperability and interconnection 
Panel B Four commitments of the Maya Declaration 
1 Create an enabling environment to harness new technology that increases access and lowers costs 
of financial services 
2 Implement a proportional framework that advances synergies in financial inclusion, integrity, and 
stability. 
3 Integrate consumer protection and empowerment as a key pillar of financial inclusion. 
4 Utilise data for informed policymaking and tracing results 
Source: Soederberg (2013, p.598-599) 
Table 4.D2 
The Alliance for Financial Inclusion membership timing across countries 
Country Year Country Year Country Year Country Year 
Afghanistan 2009 Colombia 2009 Malaysia 2009 South Africa 2010 
Angola 2011 Ecuador 2010 Mongolia 2010 Tanzania 2010 
Armenia 2011 El Salvador 2009 Mozambique 2011 Thailand 2009 
Bangladesh 2009 Ghana 2010 Namibia 2011 Uganda 2009 
Brazil 2010 India 2009 Pakistan 2009 Yemen, Rep. 2009 
Burundi 2009 Indonesia 2009 Panama 2009 Zambia 2010 
Cameroon 2009 Jamaica 2010 Philippines 2009   
Chile 2011 Kenya 2009 Rwanda 2009     
Source: http://www.afi-global.org/afi-network/members 
Note: the years indicate when the country became a member of AFI and participated in cooperative and 
consultative efforts to enhance financial inclusion in their countries. 30 out of 87 countries’ central bank 
have become members of AFI since 2009 in our sample period. 
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Table 4.D3 
 
The propensity score matching analysis–Logit model and balancing tests 
Variables coefficients z-statistics Treated Control t-stats p-value 
Log of total assets  0.590*** [0.123] 6.66 6.92 -1.07 0.29 
log of per capita GDP -1.265*** [0.179] 7.31 7.44 -0.69 0.49 
GDP growth rate -0.117 [3.262] 0.05 0.05 0.32 0.75 
Financial freedom 0.008 [0.013] 49.49 50.47 -0.44 0.66 
Regulatory Quality 0.163 [0.341] -0.18 -0.15 -0.25 0.8 
Constant 3.862*** [1.374]     
Observations 539           
Chi-squared  95.42***       
Pseudo R-squared 0.19       
Hosmer–Lemeshow test (p-value) 0.3       
Standard deviation of the propensity score 0.17           
Note: The dependent variable,  Financial Access Policy , takes the value of 1 for a country that participates 
in the AFI network in year 2009 and thereafter, or else zero. The detailed descriptions of the independent 
variables are given in Table 4.1. Z-statistics are reported in brackets. The Hosmer–Lemeshow test confirms 
the goodness-of fit of the logit model. Regarding balancing tests, we conduct t-tests of each independent 
variable used in the logit model. T-stats and P-values are reported along with respective values of the treated 
and control groups of the entire sample. Based on p-values, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that each 
characteristic is equal across the control and treatment groups in the full sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.D1 
Propensity score matching blocks and matched distribution 
 
Note that while the left figure shows common support between the treated (a member of AFI network) and 
untreated/comparison groups (non-member), the right figure shows the distribution of the unmatched and 
matched sample. This visual description of the comparison of propensity score distributions between the 
member and non-member countries clearly indicates a satisfactory match. 
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 Chapter V 
 
 
Does financial inclusion affect bank 
efficiency? International evidence 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Financial inclusion is a widespread phenomenon across the globe and has become an 
important public policy priority following the global financial crisis. We show that banks 
in countries with greater financial inclusion enhance the levels of cost and profit efficiency. 
This effect is stronger when banks have lower competition and operate in countries with 
stronger rule of law and institutional quality. Exploiting cross-country and cross-time 
variation in the timing of countries moving into a global network of financial inclusion 
policymakers, we also further show that enabling an inclusive environment has a positive 
impact on bank efficiency. This effect is robust to instrumental variable analysis, 
controlling for bank fixed effects, alternative measures of bank efficiency and financial 
inclusion, for a sample of only commercial banks and developing countries, and other 
robustness tests. 
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5.1 Introduction 
The seminal paper by King and Levine (1993) and subsequent literature 
underscores the important link between financial development and economic growth, a 
link that has spurred further exploration into various aspects of financial development and 
documents, not only positive correlations but also the causal effect of finance on growth 
in cross-country regressions.98 Over the last decade, extending access of the low income 
groups to the formal financial sector has become an important public policy priority around 
the world. Most of the countries have undertaken numerous supportive regulatory reforms 
towards having more inclusive financial sectors, which is continuously being reinforced 
with the help of many multilateral agencies include the IMF, G20, the Alliance for 
Financial Inclusion (AFI), and the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP). 
Consequently, the structure of the global banking markets has changed significantly, 
partially as a result of the inception of the operations of foreign banks in the developing 
countries. Since foreign banks “cherry pick” high net worth informationally transparent 
customers (Beck and Brown, 2014), domestic banks have increasingly searched for new 
opportunities and markets to increase their customer base (Demirgüç-Kunt, Beck and 
Honohan, 2008). Given the increased bank competition, and with the advancement of 
technology, a new frontier of financial intermediation emerges (e.g., mobile banking, agent 
banking), which allows banks to reduce transaction costs, acquire effective information, 
and enforce loan repayment (Bruhn and Love, 2014). The process of structural change and 
accompanying drive for new banking business has therefore manifested a desire for bank 
managers to explore new markets/customers and hence improve operating efficiency. 
Therefore, in this chapter, we, first, construct a composite index of financial inclusion by 
98 See, for example: Levine (1999); Wurgler (2000); Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000); and Bekaert, Harvey 
and Lundblad (2005). Most of the studies show that various aspects of financial development causally impact 
economic growth. For a detailed review of the literature see Levine (2005) and Pasalı (2013). 
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using supply-side data of Financial Access Survey (FAS) across 87 countries, and then 
investigate the link between financial inclusion and bank cost and profit efficiency for an 
international sample of 2913 banks for the period 2004-2012.99 
Existing literature suggests several channels through which financial inclusion, 
that is, a greater inclusive financial sector, might affect efficient intermediation of the 
financial institutions. First, higher financial inclusion increases the opportunity for banks 
to expand their businesses to geographically distant customers by broadening the access 
of the unbanked poor people to formal financial services. Through geographic outreach, 
banks have the opportunities to diversify their funding and lending portfolios by exploiting 
managerial and technical expertise and improving managerial efficiency (Saunders, 1994; 
Berger and DeYoung, 2001; Deng and Elyasiani, 2008). When banks reach out to 
customers who are at the lower rung of the income ladder they are able to extract deposits 
from a large number of people, which is often the principal source of funds for banks 
(Calomiris and Kahn, 1991). Retail deposits are often dubbed sluggish, insensitive to risk 
and providing a stable cheaper source of long-term funding compared to wholesale funding 
that is sophisticated, relatively risky and expensive as wholesale funders possess critical 
information about the prospects of bank projects (see  Song and Thakor, 2007; Huang and 
Ratnovski, 2011).100 Rajan (1992) compares informed and arm’s length debt and shows 
that former debt holders (i.e., wholesale funders) could ask for higher compensation for 
further funding if they sense any negative prospects of bank projects. A recent study by 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010), using a sample of listed banks in 101 countries for 
the period 1995-2007, show that a higher level of non-deposit/wholesale funding shares 
lowers the rate of return on assets and/or bank soundness.101 Using a sample of European 
99 Throughout this paper, we use the term “bank efficiency” to refer to both “cost efficiency” and “profit 
efficiency”. 
100 See for example  Shin (2009) and Goldsmith-Pinkham and Yorulmazer (2010). 
101 Beltratti and Stulz (2012) analyse overall performance of large banks around the World over the recent 
financial crisis period (i.e., July 2007 to December 2008). They find that banks financed with less (more) 
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Union countries, Poghosyan and Čihak (2011) also confirm that banks depending 
extensively on wholesale funding are more exposed to distress than those banks that are 
mostly depending on retail deposits. Overall, this would imply greater opportunities for 
banks extending the access of the disadvantaged groups to formal financial services with 
more inclusive financial sectors by attracting cheaper funding from a large pool of 
customers.102 
  Second, more inclusive financial sectors also provide greater opportunities for 
banks to reduce information asymmetries and agency problems between lenders and 
borrowers and thus increase efficient operations of financial institutions. Through 
diversifying lending strategy and extending credit to more productive areas of the 
economy, banks can increase efficiency. As banks operate in an inclusive financial sector, 
they are able to extend credit to a diverse set of customers and ensure efficient allocation 
of resources. With this process, they can acquire proprietary information about the 
customers which is at the heart of reducing informational asymmetries (Black, 1975; Fama, 
1985). In an inclusive financial sector, banks can reduce ex post monitoring and transaction 
costs due to greater availability of borrower-specific information, particularly associated 
with lower income groups. Sharpe (1990) demonstrates that with asymmetric evolution of 
borrower information banks can increase ex post monopoly power in the loan market even 
if banks are ex ante competitive. Additionally,  information related to households and firms 
can be more easily observed in an inclusive financial sector, which is likely to reduce any 
incentives for borrowers to default on their loans and make losses for lenders (Goldberg 
and White, 1998).103 A recent study related to Chilean banks suggests that losses on large 
short-terms funds in the money markets (deposits) performed better. 
102 Most of the emerging economies are continuously adopting pro-access policies to broaden financial 
inclusion. For instance: to get rid of financial untouchability, the Indian government has launched a scheme 
called the ‘Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana’ (Prime Minister's People Money Scheme) on 28 August 2014. 
Within two weeks of launch of this scheme, banks were able to accumulate retail deposits of Rs 1500 crore 
($240 million), with around 30.2 million new accounts. 
103 De Mel, McKenzie and Woodruff (2008) in Sri Lanka and McKenzie and Woodruff (2008) in Mexico, 
 198 
                                                        
loans are unpredictable and greater compared to small loans (Adasme, Majnoni and Uribe, 
2006). Extending the access of the poor customers to finance involves disbursing a large 
number of small credits, which are often a routine and standard task, and require fewer 
monitoring and screening costs. Furthermore, through financial outreach, banks reduce 
distance with a large number of customers.  
By reducing lender-borrower proximity banks can enhance efficiency of financial 
intermediation while dealing with informationally opaque customers (e.g., Degryse and 
Ongena, 2005; Hauswald and Marquez, 2006; Mian, 2006; Deng and Elyasiani, 2008). In 
a theoretical model, Hauswald and Marquez (2006) show that with reduced distance banks 
are able to get a precise signal about the borrower. Therefore, further to the funding and 
lending opportunities, by reaching out to remote customers, banks reduce lender-borrower 
proximity, which in turn reduces cost of monitoring, and thus increases bank efficiency.  
Third, the higher degree of financial inclusion also mitigates some exogenous 
risks (i.e., social and political disruptions), which may undermine efficient operations of 
financial institutions and stability (Hawkins, 2006). Recently, Bauchet, Marshall, Starita, 
Thomas and Yalouris (2011) summarised evidence from randomised evaluations of 
microfinance. Based on the findings of these randomized field experiments, they conclude 
that access to finance is positively correlated with many microeconomic indicators, 
including self-employment, business activities, household consumption, and well-being. 
More recent studies also show that greater financial inclusion reduces poverty (e.g., Bruhn 
and Love, 2014), unemployment (e.g., Prasad, 2010), bad decision making (e.g., Mani, 
Mullainathan, Shafir and Zhao, 2013). Burgess and Pande (2005) use state-level Indian 
data and show that opening bank branches in rural unbanked areas is associated with 
using randomized experiments, show that microentrepreneurs are capable of paying high interest charged by 
microfinance institutions. 
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reduction in rural poverty.104 Increasing financial inclusion therefore has a positive effect 
on economic and social stability which should have meaningful effects on the functioning 
of banking systems, and hence to the efficient operation of financial institutions.105 
Overall, we would expect that greater financial inclusion does matter for bank efficiency. 
However, there may be a countervailing effect due to higher distance-related 
agency problems and organisational structure in financially more inclusive economies. 
First, in an inclusive financial sector, banks expand branches to unbanked remote areas. 
As distance increases between headquarters and distant branches, monitoring of the latter 
by senior managers becomes more difficult (see Brickley, Linck and Smith Jr, 2003). In 
this case, the farther away a branch is from the headquarters due to broadening access of 
the unbanked people to finance, the more difficult it gets to transmit efficiencies and 
aptitude of the senior managers to branches for enhancing overall operating efficiency.106 
Second, another offsetting effect may stem from a complex organisational and product 
structure associated with financial inclusion. Broadening the access of all income groups 
to financial services requires banks to maintain a large branch network and diverse product 
lines targeted to all customers. Inefficiency may arise due to lack of managerial and 
technical expertise, and agency problems related to complex organisational and product 
structure. Therefore, in the end, how an inclusive financial sector is associated with 
operating efficiency of financial institutions becomes an empirical question. 
Our results indicate that there is a strong link between these variables. In 
particular, the higher the degree of financial inclusion, the better the banks’ performance 
is in terms of increasing cost and profit efficiency. This result is robust in controlling for 
the country level of economic development and for an array of other indicators of the 
104 Using U.S. data, Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) show that relaxation of intra- and interstate branching of 
banks has a positive impact on economic growth.  
105 See Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt and Lyman (2012). 
106 Berger and DeYoung (2001) find that the extent of parent’s control over the efficiency of affiliates 
declines as their distance increases.  
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institutional characteristics in which banks operate. To address potential omitted variable 
biases and reverse causality, which might bias the empirical results, we confirm our 
findings using an instrumental variable (IV) approach. We also confirm our findings using 
a subsample, and an array of other robustness tests.  
Using the same analytical framework as mentioned above, we show that any 
beneficial effects of financial inclusion on bank cost (profit) efficiency tend to be more 
(less) pronounced in banking sectors with more (less) competition. We also show that the 
positive impact of financial inclusion on efficiency reinforces if the country in which banks 
operate has greater institutional quality. Specifically, greater freedom of expression and 
rule of law enhance the positive relationship between financial inclusion and bank 
efficiency. Showing the role of bank competition and institutional qualities on the access-
efficiency relationship, combined with the IV approach, helps eradicate concerns 
stemming from endogeneity and omitted variables.107 
Finally, to further corroborate our findings, we use a ‘Quasi-natural experiment’ 
type difference-in-differences (DID) approach to tackle the question of how being a 
member of the network of the financial inclusion policymakers (i.e., Alliance for Financial 
Inclusion), which set the stage for various supportive inclusive policies due to broadening 
financial inclusion impact bank efficiency. The DID result is consistent with the earlier 
findings that both cost and profit efficiency have increased significantly for those banks 
that operate in the countries that have created a pro-access environment for inclusive 
financial sectors. We also confirm our DID results by using a number of matching 
estimators including a recently developed bias-corrected covariate matching estimator 
proposed by Abadie and Imbens (2006). These matching estimators alleviate any sample 
selection bias and confounding factors providing unbiased treatment effects. 
107 Throughout this paper, we use the term “access-efficiency” and “financial inclusion-bank efficiency” 
interchangeably.  
 201 
                                                        
This paper aims to contribute to the existing empirical analyses in three important 
ways. First, we fill an important gap in the literature by providing new evidence on the 
impact of financial inclusion on bank efficiency using a large international sample for a 
period comprising the recent global financial crisis that took place in 2007/08. Since most 
of the empirical studies investigate the impact of access to finance on numerous socio-
economic indicators (e.g., Butler and Cornaggia, 2011; Allen, Carletti, Cull, Qian, Senbet 
and Valenzuela, 2013; Demirgüç-Kunt, Klapper and Randall, 2013; Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Klapper and Singer, 2013), or on firm-level indicators (e.g., Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Martínez Pería, 2007; Beck, Lin and Ma, 2014), we incorporate multiple access 
dimensions for constructing a composite index of financial inclusion at country level, and 
then link the bank-level cost and profit efficiency scores obtained from stochastic frontier 
analysis (SFA), a technique that is extensively used in measuring the efficiency of 
individual banks.108 The panel dimension of our composite index facilitates exploiting 
within country variation in the inclusiveness of financial sectors ensuring robust 
subsequent analyses in this paper. This study therefore contributes to the understanding 
about how inclusive financial sectors help reduce unbanked population and reduce distance 
between lenders and borrowers (i.e., reduce information asymmetries) and increase the 
efficiency of the financial institutions. 
Second, we contribute to the literature on finance and growth by exploring the 
connection between important aspects of financial development and the efficiency of 
financial institutions. Well-functioning and efficient financial systems exert a first-order 
impact on economic growth and development (see e.g., Levine, 2005). The need for 
efficient financial systems was underscored during the recent global financial crisis. As a 
result, many multilateral organisations as well as national policymakers around the World 
108 See recent studies, Lensink and Meesters (2014) and Goddard, Molyneux and Williams (2014), that have 
applied stochastic frontier analysis to measure bank efficiency. 
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increasingly focus on improving access to finance by introducing favourable policies to 
promote better functioning of the banking systems. Our empirical findings unearth an 
important channel through which financial intermediation can augment economic growth 
while extending the access of all groups of people to financial services and increasing the 
operating efficiency of banks. Finding a link between these two important issues is also 
important as formal financial institutions used to perceive broadening the access of the 
disadvantaged groups who are at the bottom of the income pyramid as an antagonistic 
strategy for their performance because of high operating costs binding with the poor.109 
However, such a myopic view is subsiding as more financial institutions are increasingly 
focusing on microfinance style of operation realising the implications of access to finance 
on their performances as well as on the society in general.110 Recent studies suggest that 
almost 2.5 billion adults, just over half of the world’s adult population, do not use any form 
of formal financial services with only 41% of people in the developing countries compared 
to 89% in developed ones having bank accounts (Kendall, Mylenko and Ponce, 2010; 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper, 2012). Reviewing a body of recent studies, Cull, Ehrbeck 
and Holle (2014) conclude that including non-banking people into the formal financial 
systems is an important component for economic and social progress. Therefore, 
identifying policy areas that have a first-order effect on increasing efficiency of the 
financial institutions is critical for policymakers to spur inclusive economic growth as 
109 See Cull and Spreng (2011) for a study on the privatisation of the National Bank of Commerce (NBC) of 
Tanzania which was split into two banks namely New NBC and the National Microfinance Bank (NMB). 
While the former had only 35 bank branches and had business lines targeted to commercial enterprises and 
individuals, mostly located in urban centres, the latter had 95 bank branches and had the objectives of 
fostering access of the disadvantaged groups of the rural and urban centres to finance. Both breakaway banks 
were able to improve their profitability and the share of performing loans eventually. However, the initial 
growth of credit of New NBC was slow whereas NMB had decent growth. This is an example that shows 
how broadening access of the poor people to financial services does not reduce efficiency of banks.  
110 For example: Grameen Bank of Bangladesh, Bank Rakyat Indonesia, Khushhali Bank in Pakistan, 
BancoSol in Bolivia, Banco Solidario in Ecuador, MiBanco in Peru, Banco Azteca in Mexico, and K-Rep 
Bank in Kenya are most of the recent success stories that show how commercially-oriented microfinance 
banks can achieve high operating efficiency and become profitable while serving the poor. For more on 
commercially-mined microfinance bank see Harper and Arora (2005) and Bruhn and Love (2014). 
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efficiency gains increase availability of more productive loans and overall economic 
development (Fries and Taci, 2005).  
Third, our paper contributes to the literature that explores the determinants of 
bank efficiency (e.g., Berger, Demsetz and Strahan, 1999; Rossi, Schwaiger and Winkler, 
2009; Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2013; Chortareas, Girardone and Ventouri, 2013). Despite 
the extensive literature on bank efficiency (see Berger, 2007, for reviews of the literature), 
a systematic study on whether an inclusive financial sector increases or decreases efficient 
operation of banks does not yet exist. This is mainly due to limited data availability for a 
long period of time across countries and lack of development of a reliable quantitative 
index of financial inclusion.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 5.2 describes the data 
and methodology. Sections 5.3 and 5.4 discuss the empirical results and the sensitivity 
analyses, respectively. Section 5.5 provides further evidence on whether pro-access 
policies improve the functioning of financial systems using ‘Quasi-natural experiment’ 
type analysis, and Section 5.6 concludes with some policy implications.  
 
5.2 Data and Methodology 
To test the relationship between financial inclusion and bank efficiency, we 
combine bank- and country-level data from various sources including the IMF Financial 
Access Survey (FAS) data for the construction of the financial inclusion index. This section 
discusses the assorted data sources, variables and methodology that we use in this paper. 
In this effort, we start with basic regression analysis, and then control for bank- and 
country-specific heterogeneity and focus on alleviating the possible endogeneity and 
omitted variable biases that might distort the relationship between financial inclusion and 
bank efficiency. Table 5.1 provides definitions and sources of all the variables.    
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5.2.1 Data sources 
We use a unique and comprehensive supply-side data set from the International 
Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Financial Access Survey to measure the degree of financial 
inclusion incorporating multiple dimensions of inclusiveness of the financial sector. The 
Financial Access Survey (FAS) has been conducted over the past fifteen years in over 186 
economies to gather a large number of indicators on financial access and usage which are 
comparable across economies in the world. The access data was initially collected by Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Martínez Pería (2007) with the joint effort of the World Bank for 
2003-2004, and later on extended by the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) 
and by the IMF.  
The use of FAS data in cross-country work has been increasingly ubiquitous in 
the recent past (see e.g., Beck, Lin and Ma, 2014) and has numerous advantages over the 
use of demand-side household-level data (i.e., Global Findex) as introduced recently by 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper (2012) for the calendar year 2011. First, Beck, Demirgüç-
Kunt and Martínez Pería (2007) show that higher branch penetration and the number of 
deposit/loan accounts per capita are associated with a higher share of households and firms 
that use formal financial services. They also show that firms report lower financing 
constraint if they operate in an environment where financial outreach and the number of 
deposit/loan accounts per capita are higher. Second, FAS provides numerous country-level 
access data including demographic and geographic branch/ATM penetration, the number 
of deposits and loans per capita, and the total volume of outstanding deposit and loans for 
a large number of economies and for a long period starting from 2004, which are 
indispensable to the construction of a comprehensive index of financial inclusion. Third, 
unlike the micro-based measures of access which are often very costly and hard to get for 
a long period of time for a large number of economies, FAS allows us to explore the 
relationship between financial inclusion and bank efficiency over time and exploit the 
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within-country variation in financial inclusion of any given banking system.  
Given the trade-off between data availability (e.g., availability of required 
dimensions of financial inclusion) and cross-country sample coverage, we manage to 
measure financial inclusion index for 87 countries over the period 2004 to 2012, and match 
the year of FAS data with the year of bank-level data. We use a large amount of individual 
bank-level data sourced from unconsolidated reports of banks compiled from the 
BankScope database provided by Bureau van Dijk and Fitch Ratings.111 Our dataset 
comprises 2,913 commercial banks, cooperative banks and Islamic banks (14,929 bank-
year observations) operating in 87 countries over the time period 2004-2012, which 
represent, respectively 52.8%, 46.2%, and 1.0% of the sample.  
5.2.2 Measuring bank efficiency 
There are numerous cross-country or single country studies on the measurement 
of bank efficiency. In this paper, we follow Turk Ariss (2010) and identify two frontier 
models, namely cost frontier and alternative profit frontier, to measure cost and profit 
efficiency of individual banks by using stochastic frontier analysis (SFA).112 Cost and 
profit efficiency scores measure the proximity of a bank’s cost or profit relative to a best 
practice bank’s cost or profit in a particular sample for producing the same output bundle 
under the same exogenous conditions. The intermediation approach of Sealey and Lindley 
(1977) is followed where financial institutions collect deposits and other liabilities and use 
them to produce interest-earning assets, that is, loans and investments. The empirical 
specification of the cost frontier is the following: 
 
111 We discard unconsolidated reports of banks whenever consolidated ones of the same group are available 
in order to avoid any double counting of institutions.  
112 We choose parametric, SFA, as it allows measurement error in the estimation and is not sensitive to 
outliers and measurement errors unlike the non-parametric techniques, that is, Data Envelopment Analysis 
(see Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2003, for details on this technique). For details on parametric and non-
parametric techniques, see Matousek and Taci (2004). 
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Where itTOC  is either total operating costs or total profits of bank i  at time t , Q  
is the output i.e., total assets and W  is a set of input prices. Three input prices are used 
where 1W  is the price of funds; 2W  is the price of labour; 3W  is the price of capital of bank 
i  at time t .  We impose homogeneity of degree one on input prices and divide all factor 
prices and itTOC  by  3W  . We include bank type (commercial, co-operative and Islamic) 
and year dummies denoted by Btype  and year , respectively. A vector of unknown 
parameters β  will be estimated. For the case of cost inefficiency, the total error in 
equation (5.1) is ,it it itv uε = +  where itv  denotes random noise, and itu  stands for deviations 
due to inefficiency, while for the case of profit inefficiency it is it it itv uε = − . The random 
noise term itv  is assumed to be i.i.d with 2(0, )it vv N σ , and independent of the explanatory 
variables. The inefficiency term itu  is assumed to be i.i.d with 2(0, )it uu N σ , and 
independent of itv . We assume that inefficiency terms of the banks in our sample change 
considerably over time; controlling for bank fixed effects will allow us to distinguish 
inefficiency from the unobserved heterogeneity. Therefore, failure to account for 
unobserved heterogeneity in the efficiency modelling will provide biased efficiency scores 
of individual banks.113 iα  is included in equation (5.1) to control for bank fixed effects, 
and it is correlated with the output, inputs and quasi-fixed input of banks (Greene, 2005).114 
We also allow for bank type to directly affect cost (profit) function by adding a set of 
dummies of bank types in the stochastic frontier.  
Profit efficiency is measured using the alternative profit frontier. We choose 
113 Using data on German savings banks, Bos, Koetter, Kolari and Kool (2009) show that efficiency scores 
of banks are sensitive to the treatment of heterogeneity in the stochastic frontier model.   
114 Following banking literature, we treat equity as the quasi-fixed input. 
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alternative profit frontier over standard profit function as the former assumes that financial 
institutions take the output quantities and the input prices as given and maximise profits 
by adjusting output prices and input quantities (Duygun, Sena and Shaban, 2014).115 In 
this case, we replace itTOC  with itPBT  , that is, profit before tax as the dependent variable. 
Additionally, we follow Bos and Koetter (2011) and use a negative profit indicator (NPI) 
in the profit function as many of our banks in the sample reported a loss. In this paper, we 
use the True fixed effects stochastic frontier model to calculate cost and profit efficiency. 
Using maximum likelihood technique, equation (5.1) is estimated separately for each 
country due to measuring bank efficiency relative to a country best practice frontier. 
 
5.2.3 The construction of financial inclusion index 
In constructing the financial inclusion index, we use three dimensions namely 
Accessibility/Penetration, Availability, and Usage that are identified by the policy makers 
as the main indicators of financial inclusion. For the accessibility dimension, we use the 
number of bank accounts per 1,000 people in order to integrate the depth of the financial 
access.116 The availability dimension is used to account for the pervasiveness of outreach 
of the financial sector in terms of banks’ physical outlets, as physical distance to physical 
point of financial services is deemed an important impediment to financial inclusion (see 
Allen, Carletti, Cull, Senbet and Valenzuela, 2014). We use two classes of penetration of 
banking services i.e., demographic and geographic penetration of bank branch and ATM, 
and create four sub-indices (see Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Martínez Pería, 2007). For the 
demographic penetration, we use the number of bank branches and number of ATMs per 
115 Giver the international sample in this paper, we prefer alternative profit frontier as it does not require 
having perfect competition assumption.  
116 Measuring penetration dimension, the number of accounts per capita is used as data on the number of 
people having bank accounts is limited. In the former case there is a possibility of double counting the same 
person on having multiple accounts.  
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100,000 people, and for the geographic penetration we use the number of bank branches 
and number of ATMs per 1,000 square kilometres. For the usage dimension, we use the 
volume of credit plus deposit relative to the GDP. However, one could incorporate many 
other dimensions (e.g., affordability) that may reflect the “transaction costs” and “ease of 
transaction” to have a more comprehensive measure of financial inclusion. We do not take 
affordability dimension in the construction of our index due to the limitations of 
comparable macro data across economies.117 Since using standalone indicators of financial 
inclusion would provide an incomprehensive picture of inclusiveness of the financial 
sectors, and hence have implications on bank efficiency, we build upon Beck, Demirgüç-
Kunt and Martínez Pería (2007) to construct a composite weighted index of financial 
inclusion using a two-stage principal component analysis (PCA) as follows:118 
 
  0.71*  0.71*  0.06*jt jt jt jtFII Penetration Availability Usage= + +   (7.2) 
 
PCA is a common statistical approach for data reduction which is intended to 
explain the variance of the observed data using linear combinations of a large set of 
variables. In other words, PCA allows for the extraction of necessary information common 
to a number of variables. First, we apply PCA to estimate the availability dimension from 
a group of four sub-indices related to outreach mentioned above. Second, we apply PCA 
again to estimate the overall financial inclusion index (FII) by using three dimensions of 
the inclusive financial sector: the penetration, availability and usage as causal variables.119 
117 Incorporating information, that is, the annual fees charged to customers for ATM cards and/or accounts  
(i.e., transaction costs) and the minimum amount and/or document requires opening savings or checking 
accounts (i.e., ease of transaction), would have improved the quality of financial inclusion index.  
118 See Tetlock (2007) for details on principal component analysis. 
119 Before using PCA, first, we winsorise each indicator at the 95th percentile levels to reduce the influence 
at the upper tail. Second, we normalise each indicator to have values between zero and one to show the scale 
at which they are measured is immaterial.  
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In PCA, the first principal component is the single linear combination of the financial 
inclusion indicators that explains the most of the variation. 
The results of the PCA are reported in chapter IV (see Table 4.A1). In the case of 
availability dimension, the first principal component (PC) explains about 70% of the 
variations with the eigenvalue of more than one, that is, 2.81 (see Panel A). The availability 
dimension is calculated using weights (i.e., 0.52, 0.52, 0.47, and 0.48) assigned to the first 
PC. Constructing the financial inclusion index, we find three PCs with eigenvalues of 1.54, 
0.99, and 0.45. Again, the first PC explains about 51% of the corresponding sample 
variance (see Panel B). Since only the first PC has an eigenvalue that is more than one, 
according to the Kaiser rule, we assume that it sufficiently explains the common variation 
among the three dimensions.120 The parametric methods that we have applied for 
constructing FII assigns factor loadings (weights) on each dimension. We use these weights 
to construct FII as in equation (5.2). It is noted that usage dimension has relatively much 
lower weights than the penetration and availability dimensions.121 We normalise FII and 
assign each country along a 0-1 scale for ease of interpretation in the subsequent analyses, 
where zero indicates financial exclusion and one indicates financial inclusion.122  
Following Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Martínez Pería (2007), we conduct 
numerous verification tests to gauge the strength of our index. We use demand-side 
information of the Global Findex database, and find that our index is positively and 
significantly associated with the share of household account. The correlation between 
120 Dropping some PCs may help reduce a portion of noise components from our data, and ensures reliability 
of the subsequent analyses in this paper. 
121 In the spirit of Tetlock (2007), we check the stability and robustness of our financial inclusion index. In 
this effort, we use PCA on a year-by-year basis in which loadings are determined annually instead of over 
the entire sample period. The correlation between these two indices (one where the loadings are derived over 
the entire sample period and the other derived annually) is very high (i.e. 0.98), indicating the robustness of 
our index irrespective of how loadings are determined.  
122 Our primary objective in this paper is to explore the effects of an inclusive financial sector on bank 
cost/profit efficiency for the period 2004-2012; therefore, FII is constructed across countries and period due 
to taking into account the evolution of financial inclusiveness.  
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predicted share of household account and the actual share of household account at financial 
institutes is 76%. In addition, using a unique data set across 64 countries and over 38,987 
firms of the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (WBES), we also find the expected 
relationship between our index and a firm’s financing obstacle. In particular, we find that 
financing obstacles are negatively and significantly related to an inclusive financial 
system.123  
 
5.2.4 Measuring bank competition 
The Lerner index is employed to measure bank competition as it is the most 
accurate and the only computable market power indicator that varies at the bank-level 
(Berger, Klapper and Turk-Ariss, 2009; Carbó-Valverde, Rodriguez-Fernandez and Udell, 
2009; Beck, De Jonghe and Schepens, 2013). The Lerner index estimates the ability of 
pricing power by measuring the disparity between price and marginal costs as a percentage 
of price. Put differently, it estimates the degree to which a financial institution is able to 
enhance its marginal price beyond its marginal costs. The Lerner index is calculated at the 
bank-level as follows:  
it it
it
it
P MCLerner
P
−
=   (7.3) 
Where itP  is the price of total assets proxied by the ratio of total revenue (interest 
and non-interest income) to total assets for bank i  at time t . itMC  is the marginal costs of 
producing an additional unit of output. Marginal cost is calculated by using stochastic 
frontier analysis (SFA) following conventional bank efficiency studies (e.g., Turk Ariss, 
2010). The estimated marginal costs and price are used in equation (5.3) to measure the 
Lerner index, a conventional Lerner index (C-Lerner). It is the inverse of the degree of 
123 All verification tests of the financial inclusion index are available from the authors upon request. 
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bank competition, and is given by the range of 0 < Lerner index <1. When there is perfect 
competition, the Lerner index = 0; in the case of a pure monopoly, the Lerner index = 1. A 
Lerner index < 0, indicates pricing below the marginal cost and could result, for instance, 
from sub-optimal bank behavior (Fu, Lin and Molyneux, 2014). For robustness test, we 
also follow Koetter, Kolari and Spierdijk (2012) and calculate efficiency-adjusted Lerner 
index (E-Lerner) (as explained in Appendix 4.B). E-Lerner does not assume full bank 
efficiency and therefore unlike C-Lerner it accounts for bankers’ ability to exploit output 
pricing opportunities resulting from market power. 
5.2.5 Bank-specific and macro control variables 
To investigate the impact of financial inclusion on bank efficiency, we make use 
of a number of control variables. These controls are bank characteristics and characteristics 
of the macroeconomic environment that can be correlated with the bank efficiency. 
Specifically, we use six main bank-level controls. First, loan ratio is the ratio of loans to 
asset accounts for liquidity risk of individual banks. Second, total assets is the logarithm 
of assets to proxy for bank size. Third, LLP, the ratio of loan loss provision to loans, is 
used to account for an individual bank’s loan portfolio risk. Fourth, income diversification, 
the ratio of non-interest income over total operating income, is included to account for the 
effect of off-balance sheet activities of individual banks. Fifth, better management quality 
is often associated with high levels of bank efficiency, and the ratio of total earning assets 
to total assets is used to proxy for management quality. Sixth, equity is the ratio of equity 
to assets and it is used to control for capital risk. Next, there are two macroeconomic 
control variables. First, GDP is used to control for economic growth. Second, since the 
inclusive financial sector is associated with the level of economic development, controlling 
for GDP per capita is critical due to extracting a robust link between financial inclusion 
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and bank efficiency.124 
 
We also include an array of additional country-level variables related to 
institutional qualities and instrumental variables. The former is compiled from the 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010) Governance Index database, and the latter is from 
the Heritage Foundation and Doing Business database. Considering the objective of this 
paper, we exclude countries for which we have no information on different dimensions of 
the financial inclusion index. We deflate all monetary values to 2005 (2005 = 100) prices 
using the GDP deflator of U.S. obtained from the WDI. The deflated series are reported in 
millions of U.S. dollars ($). 
 
5.2.6 Descriptive statistics 
Table 5.2A reports descriptive statistics of all variables, while Table B5.1 presents 
the correlations between the different variables. The average cost (profit) efficiency is 0.81 
(0.56) with a standard deviation of 0.29 (0.32). The higher standard deviation of profit 
efficiency relative to cost efficiency suggests that there is substantial variation in the levels 
of profit efficiency scores. The average of the variable of interest, financial inclusion index, 
is 0.56 with standard deviation of 0.29. The large standard deviation indicates considerable 
heterogeneity in the inclusiveness of financial sectors across 87 countries. Table 5.2B 
reports the average values for these variables across the countries in our sample, where 
ranks of the countries are in parentheses based on the financial inclusion index. According 
to the rank, South Korea, Belgium and Japan have the most inclusive financial sector, 
whereas Afghanistan, Yemen and Malawi have the least inclusive. The country-level 
correlations indicate that financial inclusion is higher in countries with greater economic 
124 See Honohan (2008). 
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development, freedom of expression, political and social stability, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption and overall institutional 
quality, thereby underscoring the need for investigating the role of these indicators in the 
access-efficiency relationship (see table 5.A1).125  
5.2.7 Methodology 
To examine the impact of financial inclusion on bank efficiency, we run several 
regressions using the following baseline model: 
 
0 1 2 3  ijt jt ijt jt t ijtBank efficiency Financial Inclusion BC KC Yearβ β β β ε= + + + + +   (7.4) 
 
Where the i, j and t subscripts indicate bank, country and year, respectively. Bank 
efficiency is either cost efficiency or alternative profit efficiency, measured at the bank 
level. BC and KC are bank- and country-specific control variables, respectively. Table 5.1 
provides detailed definitions of all variables that are used in this paper. Our main 
explanatory variable of interest is Financial Inclusion, measured at the country level. Year 
is a yearly dummy variable controlling inter alia for other macroeconomic and time 
varying global business cycle effects. Since bank competition is one of the important 
determinants of bank efficiency, given the recent development we use two variant 
measures of Lerner indices namely conventional and efficiency adjusted Lerner indices to 
proxy bank competition, and at the same time to see the robustness of our results.126 We 
125 Since financial inclusion is highly correlated with the level of economic development and institutional 
qualities, we have computed the variance inflation factors (VIF) for each of our model estimates. The average 
VIF never exceeds 3, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a cause for concern for the outcomes in this 
paper. See Lensink, Meesters and Naaborg (2008) for details on institutional quality and bank efficiency.  
126 Lagged values of one period of Lerner indices are used throughout this paper in order to alleviate any 
endogeneity issues that might be associated with market power and bank efficiency (see e.g., Turk Ariss, 
2010; Love and Martínez Pería, 2014). 
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use a Tobit model for the regression of bank efficiency, as these variables are bounded 
between zero and one. To gauge both the statistical as well as economic significance of our 
regression results, we report marginal effects in lieu of coefficient estimates. A positive 
and significant 1β  would indicate that greater financial inclusion is associated with higher 
levels of cost and profit efficiency of banks. Given that our results might suffer from 
endogeneity and omitted variable biases, we also estimate instrumental variable (IV) and 
random effects Tobit regressions, discussed in great length later.  
Since the impact of lack of access to finance may rely on the competitiveness in 
the markets, and the environment in which the bank operates, we also see the interactive 
effect of financial inclusion with bank-level competition and country-level institutional 
qualities in the following regression models:  
 
0 1 2 3
4 5
   
                                
ijt jt ijt ijt
jt ijt jt t ijt
Bank efficiency Financial Inclusion BC Bank Competition
Financial Inclusion Bank Competition KC Year
β β β β
β β ε
= + + +
+ • + + +
  (7.5) 
 
0 1 2 3 4
5
   
                               
ijt jt ijt jt jt
jt jt t ijt
Bank efficiency Financial Inclusion BC KC Institutional Quality
Financial Inclusion Institutional Quality Year
β β β β β
β ε
= + + + +
+ • + +
  (7.6) 
 
where Bank Competition is either conventional or efficiency-adjusted Lerner 
indices and Institutional Quality is the Governance Index of Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi (2010). We expect a positive coefficient on the interaction of financial inclusion 
with Bank Competition and Institutional Quality, as more individual bank market power 
and better institutional settings would complement the positive relationship between 
financial inclusion and bank efficiency. Since six indicators of institutional quality are 
highly correlated with each other, we run regression using each indicator and its interaction 
term with financial inclusion one at a time to avoid the multicollinearity problem. In 
 215 
addition, we create a composite index of institutional quality by capturing common 
variation among these six indicators using PCA, and run regressions. We report Tobit 
regressions of these interaction effects as well as derive marginal effects to gauge 
economic significance. As robustness tests, we also treat financial inclusion, bank 
competition (institutional quality) and their interaction terms as endogenous variables and 
instrument them via the instrumental variables listed in Table 5.1.   
 
5.3 Empirical results 
In this section, combining both bank-level and country-level variables, we test 
whether greater financial inclusion is associated with higher cost and profit efficiency of 
banks. We first explore the effect of cross-country variation in financial inclusion, before 
examining the role of the variations of bank competition and various institutional qualities 
on the relationship between financial inclusion and bank efficiency. We also use bank-
level random effects Tobit regressions to control for bank-specific unobserved 
heterogeneity and IV analysis to control more rigorously for endogeneity and omitted 
variable biases. We report both statistical and economic significance of our results to gauge 
the importance of this relationship.  
 
5.3.1 Financial inclusion and bank efficiency 
The results in Table 5.3 show a statistically and economically significant 
relationship between financial inclusion and bank efficiency across a sample of 2913 banks 
in 87 countries. We report pooled cross-sectional Tobit regressions that include unreported 
year dummies and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.127 Considering the recent 
127 We confirm our results using ordinary least squares regressions that include year dummies and 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) standard errors. The results are quantitatively 
similar, and available from the authors. 
 216 
                                                        
development in the measure of bank competition, we report two variant measures namely 
conventional Lerner index (i.e., C-Lerner) and efficiency adjusted Lerner index (i.e., E-
Lerner) as the proxy for bank competition. In columns 1 and 2, our dependent variable is 
cost efficiency whereas profit efficiency is in columns 3 and 4. In all models we use bank- 
and country-level control variables.  
As can be seen from Table 5.3, financial inclusion is associated with a higher 
level of cost and profit efficiency of banks. Financial inclusion enters positively and 
significantly in all four regressions. If a country wants to increase its financial inclusion 
by one point, the expected cost and profit efficiency of the bank would increase by 0.32 
and 0.06 while holding all other variables in the model constant, respectively. Thus, the 
higher a country’s financial inclusion, the higher the predicted cost and profit efficiency 
of the banks. The effect is also economically significant. A one standard deviation increase 
in Financial Inclusion increases the Cost and Profit efficiency by 12% and 3%, 
respectively.128 It is obvious that when financial intermediaries operate in a more inclusive 
environment they may be more likely to engage in activities and allocate resources more 
efficiently to a wide range of the population which helps increase operating efficiencies. It 
is also the case that the homogeneous and predictable nature of small loans requires less 
time and monitoring costs than larger ones, and hence allows banks to be more cost and 
profit efficient. The recent empirical evidence also supports our results impliedly that by 
expanding bank branches and/or reaching out to customers by diversifying geographically 
and/or diversifying loan portfolios (i.e., financial inclusion), banks improve operating 
efficiency (e.g., Grabowski, Rangan and Rezvanian, 1993; Berger and DeYoung, 2001; 
Bos and Kolari, 2005; Deng and Elyasiani, 2008; Rossi, Schwaiger and Winkler, 2009).  
Turning to the control variables, banks with smaller size, greater competition, and 
128 Throughout this paper marginal effects and elasticities are calculated at the means of all variables.  
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better management are more cost efficient, whereas banks with greater loan portfolio, 
equity capital, market power, and lower loan loss provisioning are more efficient in terms 
of profitability. Regarding country-level macro controls, the results suggest that higher 
economic growth and levels of economic development are associated with lower cost and 
profit efficiency.  
 
5.3.2 The role of bank competition and institutional quality 
The interaction effects of financial inclusion and bank competition are presented 
in Table 5.4. In column 2, we find a negative and significant interactive effect of financial 
inclusion and bank competition on cost efficiency. The negative coefficient suggests that 
the positive impact of financial inclusion on cost efficiency is more pronounced if banks 
are more competitive. At the mean of all variables including efficiency-adjusted Lerner 
index (E-Lerner = 0.14), the marginal effect of financial inclusion is -0.16. This effect 
implies that one standard deviation increase in E-Lerner (0.25), leads to a decline in cost 
efficiency of a little less than 4%. This evidence suggests that the magnitude of the positive 
impact of financial inclusion on bank cost efficiency increases if it has lower (higher) 
market power (competition). On the contrary, we find positive and significant interactive 
effects on profit efficiency. It suggests that the higher pricing power of individual banks 
increases the positive effects of financial inclusion on profit efficiency. Taking column 4, 
at the mean of all variables including E-Lerner (0.14), the marginal effect of financial 
inclusion is 0.28, which implies that one standard deviation increase in market power 
(0.25) would increase profit efficiency by almost 7%.    
Following Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006), we use marginal effect to show the 
influence of different levels of bank competition on the impact of financial inclusion on 
bank efficiency. In Figure 5.1, we graphically illustrate the estimated total marginal effects 
and standard errors of financial inclusion. Panel A (right) shows a downward slope 
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indicating as market power increases the positive impact of financial inclusion on bank 
cost efficiency decreases. Panel B shows that as pricing power of an individual bank 
increases the positive impact of financial inclusion on profit efficiency increases. These 
outcomes are consistent with existing literature as Marquez (2002) theoretically shows that 
increasing competition can induce banks to lend excessively to less creditworthy 
borrowers, thereby decreasing efficiencies.  
Figure 5.1 
Marginal effect of financial inclusion on cost efficiency 
 
Note that it corresponds with our results in Table 5.4. The graphs on the upper panel display the marginal 
effect of financial inclusion on cost efficiency at different levels of market power i.e., C-Lerner (left) and E-
Lerner (right). It shows that the positive impact of financial inclusion on cost efficiency decreases as market 
power increases. The graphs on the lower panel display the marginal effect of financial inclusion on profit 
efficiency at different levels of market power i.e., C-Lerner (left) and E-Lerner (right). It shows that the 
positive impact of financial inclusion increases as market power increases. 
 
Regarding the interactive effects of financial inclusion with institutional quality, 
we use efficiency-adjusted Lerner indices as the measure of bank competition for brevity’s 
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sake. For expositional brevity, and because we are interested in the interaction effects the 
results of the controls are not reported.  
Most of the interaction terms enter positively and significantly at the 1% level. 
Columns 1-6 Table 5.5 suggest that the benefit of having greater freedom of expression 
and free media (Voice), political stability (Political), effective governance regulatory 
quality (Regulatory), rule of law (Law), and control of corruption in increasing cost 
efficiency is more pronounced in the markets where financial inclusion is higher. At the 
bottom of the table, we report the marginal effect of financial inclusion at the mean of each 
indicator. In column 7, we use the first principal component (the only component that has 
an eigenvalue of more than one i.e., 5.27 with 87% variation) of all institutional variables 
(e.g., Voice, Political, Government, Regulatory, Law and Corruption) and create a 
composite index of ‘Institutional Quality’ and run the regression. The interaction term in 
column 7 also confirms our results that the positive impact of institutional quality on 
enhancing cost efficiency is higher if the bank operates in an inclusive financial system.   
In terms of the economic significance, the magnitude of the coefficient suggests 
that there is a significant effect of financial inclusion on bank cost efficiency in the 
countries with the highest levels of institutional development. For instance, using 
estimated coefficients in column 7, at the mean of institutional quality index (IQI) (-0.01), 
the marginal effect of financial inclusion is 0.08. Therefore, for one standard deviation 
increase in the overall institutional quality (2.29), there would be an 18% increase in the 
relationship between financial inclusion and cost efficiency. These findings are consistent 
with existing empirical literature as Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2005) and 
Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2006) show that greater institutional development (e.g., 
financial, legal and corruption) facilitates better access to finance, especially for the 
smallest firms; for example: more effective rule of law provides more flexibility in terms 
of contract enforcement without much delay. Overall, the positive interactive effects seem 
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to suggest that the beneficial effects of financial inclusion on bank cost efficiency reinforce 
if the market within which banks operate has greater quality of institutional settings. 
In Table 5.6, we report the results of the interactive effects on profit efficiency. 
While columns 1 and 4 show that greater freedom of expression and regulatory quality is 
detrimental, column 5 shows that better rule of law complements the relationship of 
financial inclusion and bank profit efficiency. Regarding overall institutional quality, we 
find that the interactive effect is positive and significant at the 10% level where the 
marginal effect of financial inclusion at the mean of all variables is 0.03. This effect implies 
that for one standard deviation increase in IQI, there would be an 8% increase in the profit 
efficiency.  
5.4 Additional sensitivity analysis 
In this section, we discuss various additional robustness tests of our study. 
Regarding IV regressions, we report endogeneity, under-identification and over-
identification tests. We use alternative measures of financial inclusion and bank efficiency. 
We split the sample into terciles based on financial inclusion and re-run regressions 
keeping only commercial banks or developing countries.  
5.4.1 Instrumental variable regression 
Endogeneity is deemed to be a concern in cross-country studies. It is possible that 
the results of our study may be biased because of the endogeneity problem between 
financial inclusion and bank efficiency. Endogeneity can arise if banks engage in less 
efficient activities in the current set-up and venture into unbanked areas and/or if they self-
select into inclusive financial activities because these reward them with greater market 
power and profitability. In addition, despite controlling for an array of bank- and country-
specific variables, as our regressions link country-level financial inclusion to bank-level 
efficiency, omitted variable bias could still be of concern. It may be the case that the 
composite index that we construct to proxy for financial inclusion may be subject to 
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measurement error. Therefore, to alleviate any endogeneity and omitted variable biases, 
and measurement errors, we employ the Tobit model with instrumental variables, using 
Newey’s minimum chi-squared two step estimator.  
To address the concern of the potential endogeneity problem, we search 
extensively for instrumental variables and find that remittance flow to GDP and 
government bank ownership is suitable as instruments. The former is obtained from the 
World Bank Global Financial Development Database, a detailed description of which is 
available in Cihak, Demirgüç-Kunt, Feyen and Levine (2012). The latter is obtained from 
the Bank Regulation and Supervision Database compiled by Barth, Caprio and Levine 
(2013). The detailed definitions of these variables can be found in Table 5.1. Intuitively, 
remittance flow and government bank ownership should have a direct impact on the 
development of an inclusive financial system, but not affect bank efficiency directly.  
Table 5.B1 shows the First-stage regressions of financial inclusion on instruments 
used in this study. We find that all instruments have statistically significant effects on 
financial inclusion. The results are interesting as they show that remittance flow and 
government bank ownership are negatively associated with financial inclusion. The 
probable explanation of our result is that as remittance flow is a developing economies 
phenomenon, and it relaxes the credit constraints of the individual, it is unlikely that 
remittance flow will enhance financial inclusion for the entire sample.129 In addition, 
government-owned banks are less efficient in their outreach of financial services than 
privately owned (foreign) ones; therefore it will have minimal impact (zero impact) on 
extending access to finance. However, we test the relevance and validity of our IVs used 
in this study. The first stage regression of the instruments on financial inclusion suggests 
129 We find financial inclusion is positively associated with remittance flow for a sample of developing 
countries. The contrasting result is due to the fact that most developing economies receive the lion share of 
remittance relative to GDP compared to developed ones, which ultimately channel through the formal 
financial system, and hence enhance financial inclusion.  
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these instruments are strong, with the average F-stats well above the conventional 
threshold (F  ≥  10), demonstrating the relevance of the instrumental variables (Staiger and 
Stock, 1997).  
The second-stage regression results are reported in Table 5.7. The reported values 
of the Wald (χ2) tests statistic for exogeneity indicate the financial inclusion variable can 
be considered as endogenous and therefore instrumenting is appropriate. We also conduct 
the Anderson-Rubin test of under-identification, and find that the null hypothesis of weak 
instruments is rejected at a 1% significance level in all cases. The over-identification test 
proxied by the Amemiya–Lee–Newey minimum χ2 test shows that the selected group of 
instruments is valid as the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 5% significance level. 
The results show the robustness of our findings in controlling for endogeneity and 
simultaneity biases. We find strong and consistent evidence that greater financial inclusion 
is associated with high levels of cost and profit efficiency in banks. Table 5.B2 also 
confirms our earlier interactive effects of financial inclusion with bank competition and 
institutional quality on bank efficiency using IV Tobit regressions.  
 
5.4.2 Alternative bank efficiency measure  
So far we find a robust link between financial inclusion and bank efficiency. 
However, it is possible that this relation could be due to poorly specified cost and profit 
functions. Columns 5-8 of Table 5.7 also reports robustness checks that we performed due 
to addressing concerns related to cost and profit frontier estimation. In this case, we 
estimated cost and profit efficiency by using time-varying inefficiency specifications of 
Battese and Coelli (1992). The results also confirm our earlier findings that financial 
inclusion has positive and significant effects on the cost and profit efficiency of banks. 
5.4.3 Alternative financial inclusion index 
Given the limitations of data availability, we try to incorporate as many 
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dimensions as possible in the construction of a financial inclusion index. However, it might 
be the case that the inadequate measure of financial inclusion has provided an incorrect 
inference in this study. Therefore, we use Global Findex Database to examine whether our 
main results hold. The most common variables that are used as the proxy for financial 
inclusion in recent studies (see e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt, Klapper and Singer, 2013; Allen, 
Carletti, Cull, Senbet and Valenzuela, 2014) are Adults with an account at a formal 
financial institution to total adults (%) and Adults saving at a financial institution in the 
past year to total adults (%). Since this database is new and just covers the calendar year 
2011, we collapse our dataset at bank-level to run pooled cross-sectional Tobit regressions. 
The regression results are reported in Table 5.8. We run eight different regressions and the 
results are highly significant and consistent with the earlier findings that financial inclusion 
(i.e., the percentage of adults with account/savings in a formal financial system) is 
positively associated with bank cost and profit efficiency. It stresses the point that greater 
financial inclusion is congenial for efficient financial intermediation of banks both in terms 
of cost and profit.  
5.4.4 Split samples based on financial inclusion 
Based on the financial inclusion index, we split our sample into terciles and re-
run six Tobit regressions.130 For the sake of expositional simplicity, efficiency-adjusted 
Lerner index is used as a measure of bank competition in all cases. The results are reported 
in Table 5.9 (column 1-6). In columns 1-3, we find that all three groups of financial 
inclusion (low, medium, and high) are positively and significantly associated with bank 
cost efficiency. As we move from low to high groups of financial inclusion, we see that the 
magnitude of the coefficients of financial inclusion as well as the levels of significance 
130 Summary statistics: the group with the lowest financial inclusion index (FII) has an average cost (profit) 
efficiency of 71% (51%), the group with a medium FII has an average cost (profit) of 78% (58%), and the 
group with the highest FII has an average cost (profit) of 95% (58%). 
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increase. The twofold increases of the magnitude of coefficients of financial inclusion from 
low to high groups are an indication of the importance of greater financial inclusion on 
bank cost efficiency. In columns 4-6, while a lower level of financial inclusion is not 
statistically significant, medium terciles of financial inclusion are positively and 
significantly associated with bank profit efficiency. Interestingly, the negative coefficient 
of high terciles of financial inclusion indicates that greater financial inclusion decreases 
the level of profit efficiency.  
 
5.4.5 Different sample selection and weighted Tobit regressions 
We also conduct a battery of sensitivity checks using different sample selection 
criteria such as excluding cooperative and Islamic banks, excluding Japan and Italy, and 
keeping only developing countries. Our dataset comprises 1549 commercial banks, 1084 
cooperative banks and 37 Islamic banks. We drop all cooperative and Islamic banks from 
our dataset and keep only commercial banks. The result of the regressions, which is 
reported in Table 5.9 (column 7 and 8), also confirms our earlier findings of the positive 
effects of financial inclusion on bank cost and profit efficiency. The number of banks in 
Japan and Italy is 457 and 489 respectively, which constitute the lion’s share of our sample. 
We drop these two countries and re-run regressions, which are reported in Table 5.9 
(columns 9 and 10). Dropping Japan and Italy does not alter the main findings of this study. 
In columns 11 and 12, we drop all developed countries from our sample and re-run Tobit 
regression using only developing countries.131 The magnitude of the coefficients of 
financial inclusion suggests that the impacts of an inclusive financial system on cost and 
profit efficiency for the banks operating in developing economies are much higher than 
131 The 27 countries we dropped are: Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Greece, 
Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kuwait, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom. 
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the banks in developed ones. Furthermore, it might be the case that our results are biased 
to business cycle and too-big-to-fail banks. First, given the global financial crisis, we have 
therefore averaged all variables over 2004-2012 to eradicate any period cyclicality and run 
Tobit regression at the bank level similar to Houston, Lin, Lin and Ma (2010). One 
advantage of this procedure is that it smoothes variables that vary over time (Demirgüç-
Kunt, Laeven and Levine, 2004). Second, to avoid any effects of the heterogeneous bank 
size, we use total assets of individual banks as Weights and run weighted Tobit regressions. 
The results are reported in Table 5.10. Even after controlling for all these, we find 
significant positive effects of financial inclusion on bank cost and profit efficiency.  
 
 
5.4.6 Exploiting country- and bank-specific heterogeneity 
Since sample heterogeneity of different economies is inherent in any cross-
country study, we choose to include country dummies with year fixed effect to ensure that 
any country-level fixed effects have not been inadvertently captured by our country-level 
variable of interest-financial inclusion. The results are reported in Table 5.11. According 
to columns 1-4, while financial inclusion is significantly associated with cost efficiency it 
shows an insignificant association with bank profit efficiency. However, the coefficient 
remains positive.  
So far, we estimate the pooled cross-sectional Tobit model assuming there is no 
bank-specific heterogeneity. In columns 5-8, we control for bank unobserved heterogeneity 
by using random effects Tobit model. Random effects Tobit model is employed as panel 
Tobit estimates with fixed effects tend to be biased (Greene, 2004). The consistency of the 
random effects Tobit model requires the strict exogeneity assumption, that is, the error term 
has to be uncorrelated with the covariates across all time periods, as well as the unobserved 
bank-level heterogeneity being uncorrelated with all covariates (Czarnitzki and Toole, 
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2011). However, the reported likelihood-ratio test indicates that unobserved heterogeneity 
plays an important role in depicting the relationship between financial inclusion and bank 
efficiency. The estimation results of the random effect model also corroborate with the 
pooled estimations that financial inclusion is positively associated with bank cost and 
profit efficiency. Particularly, while the magnitude of the coefficient of financial inclusion 
on cost efficiency slightly wanes, it remains largely unchanged for profit efficiency. In 
terms of economic significance, it shows that one standard deviation increase in the 
financial inclusion index will lead to a 4% and 3% increase in bank cost and profit 
efficiency, respectively.  
 
 
5.5 The causal effects of enabling inclusive financial environment and bank 
efficiency: a ‘Quasi-natural experiment’ 
In this section, we exploit the timing variations of the countries that become 
members of the network of financial inclusion policymakers, that is, the Alliance for 
Financial Inclusion (henceforth AFI), and identify the causal effects of enabling an 
inclusive environment on bank efficiency while using a ‘Quasi-natural experiment’ type 
difference-in-differences (DID) approach. To eliminate any sample selection bias and 
confounding in the treatment effects, we deploy a number of matching estimators including 
the recently developed bias-corrected covariate matching estimator proposed by Abadie 
and Imbens (2006). 
In response to the global financial crisis that took place in 2008, the G20 leaders 
committed to reduce unbanked adult population in the world through improving the access 
of the low income groups to formal financial services at the Pittsburgh Summit in 2009. 
At the summit, the G20 principles for innovative financial inclusion (henceforth GPIFI) 
were drafted by the three Financial Inclusion Experts Group including the Alliance for 
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Financial Inclusion (henceforth AFI), the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), 
and the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation (IFC) (Soederberg, 2013). To 
invigorate GPIFI, the Maya Declaration was signed by 38 member countries at the third 
Global Policy Forum of the AFI held in Riviera Maya, Mexico in 2011 (see Table 4.D1 for 
detail on the GPIFI and the Maya Declaration). However, 30 countries in our sample had 
acknowledged the benefit of embracing low income groups with formal financial services 
and became members of AFI at different time periods after the first Global Policy Forum 
held in Nairobi in 2009 (see Table 4.D2 for membership timing across countries). Since 
through the AFI member countries could share knowledge on access policies, and could 
get financial assistance from the organisation, extending the access of the poor people to 
formal financial sectors became an important policy priority for these countries. Since 
then, these countries have taken many initiatives for providing supportive laws and 
regulations for inclusive financial sectors.132  
We assume that the pro-access policies that have been developed and 
implemented in those member countries had an obvious effect on the efficient functioning 
of banks. With the changing environment banks may have designed and adopted 
innovative, affordable and low-cost financial delivery models for providing services to low 
income groups. Therefore, we apply a difference-in-differences approach and explore 
whether the cost and profit efficiency of banks that operate in those countries increased or 
decreased due to enabling inclusive financial policies as follows:  
 
0 -1 1 2 (  )ijt j t jt ijt jt ijtBank efficiency Financial Access Policy BC KCα α α γ β β ε= + + + + + +   (7.7) 
 
132 Member countries that took various supportive laws and regulations to broaden financial inclusion over 
time are summarised in the AFI’s Working Groups Annual Report 2014, and can be accessed through the 
link below:  
http://www.afi-global.org/sites/default/files/publications/afi_wg_report_2014_revise.pdf 
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Where i  indexes bank, j  indexes countries, and t  indexes years.  ijtBank efficiency  
is either Cost or Profit efficiency of banks. The country and year fixed effects are denoted 
as jα  and tα , respectively (we also use bank fixed effects as a robustness test in Table 5.12). 
The analogous bank- and country-level controls are used as in equation (5.4) denoted by 
ijtBC  and jtKC , respectively.133 -1 jtFinancial Access Policy  is an indicator variable that takes 
a value equal to one if a bank operates in any member country listed in Table 4.D2 that 
became a member of AFI’s network in 2009 and thereafter or else zero. The variable of 
interest is γ , and it captures the sensitivity of the dependent variable to the changes in the 
Pro-access policies.134 Notice that we use 1-year lag membership variable assuming that 
the beneficial effects of financial inclusion are a year-end status. The advantage of the DID 
approach is that we are able to identify the causal effects of an event (in our case, the 
membership of AFI) on groups that are affected by the institutional settings (henceforth 
treated) with those that are not affected (henceforth control).135 Since we are controlling 
both groups before and after the events and the same group is acting as control and treated 
in this methodology, we are able to control for both observables and unobservable factors 
that may have changed over time as well. With this approach, we can capture the treatment 
effect by eliminating the effects of the other changes that could have affected the treated 
group (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). The studies that apply this approach are Koetter, 
Kolari and Spierdijk (2012) on cross-state setup for the US banking sector and Haselmann, 
Pistor and Vig (2010) on cross-country setup for East European countries. 
133 We use lagged values of E-Lerner as the measure of bank competition due to alleviating reverse 
causality. 
134 For details on this methodology see Haselmann, Pistor and Vig (2010). 
135 To consider the DID approach is meaningful; there are two aspects that should be accounted for namely 
homogeneous comparison groups and the changes in the efforts of improving financial inclusion should be 
exogenous. The first issue has minimal effect on our analysis as most of the members are from developing 
countries (propensity score matching is employed for having valid counterfactuals in the latter analysis). 
Regarding the second issue, whether change of efforts of improving financial inclusion is exogenous or 
endogenous, it is an important concern. Since policy initiatives and innovative principles of financial 
inclusion were thrust upon by G20, expert groups on financial inclusion e.g., AFI and World Bank, it shows 
the exogenous nature and randomness in embracing innovative policy suggestions. 
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 Table 5.12 reports the results of the DID estimation. It shows that bank efficiency 
has increased following participation in the network of AFI. Particularly, while we control 
for country fixed effects in columns 1-2, we consider bank fixed effects in columns 3-4. In 
all specifications, we use the analogous bank- and country-specific controls with year fixed 
effects. It can be seen from column 1 that the coefficient on the  Financial Access Policy
indicator is positive and highly significant with bank cost efficiency. A similar result can 
be observed with profit efficiency. We can also see that even controlling for bank fixed 
effects in columns 3-4 it does not change our results for any of the efficiency measures. 
The probable reason for such results is that member country regulatory institutions could 
develop and implement more effective policies designed to broaden access for the poor 
under the auspices of AFI which played an important role in the observed bank efficiency 
pickup. It also indicates that increasing financial inclusion reduces average costs of 
intermediation by increasing the levels of cost and profit efficiency of banks. This result is 
also consistent with the existing evidence suggesting that with favourable institutional 
settings, banks are better able to exploit economies of scale and operate efficiently (see 
Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996).  
Our analysis focuses on the comparison of countries that are members of AFI with 
non-member ones in terms of efficiency of the financial intermediation. To this end, we 
employ a placebo test to examine whether these treated countries have similar effects on 
bank efficiency if we construct a pseudo indicator assuming that these countries had joined 
the AFI network three years prior to the timing reported in Table 4.D2. In this case, if 
indeed the earlier positive effects of the AFI network on bank efficiency were to be true 
we would expect no significant positive effects between placebo AFI indicator and bank 
efficiency. The results are presented in columns 5-8 of table 5.12. They show a significant 
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negative coefficient for cost efficiency and insignificant positive relationship with profit 
efficiency. This reaffirms our argument that increasing financial inclusion is positively 
associated with bank efficiency.  
So far we use bank/country fixed effects to control for bank—and country—level 
unobservables along with time-varying industry-level unobservables. It does not guarantee 
that our comparison group is appropriately handled for our analysis. This limitation can be 
alleviated effectively using matching estimators where treated and control groups will be 
selected based on their observable characteristics (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). In that 
vein, we use the non-parametric difference-in-differences propensity score matching 
approach to identify the causal effect of the AFI network on bank efficiency. Combining 
matching estimators with difference-in-differences technique is arguably the most 
appropriate approach making a causal claim while alleviating any selection bias that 
ascertain a valid control group as counterfactual (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000). 
 In the first stage of propensity score matching (PSM), we estimate the likelihood 
of countries being treated (becoming a member of the AFI network in the present context) 
by using a logit model employing country- and industry-specific characteristics (see Table 
5.C1). In the second stage, we match each member country of AFI with non-member 
countries with a similar propensity score.136 For this procedure, we consider two matching 
techniques including kernel marching and stratification matching to calculate the average 
treatment effect for the treated (ATT).137 Additionally, we employ a covariate matching 
estimator (henceforth Abadie and Imbens) following the recent development in the 
microeconometric evaluation studies (Abadie and Imbens, 2006). In this case, we follow 
136 The balancing tests are satisfied and reported in Table 5.C1. Figure 5.C1 shows the propensity score 
matching blocks.    
137 While kernel matching estimator matches the treated units with weighted average of all control units, with 
weights that are inversely proportional to the distance in terms of their propensity score, stratification 
matching estimator divides the common support into different strata and measures the treatment’s effect 
within each interval. For details on the matching methods see Lin and Ye (2007) and De Mendonça and De 
Souza (2012). 
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Abadie, Drukker, Herr and Imbens (2004) and measure ATT matching on the four nearest 
neighbours. Unlike PSM, the Abadie and Imbens method employs covariates to match the 
treatment group and control group.138 It also corrects for bias when matching is not perfect, 
and provides heteroskedasticity robust standard errors for the matching estimators while 
making no assumption about the functional form.  
The results are reported in Panel B of Table 5.12, and they are consistent with the 
earlier findings. The result provides the causal effects of the  Financial Access Policy  on bank 
efficiency. In all matching estimators, we impose a common support condition to restrict 
control groups to fall within the support of the propensity score distribution of the treated 
groups. The estimates show that the average treatment effect of the  Financial Access Policy  
on bank cost efficiency is 0.06, while it is 0.04 on profit efficiency (averaged across 
estimators). However, for the latter case, Abadie and Imbens’ method shows positive but 
insignificant ATT effects. These results once again reaffirm our hypothesis that financial 
inclusion is good for bank efficiency.  
 
5.6 Conclusions and policy implications 
This paper investigates the association of an inclusive financial sector with bank 
efficiency using 2913 banks from 87 countries for the period 2004-2012. We find strong 
evidence that banks in countries with a greater inclusive banking sector tend to have higher 
levels of cost and profit efficiency. This effect is particularly strong for banks with higher 
market power and banks that operate in an environment where the overall institutional 
qualities are greater. Furthermore, we also exploit the exogenous timing variations of the 
developing countries that participate in a network of financial inclusion policymakers, and 
138 In Abadie and Imbens, the following pre-treatment characteristics are used as covariates for matching: 
industry average total asset, GDP per capita, GDP growth rate, financial freedom, regulatory quality, and a 
dummy that takes one for developing countries or else zero. 
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explore the causal effects of a supporting inclusive environment on bank efficiency. This 
underscores the importance of a conducive inclusive environment in broadening the access 
to finance and its complementary effects on the efficient intermediation of financial 
institutions.  
The results are robust to alternative measures of financial inclusion, bank 
efficiency, to keeping only commercial banks and developing countries, to employing IV 
analysis, to controlling for country- and bank unobserved heterogeneity, and finally, to 
exploring the effects of a network of financial inclusion policymakers, which sets the stage 
for many enabling laws in the member countries to broaden the access of the poor people 
to financial services. For all of these alternative setups, we show that the efficiency of the 
banks has increased after the expansion of the financial inclusion. Our findings suggest 
that a financial system that provides easier access to finance increases efficiency in the 
financial intermediation of the banks, and hence makes them more efficient, both in terms 
of cost and profit. They also show that financial inclusion is an important policy lever to 
bring more people into the formal economy, and concurrently set an environment for 
efficient financial operation. 
These results are novel in the literature. While previous papers show the effect of 
financial inclusion on various socio-economic indicators (e.g., Butler and Cornaggia, 
2011; Allen, Carletti, Cull, Qian, Senbet and Valenzuela, 2013; Demirgüç-Kunt, Klapper 
and Singer, 2013), this paper is the first to show the explicit link between a key ingredient 
of financial development strategy and cross-bank and cross-country variation in the levels 
of bank efficiency, a topic that deserves more theoretical and empirical attention for 
establishing a robust link between these variables. While previous studies focus on the 
relationship between bank branch penetration and a firm’s tax avoidance (see Beck, Lin 
and Ma, 2014), or a firm’s financing obstacle (see Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Martínez 
Pería, 2007), this is the first paper to relate cross-country variation in an inclusive banking 
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sector to the operating efficiency of the financial institutions, and to simultaneously 
contribute to the bank efficiency literature.  
The policy implications of our results are great. Since the larger the banking 
population the higher the bank efficiency, both in terms of cost and profit, policymakers 
should introduce more policies that are conducive for access to finance aiming at ensuring 
efficient financial intermediation. Furthermore, our results also stress the importance of 
the underlying competitive and institutional framework. The beneficial effects of financial 
inclusion on bank cost (profit) efficiency are more (less) in the countries where competition 
of banks is high (low). In this respect, regulators should pay adequate attention to balancing 
this moderating effect of bank competition on the nexus between financial inclusion and 
cost/profit efficiency. They should continuously make efforts to provide an environment 
that would be conducive for increasing financial inclusion and hence bank efficiency.  
We see this paper as a first attempt to find the link between financial inclusion 
and bank efficiency. As more data, both supplier and demand-side, become available, other 
dimensions of financial inclusion can be incorporated into the construction of the 
composite index so as to explore the relationship between an inclusive financial sector and 
bank efficiency.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 234 
Table 5.1 
Variable Definitions and Sources 
Variable Definitions Source 
Dependent Variables  
Cost efficiency Cost efficiency has been estimated using stochastic frontier model proposed by Greene 
(2005) with the range between 0 and 1 
Authors’ 
calculation 
Profit efficiency Alternative profit efficiency has been estimated using stochastic frontier model proposed 
by Greene (2005) with the range between 0 and 1 
Authors’ 
calculation 
Financial 
 
  
Penetration The number of deposit and loan accounts per 1000 adults IMF FAS 
Availability The outreach dimension constructed using principal component analysis (PCA) from the 
variables related to geographic and demographic availability of branches and ATMs 
Authors’ 
calculation 
Usage Total volume of deposit and loans relative to GDP IMF FAS 
Financial 
inclusion index 
Financial inclusion index is constructed using principal component analysis from the 
penetration, availability and usage dimensions. 
Authors’ 
calculation 
Bank competition  
C-Lerner A bank-level non-structural indicator of bank competition, measured by using a stochastic 
frontier analysis approach assuming full bank efficiency, with lower values indicating 
higher competition in the banking sector 
Authors’ 
calculation 
E-Lerner A bank-level non-structural indicator of bank competition, an efficiency-adjusted Lerner 
index, measured by using a stochastic frontier analysis approach, with lower values 
indicating higher competition in the banking sector 
Authors’ 
calculation 
Bank-specific variables  
Loan ratio Total performing loans divided by total assets BankScope 
LLP ratio Total loan loss provision divided by total assets BankScope 
Income 
diversification  
Non-interest income divided by total operating income BankScope 
Management 
 
Total earning assets divided by total assets BankScope 
Equity ratio Total equity divided by total assets BankScope 
IV Instruments  
Remittance Remittance inflows to GDP (%) from Global Financial Development Database World Bank 
Government bank 
ownership 
The extent to which the banking system's assets are government owned Barth, Caprio, 
and Levine 
(2013) 
Monetary freedom Weighted average of the extent of price controls and current and two-period lagged 
inflation rate to combine the measure of price stability. 
Heritage 
Foundation 
(2014) 
Entry density Entry density is a variable referring to the number of newly registered companies with 
limited liability per 1,000 working-age people (those aged 15-64). 
Doing Business 
database 
Macroeconomic variables  
GDP growth rate The growth rate of GDP World Bank 
GDP per capita The natural logarithm of per capita GDP World Bank 
Voice and 
accountability 
(Voice) 
The indicator measures the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in 
selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and 
free media. Higher values mean greater political rights 
Kaufmann, 
Kraay and 
Mastruzzi 
(2010) 
Political stability 
(Political) 
The indicator measures the perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including political 
violence and terrorism. Higher values mean more stable political environment 
Kaufmann, 
Kraay and 
Mastruzzi 
(2010) 
Government 
effectiveness 
(Government) 
The indicator measures the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and 
the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation 
and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies. 
Higher values mean higher quality of public and civil service 
Kaufmann, 
Kraay and 
Mastruzzi 
(2010) 
Regulatory quality 
(Regulatory) 
The indicator measures the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that permit and promote market competition and private-sector 
development. Higher values mean higher quality of regulation 
Kaufmann, 
Kraay and 
Mastruzzi 
(2010) 
Rule of law (Law) The indicator measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the 
rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Higher values mean stronger law 
and order. 
Kaufmann, 
Kraay and 
Mastruzzi 
(2010) 
Control of 
corruption 
(Corruption) 
The indicator measures the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘‘capture’’ the state by elites 
and private interests. Higher values indicate better control of corruption. 
Kaufmann, 
Kraay and 
Mastruzzi 
(2010) 
Institutional 
quality index 
(IQI) 
Institutional quality index is constructed using principal component analysis from the 
Voice, Political, Government, Regulatory, Law, and Corruption indexes of Kaufmann, 
Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010) 
Authors’ 
calculation 
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Table 5.2A  
Summary Statistics 
This table shows the total sample summary statistics for the bank-specific variables, macroeconomic 
variables and the variables that are used as instruments in the instrumental variable regressions throughout 
the paper. Detailed definitions and the sources of the variables are provided in Table 5.1.  The full sample 
contains 14929 observations. This table consists of six parts. The descriptive statistics of the dependent 
variables which are used to proxy for cost and profit efficiency of individual banks are in the first part. The 
financial inclusion index and its three dimensions are in the second part of this table. The third part contains 
two variant measures of bank competition, which is proxied by two variants of Lerner indices: conventional 
Lerner (i.e., C-Lerner) and efficiency-adjusted Lerner (i.e., E-Lerner). Bank-specific variables are in the 
fourth part. IV instruments are in the fifth part of this table followed by the macroeconomic variables in the 
sixth.   
  Mean Median SD Min Max N 
Dependent Variables 
Cost efficiency 0.81 0.95 0.29 0.00 1.00 14929 
Profit efficiency 0.56 0.58 0.32 0.00 1.00 14929 
Financial Inclusion 
Financial inclusion index 0.56 0.59 0.29 0.00 1.00 14929 
Penetration 0.49 0.35 0.35 0.00 1.00 14929 
Availability 0.62 0.79 0.34 0.00 1.00 14929 
Usage 0.11 0.00 0.22 0.00 1.00 14929 
Bank competition  measures 
C-Lerner 0.06 0.10 0.29 -1.39 0.80 14929 
E-Lerner 0.14 0.16 0.25 -0.75 0.88 14929 
Bank-specific variables 
Loan ratio 0.56 0.57 0.19 0.00 1.00 14929 
Total assets 7.08 6.90 1.94 -2.03 14.91 14929 
LLP ratio 0.01 0.01 0.04 -0.29 2.69 14929 
Income diversification  0.17 0.14 0.77 -24.25 82.21 14929 
Management quality 0.91 0.95 0.10 0.03 1.11 14929 
Equity ratio 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.93 14929 
IV Instruments 
remittance flow to GDP 1.79 0.32 4.05 0.00 34.50 14659 
Government bank ownership 13.29 4.80 18.56 0.00 90.00 11236 
Monetary freedom 80.31 80.70 8.31 40.30 94.30 14826 
New firm entry density 2.68 1.91 3.73 0.03 39.00 12869 
Macroeconomic variables 
GDP growth rate 2.10 1.90 4.00 -18.00 22.60 14929 
log GDP per capita 9.50 10.28 1.36 4.97 11.12 14929 
Voice and accountability (Voice) 0.67 0.95 0.71 -2.10 1.75 14929 
Political stability (Political) 0.31 0.50 0.81 -2.81 1.49 14929 
Government effectiveness (Government) 0.67 0.45 0.86 -1.50 2.43 14929 
Regulatory quality (Regulatory) 0.71 0.95 0.73 -1.68 1.96 14929 
Rule of law (Law) 0.59 0.44 0.91 -1.96 1.98 14929 
Control of corruption (Corruption) 0.55 0.31 0.98 -1.64 2.27 14929 
Institutional quality index (IQI) -0.01 0.01 2.29 -7.03 3.75 14929 
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Table 5.2B 
The estimation results for the bank efficiency and financial inclusion (country ranking in 
parentheses) Source: Author’s calculation. 
Country Cost 
efficien
cy 
Profit 
efficien
cy 
Financi
al 
inclusio
  
No. 
of 
Ban
 
Country Cost 
efficien
cy 
Profit 
efficien
cy 
Financi
al 
inclusio
  
No. 
of 
Ban
 Asia          
Afghanistan 0.991 0.757 0.012 
 
9 Norway 0.830 0.647 0.089 
 
12 
Armenia 0.932 0.645 0.224 
 
14 Portugal 0.927 0.522 0.785 
 
18 
Azerbaijan 0.947 0.570 0.136 
 
21 Serbia 0.949 0.553 0.385 
 
28 
Bangladesh 0.996 0.917 0.46 
 
12 Spain 0.849 0.615 0.816 
 
89 
Cambodia 0.982 0.714 0.072 
 
12 Switzerland 0.873 0.640 0.694 
 
124 
Cyprus 0.379 0.696 0.365 
 
13 Ukraine 0.434 0.242 0.52 
 
14 
Georgia 0.128 0.098 0.285 
 
12 United Kingdom 0.808 0.478 0.405 
 
95 
Hong Kong SAR, 
 
0.895 0.655 0.389 
 
28 Average/Total 0.818 0.585 0.527 1266 
India 0.954 0.686 0.373 
 
62 Americas     
Indonesia 0.932 0.680 0.233 
 
61 Argentina 0.091 0.072 0.256 
 
50 
Japan 0.999 0.568 0.977 
 
457 Bahamas, The 0.919 0.690 0.429 
 
11 
Jordan 0.010 0.010 0.272 
 
12 Bolivia 0.968 0.836 0.083 
 
10 
Kazakhstan 0.107 0.084 0.304 
 
27 Brazil 0.747 0.507 0.455 
 
104 
Korea, Rep. 0.753 0.734 0.991 
 
14 Chile 0.388 0.460 0.622 
 
24 
Kuwait 0.974 0.577 0.292 
 
12 Colombia 0.947 0.687 0.414 
 
21 
Lebanon 0.008 0.008 0.496 
 
33 Costa Rica 0.217 0.209 0.362 
 
42 
Malaysia 0.816 0.839 0.48
 
14 Dominican 
 
0.277 0.248 0.184 
 
57 
Mongolia 1.000 0.956 0.421 
 
3 Ecuador 0.977 0.612 0.191 
 
19 
Pakistan 0.932 0.647 0.076 
 
11 El Salvador 0.978 0.640 0.206 
 
13 
Philippines 0.045 0.045 0.116 
 
22 Honduras 0.995 0.704 0.143 
 
15 
Saudi Arabia 0.997 0.663 0.271 
 
12 Jamaica 0.965 0.997 0.343 
 
5 
Singapore 0.810 0.681 0.368 
 
13 Nicaragua 0.680 0.918 0.081 
 
5 
Thailand 0.742 0.684 0.475 
 
21 Panama 0.198 0.164 0.258 
 
41 
Turkey 0.938 0.688 0.524 
 
27 Peru 0.340 0.099 0.24 
 
15 
United Arab 
 
0.925 0.629 0.296 
 
24 Trinidad and 
 
0.050 0.050 0.345 
 
9 
Uzbekistan 0.044 0.044 0.138 
 
9 Venezuela, RB 0.869 0.669 0.236 
 
27 
Yemen, Rep. 0.999 0.585 0.021 
 
6 Average/Total 0.624 0.504 0.285 468 
Average/Total 0.712 0.550 0.336 961 Africa     
Europe     Algeria 0.111 0.085 0.079 
 
12 
Austria 0.863 0.593 0.354 
 
158 Angola 0.330 0.757 0.047 
 
12 
Belgium 0.820 0.533 0.981 
 
27 Botswana 0.984 0.806 0.199 
 
7 
Bosnia and 
 
0.973 0.544 0.312 
 
19 Burundi 0.630 0.891 0.051 
 
5 
Bulgaria 0.964 0.618 0.711 
 
17 Cameroon 0.969 0.654 0.033 
 
8 
Croatia 0.385 0.584 0.386 
 
29 Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.001 0.001 0.102 
 
21 
Estonia 0.962 0.819 0.618 
 
7 Ghana 0.975 0.711 0.059 
 
17 
Finland 0.866 0.692 0.542 
 
10 Kenya 0.957 0.663 0.055 
 
29 
Greece 0.779 0.575 0.545 
 
10 Libya 0.997 0.972 0.051 
 
6 
Hungary 0.931 0.585 0.417 
 
22 Malawi 0.996 0.910 0.027 
 
5 
Iceland 0.016 0.000 0.206 
 
5 Mauritius 0.954 0.721 0.557 
 
12 
Ireland 0.925 0.636 0.489 
 
8 Mozambique 0.983 0.618 0.03 
 
10 
Italy 0.827 0.633 0.564 
 
489 Namibia 0.699 0.693 0.231 
 
6 
Latvia 0.955 0.647 0.393 
 
19 Rwanda 0.974 0.512 0.112 
 
7 
Macedonia, FYR 0.963 0.688 0.492 
 
13 South Africa 0.853 0.683 0.182 
 
14 
Malta 0.949 0.744 0.921 
 
7 Tanzania 0.985 0.617 0.034 
 
21 
Moldova 0.909 0.758 0.327 
 
12 Uganda 0.982 0.534 0.044 
 
14 
Montenegro 0.883 0.674 0.386 
 
7 Zambia 0.980 0.556 0.071 
 
12 
Netherlands 0.803 0.604 0.83 (5) 27 Average/Total 0.798 0.632 0.109 218 
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 Table 5.3 
The effect of financial inclusion on bank efficiency 
We use pooled cross-sectional Tobit model where the dependent variable is the Cost efficiency, reported in 
columns 1-2, Alternative profit efficiency is reported in columns 3-4. Financial Inclusion is a composite 
index, constructed by using principal component analysis from three dimensions, namely Penetration, 
Availability, and Usage. Bank competition is proxied by two variants of the Lerner indices i.e., conventional 
Lerner (C-Lerner) and efficiency-adjusted Lerner (E-Lerner). Loan ratio is measured as loans as a 
percentage of total assets. Bank size is the logarithm of total assets valued in U.S. dollar (millions).  Loan 
loss provision ratio is measured as a percentage of total assets, where income diversification is the ratio of 
non-interest income over total income. The management quality is measured as the total earning assets over 
total assets. Capitalisation is the bank total equity to asset ratio. To control for economic development, 
logarithm of GDP per capita is used, and GDP growth rate is used to account for condition of business cycle 
in each country. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Source: BankScope and WDI. Coverage: 2004-2012. 
VARIABLES Cost efficiency Profit efficiency 
  1 2 3 4 
Financial Inclusion 0.319*** 0.314*** 0.059*** 0.061*** 
 [0.019] [0.019] [0.018] [0.019] 
Bank-specific characteristics     
Loan Ratio 0.030 0.025 0.092*** 0.100*** 
 [0.026] [0.025] [0.023] [0.022] 
Bank Size -0.005* -0.005* 0.000 0.000 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] 
Loan Loss Provision 0.058 0.049 -0.522*** -0.512*** 
 [0.068] [0.066] [0.200] [0.195] 
Income Diversification 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.007 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.009] [0.009] 
Management Quality 0.345*** 0.340*** 0.247*** 0.252*** 
 [0.069] [0.069] [0.059] [0.059] 
Capitalisation -0.169** -0.147** 0.097* 0.075 
 [0.066] [0.067] [0.055] [0.055] 
C-Lerner -0.045***  0.064***  
 [0.016]  [0.014]  
E-Lerner  -0.052**  0.056*** 
  [0.023]  [0.019] 
Country Macro-controls     
GDP Growth Rate -1.283*** -1.265*** -0.761*** -0.782*** 
 [0.173] [0.174] [0.160] [0.159] 
Per Capita GDP -0.035*** -0.034*** -0.011** -0.012** 
 [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] 
Constant 0.645*** 0.654*** 0.347*** 0.336*** 
 [0.074] [0.075] [0.063] [0.063] 
Observations 14,929 14,929 14,929 14,929 
Pseudo R2 0.576 0.574 0.0587 0.0553 
F 60.11 61.21 8.533 7.491 
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Table 5.4 
Interactive result of financial inclusion and bank competition on efficiency 
We use pooled cross-sectional Tobit model where the dependent variable is the Cost efficiency, reported in 
columns 1-2, Alternative profit efficiency is reported in columns 3-4. Financial Inclusion is a composite 
index, constructed by using principal component analysis from three dimensions, namely Penetration, 
Availability, and Usage. Bank competition is proxied by two variants of the Lerner indices i.e., conventional 
Lerner (C-Lerner) and efficiency-adjusted Lerner (E-Lerner). The rest of the variables are analogous as in 
Table 5.3 except the interactions of financial inclusion and Lerner indices. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Source: BankScope and WDI. Coverage: 2004-2012. 
VARIABLES Cost efficiency Profit efficiency 
  1 2 3 4 
Financial Inclusion 0.319*** 0.319*** 0.060*** 0.055*** 
 [0.019] [0.019] [0.018] [0.019] 
Bank-specific characteristics     
Loan Ratio 0.029 0.03 0.085*** 0.093*** 
 [0.026] [0.025] [0.023] [0.022] 
Bank Size -0.005* -0.005* 0 0 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] 
Loan Loss Provision 0.058 0.054 -0.526*** -0.517*** 
 [0.068] [0.065] [0.201] [0.195] 
Income Diversification 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.007 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.008] [0.009] 
Management Quality 0.345*** 0.345*** 0.242*** 0.247*** 
 [0.069] [0.069] [0.059] [0.060] 
Capitalisation -0.170** -0.131* 0.083 0.056 
 [0.066] [0.068] [0.055] [0.056] 
C-Lerner -0.05  0.007  
 [0.031]  [0.028]  
E-Lerner  0.001  -0.008 
  [0.041]  [0.034] 
Financial Inclusion x C-Lerner 0.01  0.124***  
 [0.044]  [0.044]  
Financial Inclusion x E-Lerner  -0.129**  0.154*** 
  [0.062]  [0.058] 
Country Macro-controls     
GDP Growth Rate -1.281*** -1.279*** -0.741*** -0.765*** 
 [0.174] [0.175] [0.159] [0.160] 
Per Capita GDP -0.035*** -0.033*** -0.012** -0.013*** 
 [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] 
Constant 0.646*** 0.632*** 0.362*** 0.363*** 
 [0.075] [0.076] [0.063] [0.064] 
Observations 14,929 14,929 14,929 14,929 
Pseudo R2 0.576 0.578 0.061 0.0574 
F 62.33 74.96 9.439 7.829 
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Table 5.5 
Financial inclusion and institutional quality interactions: Cost efficiency using Tobit 
This table reports Tobit regressions of bank cost efficiency on financial inclusion, six measures of 
institutional quality and their interactions. The analogous bank and macro controls are used as in Table 5.3, 
except additional Governance Indicators and their interactions with financial inclusion. We use lagged values 
of efficiency adjusted Lerner index as the proxy for bank competition. Each interaction and its constituents 
are entered one at a time. For the sake of brevity, the results of the controls are not reported in this table but 
available upon request. The detailed definition and their sources are provided in Table 5.1. In column 7, we 
capture common variation among the six governance indicators using the principal component analysis and 
construct a composite index of institutional quality (IQI), and re-run Tobit regression to gauge overall effect 
of institutional quality on the relationship between financial inclusion and cost efficiency. 
  Dependent variable: Cost efficiency 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Financial inclusion index (FII) 0.093** 0.220*** 0.098** 0.058 0.116*** 0.199*** 0.220*** 
 [0.045] [0.035] [0.043] [0.048] [0.040] [0.039] [0.025] 
Voice and accountability (Voice) -0.019       
 [0.022]       
FII x Voice 0.254***       
 [0.045]       
Political stability (Political)  0.017      
  [0.023]      
FII x Political  0.144***      
  [0.037]      
Government effectiveness (Government)   0.02     
   [0.020]     
FII x Government   0.152***     
   [0.030]     
Regulatory quality (Regulatory)    -0.025    
    [0.024]    
FII x Regulatory    0.272***    
    [0.043]    
Rule of law (Law)     0.032*   
     [0.018]   
FII x Law     0.163***   
     [0.029]   
Control of corruption (Corruption)      0.061***  
      [0.019]  
FII x Corruption      0.072***  
      [0.027]  
Institutional quality index (IQI)       0.015* 
       [0.008] 
FII x IQI       0.065*** 
       [0.012] 
Constant 0.887*** 0.874*** 0.953*** 0.925*** 1.074*** 1.104*** 1.137*** 
 [0.089] [0.084] [0.092] [0.097] [0.089] [0.093] [0.105] 
Observations 14,929 14,929 14,929 14,929 14,929 14,929 14,929 
Bank and Macro controls √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Year dummies √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Pseudo R2 0.66 0.67 0.70 0.67 0.74 0.73 0.73 
One SD above average 0.45 0.38 0.33 0.45 0.36 0.31 0.37 
Marginal  effect 0.27 0.26 0.20 0.25 0.21 0.24 0.22 
Marginal effect: standard  error 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 
One SD below  average 0.08 0.15 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.17 0.07 
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Table 5.6 
Financial inclusion and institutional quality interactions: Profit efficiency using Tobit 
This table reports Tobit regressions of bank profit efficiency on financial inclusion, six measures of 
institutional quality and their interactions. The analogous bank and macro controls are used as in Table 5.3, 
except additional Governance Indicators and their interactions with financial inclusion. We use lagged values 
of efficiency adjusted Lerner index as the proxy for bank competition. Each interaction and its constituents 
are entered one at a time. For the sake of brevity, the results of the controls are not reported in this table but 
available upon request. The detailed definition and their sources are provided in Table 5.1. In column 7, we 
capture common variation among the six governance indicators using the principal component analysis and 
construct a composite index of institutional quality (IQI), and re-run Tobit regression to gauge the overall 
effect of institutional quality on the relationship between financial inclusion and profit efficiency. 
  Dependent variable: Profit efficiency 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Financial inclusion index (FII) 0.159*** 0.057* 0.013 0.210*** 0.004 0.048 0.03 
 [0.046] [0.030] [0.039] [0.054] [0.037] [0.036] [0.024] 
Voice and accountability (Voice) 0.113***       
 [0.021]       
FII x Voice -0.101**       
 [0.041]       
Political stability (Political)  0.038**      
  [0.018]      
FII x Political  0.003      
  [0.031]      
Government effectiveness (Government)   0.017     
   [0.018]     
FII x Government   0.03     
   [0.027]     
Regulatory quality (Regulatory)    0.162***    
    [0.027]    
FII x Regulatory    -0.131***    
    [0.045]    
Rule of law (Law)     0.019   
     [0.016]   
FII x Law     0.045*   
     [0.027]   
Control of corruption (Corruption)      0.035**  
      [0.017]  
FII x Corruption      -0.001  
      [0.025]  
Institutional quality index (IQI)       0.01 
       [0.007] 
FII x IQI       0.019* 
       [0.011] 
Constant 0.504*** 0.487*** 0.454*** 0.679*** 0.506*** 0.520*** 0.562*** 
 [0.090] [0.073] [0.080] [0.105] [0.080] [0.082] [0.091] 
Observations 12,869 14,929 14,929 12,869 14,929 14,929 14,929 
Bank and Macro controls √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Year dummies √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Pseudo R2 0.12 0.06 0.06 0.12 0.06 0.06 0.07 
One SD above average 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.07 
Marginal  effect 0.09 0.06 0.03 0.12 0.03 0.05 0.03 
Marginal effect: standard error 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 
One SD below  average 0.16 0.06 0.01 0.21 -0.01 0.05 -0.01 
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Table 5.7 
The effect of financial inclusion on bank efficiency (plus BC efficiency measure) using IV-Tobit 
This table reports the results of instrumental variables regressions of IV-Tobit regression using Newey’s 
minimum chi-squared two step estimator. The results of the First-stage regressions are presented in the 
Appendix Table C5.1. The under-identification and over-identification results of the Anderson-Rubin test 
and the Amemiya–Lee–Newey minimum χ2 test are reported at the bottom of the table, respectively. In 
columns 1-4, the dependent variable cost and profit efficiency are measured by using True fixed effects 
stochastic frontier analysis of Greene (2005), while in column 5-8, it is derived from  time-varying 
inefficiency specifications of Battese and Coelli (1992). All other variables are analogous. 
  Greene (2005) Battese and Coelli (1992) 
VARIABLES Cost efficiency  Profit efficiency  Cost efficiency  Profit efficiency  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Financial inclusion 2.300*** 2.296*** 2.182*** 2.050*** 0.102*** 0.072*** 0.136*** 0.187*** 
 [0.512] [0.485] [0.558] [0.509] [0.008] [0.008] [0.027] [0.031] 
Bank-specific characteristics         
Loan Ratio 0.002 0.001 0.032 0.045* -0.007* -0.002 -0.038*** 0.013 
 [0.023] [0.023] [0.025] [0.024] [0.004] [0.004] [0.013] [0.013] 
Bank Size -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.031*** -0.029*** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.002** -0.002 
 [0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.007] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] 
Loan Loss Provision -0.037 -0.031 -0.568*** -0.550*** -0.068*** -0.080*** -0.418*** -0.404*** 
 [0.100] [0.100] [0.109] [0.105] [0.019] [0.019] [0.055] [0.056] 
Income Diversification 0.266*** 0.261*** 0.277*** 0.262*** 0.001 0.002*** 0.002 0.005** 
 [0.054] [0.050] [0.059] [0.053] [0.001] [0.001] [0.003] [0.003] 
Management Quality 0.098 0.101 -0.052 -0.008 0.009 0.001 0.079*** 0.049* 
 [0.093] [0.087] [0.101] [0.091] [0.009] [0.009] [0.028] [0.029] 
Capitalisation -0.478*** -0.487*** -0.230*** -0.271*** -0.210*** -0.175*** -0.025 0.047 
 [0.065] [0.069] [0.071] [0.073] [0.010] [0.009] [0.030] [0.030] 
C-Lerner -0.005  0.116***  0.032***  0.152***  
 [0.019]  [0.020]  [0.003]  [0.008]  
E-Lerner  0.028  0.142***  -0.067***  -0.005 
  [0.029]  [0.031]  [0.003]  [0.012] 
Country Macro-controls         
GDP Growth Rate 1.061 1.037 1.693** 1.440** -0.143*** -0.145*** 0.303*** 0.430*** 
 [0.696] [0.648] [0.757] [0.680] [0.030] [0.029] [0.095] [0.097] 
Per Capita GDP -0.232*** -0.232*** -0.216*** -0.205*** -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.035*** -0.040*** 
 [0.046] [0.044] [0.051] [0.046] [0.001] [0.001] [0.004] [0.004] 
Constant 1.853*** 1.847*** 1.649*** 1.544*** 1.049*** 1.056*** 0.787*** 0.796*** 
 [0.281] [0.262] [0.306] [0.275] [0.011] [0.011] [0.034] [0.034] 
Observations 11,165 11,165 11,165 11,165 14,575 14,575 12,869 12,869 
Wald χ2 test: exogeneity 40.84 45.47 31.02 30.16 128.7 116.5 13.97 45.26 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Under-identification test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Over-identification test (p-value) 0.16 0.09 0.54 0.28 0.64 0.53 0.34 0.10 
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Table 5.8 
The effect of global financial inclusion on bank efficiency 
In this table we use Global Financial Inclusion Index (Global Findex) based on the World Bank. Since this 
measure is only available for the year 2011, we had to collapse our dataset at bank-level to run cross-sectional 
Tobit regression. The definitions of the rest of the variables are the same as Table 5.3. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Source: BankScope and World Bank. 
  Adults with an account at a formal 
financial institution to total adults (%) 
Adults saving at a financial 
institution in the past year to total 
d l  (%)   Cost efficiency Profit efficiency Cost efficiency Profit efficiency 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Global financial inclusion 
 
0.006*** 0.006*** 0.003** 0.003**     
 [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001]     
Global financial inclusion 
 
    0.008*** 0.008*** 0.003** 0.003** 
     [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] 
Bank-specific characteristics         
Loan Ratio 0.007 0.004 0.073 0.087 0.122 0.118 0.091 0.101 
 [0.129] [0.125] [0.087] [0.084] [0.123] [0.118] [0.090] [0.086] 
Bank Size -0.002 -0.003 0 0.001 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 
 [0.009] [0.010] [0.007] [0.008] [0.010] [0.010] [0.007] [0.007] 
Loan Loss Provision -0.033 -0.039 -0.264 -0.267 0.191 0.185 -0.13 -0.128 
 [0.172] [0.172] [0.182] [0.183] [0.239] [0.238] [0.158] [0.160] 
Income Diversification 0.012 0.012 0.026 0.031* -0.001 -0.001 0.014 0.016 
 [0.026] [0.025] [0.017] [0.019] [0.020] [0.020] [0.014] [0.014] 
Management Quality 0.642** 0.631** 0.362** 0.378** 0.419* 0.411* 0.305* 0.317* 
 [0.288] [0.285] [0.184] [0.186] [0.248] [0.247] [0.184] [0.185] 
Capitalisation -0.194 -0.154 0.052 0.01 0 0.023 0.115 0.084 
 [0.169] [0.195] [0.111] [0.131] [0.148] [0.170] [0.103] [0.117] 
C-Lerner -0.042  0.099*  -0.036  0.069  
 [0.080]  [0.051]  [0.071]  [0.049]  
E-Lerner  -0.068  0.082  -0.05  0.069 
  [0.112]  [0.064]  [0.102]  [0.064] 
Country Macro-controls         
GDP Growth Rate -2.339* -2.283 -1.731* -1.791* -4.189*** -4.138*** -2.274** -2.320** 
 [1.362] [1.396] [1.036] [1.056] [1.242] [1.285] [1.018] [1.037] 
Per Capita GDP -0.133*** -0.133*** -0.084*** -0.082*** -0.106*** -0.105*** -0.055** -0.055* 
 [0.045] [0.045] [0.030] [0.030] [0.035] [0.035] [0.028] [0.028] 
Constant 1.115*** 1.131*** 0.758*** 0.716*** 1.231*** 1.241*** 0.708*** 0.686*** 
 [0.400] [0.391] [0.227] [0.223] [0.321] [0.313] [0.238] [0.235] 
Observations 2,192 2,192 2,192 2,192 2,497 2,497 2,497 2,497 
Pseudo R2 0.87 0.87 -1.05 -0.99 0.78 0.79 13.58 13.24 
Countries 76 76 76 76 78 78 78 78 
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Table 5.9 
Financial inclusion and bank efficiency: robustness checks 
This table reports robustness tests of financial inclusion and bank efficiency. In the first six columns, we split the sample into three terciles based on financial 
inclusion and re-run Tobit regressions. In columns 7 and 8, we dropped observations of the cooperative and Islamic banks keeping only commercial banks. In 
columns 9 and 10, we dropped observations of Japan and Italy as they comprise lion shares of our sample and re-run regressions. In the last two columns, we 
dropped developed countries and re-run regression on the sample of developing countries only. The analogous bank and macro controls are used as in Table 
5.3. We use lagged values of efficiency adjusted Lerner index as the proxy for bank competition.  
  
Lower 
terciles 
of 
financial 
 
Medium 
terciles 
of 
financial 
 
Higher 
terciles of 
financial 
inclusion 
Lower 
terciles 
of 
financial 
 
Medium 
terciles of 
financial 
inclusion 
Higher 
terciles 
of 
financial 
 
Only Commercial 
banks: Cooperative and 
Islamic banks excluded 
Rest of the sample: 
Japan and Italy 
excluded 
Only Developing 
Countries: Developed 
Countries excluded 
  Cost efficiency (CE) Profit efficiency (PE) CE PE CE PE CE PE 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Financial inclusion 0.193* 0.215** 0.382*** -0.001 0.316*** -0.181** 0.209*** 0.109*** 0.159*** 0.126*** 0.550*** 0.348*** 
 [0.111] [0.098] [0.043] [0.098] [0.089] [0.072] [0.040] [0.036] [0.034] [0.030] [0.075] [0.064] 
Bank-level controls             
Loan Ratio 0.054 0.166*** -0.008 -0.021 0.144*** 0.078** 0.153*** 0.131*** 0.114*** 0.098*** 0.212*** 0.138*** 
 [0.053] [0.046] [0.019] [0.044] [0.040] [0.034] [0.038] [0.032] [0.037] [0.031] [0.064] [0.050] 
Bank Size -0.007 0.007** -0.015*** 0.003 0.003 -0.001 -0.005 0.001 -0.002 0.002 -0.005 0.004 
 [0.006] [0.003] [0.005] [0.005] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.006] [0.005] 
Loan Loss Provision 0.071 0.454** -0.023 -0.565** -0.672*** -0.468* 0.042 -0.366*** 0.084 -0.366*** 0.545*** -0.08 
 [0.187] [0.208] [0.036] [0.245] [0.252] [0.266] [0.064] [0.135] [0.066] [0.128] [0.182] [0.173] 
Income Diversification 0.150*** 0.063 0 0.143*** 0.077*** 0 0.155*** 0.132*** 0.105** 0.084*** 0.145*** 0.124*** 
 [0.049] [0.056] [0.000] [0.043] [0.029] [0.003] [0.029] [0.027] [0.043] [0.028] [0.046] [0.038] 
Management Quality 0.422*** 0.318*** 0.118* 0.266*** 0.401*** 0.214* 0.343*** 0.243*** 0.344*** 0.221*** 0.145 0.174** 
 [0.102] [0.114] [0.062] [0.083] [0.110] [0.116] [0.077] [0.066] [0.076] [0.063] [0.100] [0.081] 
Capitalisation -0.091 -0.005 -0.296*** 0.085 0.03 0.014 0.022 0.053 -0.102 -0.005 0.113 0.165** 
 [0.091] [0.112] [0.072] [0.073] [0.099] [0.103] [0.079] [0.065] [0.074] [0.059] [0.103] [0.081] 
E-Lerner -0.060* 0.01 -0.067*** -0.019 0.095*** 0.039 -0.095*** 0.001 -0.035 0.03 0.016 0.067** 
 [0.034] [0.034] [0.024] [0.029] [0.031] [0.034] [0.025] [0.022] [0.025] [0.021] [0.034] [0.028] 
Constant 0.894*** 0.022 0.576*** 0.503*** -0.001 0.544*** 0.685*** 0.374*** 0.638*** 0.406*** 2.026*** 1.177*** 
 [0.102] [0.144] [0.085] [0.087] [0.125] [0.130] [0.084] [0.070] [0.082] [0.067] [0.130] [0.108] 
Observations 4,881 5,039 5,009 4,881 5,039 5,009 7,901 7,901 8,957 8,957 5,338 5,338 
Country-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.09 1.22 -0.25 0.04 0.18 0.07 0.12 0.04 0.11 0.05 0.24 0.14 
F 11.72 56.31 34.3 3.772 12.48 4.34 12.64 5.151 12.54 5.824 20.1 11.5 
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Table 5.10 
Bank level Tobit and Weighted (by bank assets) Tobit regressions for all countries 
The dependent variables are bank cost and profit efficiency. All other variables are as described in Table 5.1. 
Before running Tobit regressions, all variables are averaged over 2004-2012. While the results of bank level 
Tobit regression are reported in Columns 1-4, the Weighted Tobit are reported in Columns 5-8.  The weights are 
the bank total assets. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered for countries are reported in brackets. 
*, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 VARIABLES Bank-level Tobit regression Weighted (by bank assets) Tobit regression 
 Cost efficiency Profit efficiency Cost efficiency Profit efficiency 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Financial Inclusion 0.315** 0.308** 0.084*** 0.084*** 0.204*** 0.185*** 0.094*** 0.088*** 
 [0.129] [0.127] [0.023] [0.023] [0.067] [0.067] [0.023] [0.022] 
Bank-specific characteristics         
Loan Ratio 0.021 0.009 0.072*** 0.077*** 0.067 0.044 0.096*** 0.091*** 
 [0.109] [0.105] [0.027] [0.027] [0.059] [0.060] [0.028] [0.028] 
Bank Size -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 0.011 0.011 0.014*** 0.014*** 
 [0.009] [0.009] [0.003] [0.003] [0.007] [0.007] [0.003] [0.003] 
Loan Loss Provision 0.138 0.134 -0.188* -0.191* 0.008 0.029 -1.612*** -1.641*** 
 [0.237] [0.235] [0.097] [0.098] [0.476] [0.462] [0.297] [0.296] 
Income Diversification 0.025 0.022 0.025** 0.026** 0.095* 0.084 0.116*** 0.118*** 
 [0.026] [0.026] [0.012] [0.012] [0.054] [0.054] [0.034] [0.034] 
Management Quality 0.389* 0.377* 0.269*** 0.274*** 0.597*** 0.588*** 0.643*** 0.633*** 
 [0.226] [0.226] [0.079] [0.079] [0.176] [0.178] [0.087] [0.087] 
Capitalisation -0.08 -0.043 0.069 0.06 0.287 0.38 1.060*** 1.110*** 
 [0.148] [0.166] [0.058] [0.059] [0.242] [0.246] [0.133] [0.133] 
C-Lerner -0.089  0.036*  -0.213***  -0.079***  
 [0.068]  [0.019]  [0.050]  [0.015]  
E-Lerner  -0.098  0.027  -0.256***  -0.111*** 
  [0.094]  [0.023]  [0.056]  [0.018] 
Country Macro-controls         
GDP Growth Rate -2.131 -2.056 -1.441*** -1.459*** 1.156 1.430** 2.437*** 2.588*** 
 [1.333] [1.353] [0.271] [0.273] [0.710] [0.702] [0.238] [0.240] 
Per Capita GDP -0.047 -0.045 -0.024*** -0.025*** 0.011 0.017 -0.008 -0.006 
 [0.032] [0.032] [0.006] [0.007] [0.018] [0.018] [0.005] [0.005] 
Constant 0.774** 0.792** 0.493*** 0.486*** -0.149 -0.161 -0.320*** -0.319*** 
 [0.318] [0.317] [0.081] [0.081] [0.244] [0.240] [0.098] [0.098] 
Observations 2,648 2,648 2,648 2,648 2,598 2,598 2,598 2,598 
Pseudo R2 0.59 0.59 9.77 9.59 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.06 
Countries 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 
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 Table 5.11 
Exploiting country and bank unobserved heterogeneity 
  Pooled Cross-Sectional Tobit Random-Effects Panel Tobit 
VARIABLES Country x Year Fixed Effects Bank x Year Fixed Effects 
 Cost efficiency Profit efficiency Cost efficiency Profit efficiency 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Financial inclusion 0.054** 0.053** 0.004 0.007 0.103*** 0.099*** 0.069*** 0.065*** 
 [0.022] [0.022] [0.049] [0.050] [0.015] [0.015] [0.020] [0.020] 
Bank-level controls         
Loan Ratio 0.047*** 0.046*** 0.024* 0.031** 0.069*** 0.070*** 0.076*** 0.084*** 
 [0.006] [0.006] [0.014] [0.014] [0.012] [0.012] [0.020] [0.020] 
Bank Size -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.007*** -0.004*** -0.003 -0.003 0 0.001 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
Loan Loss Provision 0.017 0.014 -0.580*** -0.561*** -0.018 -0.024 -0.569*** -0.554*** 
 [0.027] [0.027] [0.059] [0.060] [0.026] [0.026] [0.068] [0.068] 
Income Diversification -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.002 0 0 0.003 0.003 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.003] [0.003] [0.001] [0.001] [0.003] [0.003] 
Management Quality 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.101*** 0.117*** 0.017 0.015 0.157*** 0.161*** 
 [0.014] [0.014] [0.032] [0.032] [0.018] [0.018] [0.038] [0.039] 
Capitalisation -0.114*** -0.095*** 0.064** 0.090*** -0.374*** -0.367*** 0.117*** 0.113** 
 [0.014] [0.015] [0.031] [0.032] [0.024] [0.025] [0.044] [0.045] 
C-Lerner 0.003  0.106***  -0.012**  0.061***  
 [0.005]  [0.011]  [0.005]  [0.011]  
E-Lerner  -0.029***  0.024  -0.026***  0.032** 
  [0.007]  [0.015]  [0.008]  [0.015] 
Constant 0.929*** 0.940*** 0.535*** 0.515*** 0.395*** 0.399*** 0.304*** 0.292*** 
 [0.022] [0.022] [0.048] [0.048] [0.041] [0.041] [0.047] [0.047] 
Observations 14,929 14,929 14,929 14,929 14,929 14,929 14,929 14,929 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No  No  No  No  
Bank Fixed Effects No  No  No  No  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-level controls No  No  No  No  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 5.29 5.30 0.66 0.65 - - - - 
Likelihood-ratio test - - - - 22311*** 22323*** 2926*** 2926*** 
# of degree of freedom - -  -  -  17 17 17 17 
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Table 5.12 
The impact of supportive environment of financial inclusion on the levels of cost and profit 
efficiency 
This table presents difference-in-differences (Panel A) and Matching (Panel B) estimations relating to membership of Alliance for Financial 
Inclusion (AFI) and bank efficiency. In Panel A, the dependent variables are the Cost and Profit efficiency. The variable of interest is Financial 
Access Policy, that takes one if a country becomes a member of the AFI network and agrees to share knowledge in order to develop and 
implement more effective policies designed to expand access to financial services in year t and thereafter or else zero. The analogous bank- 
and country-specific controls are used with a set of year dummies. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in brackets. In 
columns 1-4, the first two columns use country fixed effects, and the last two columns use bank fixed effects. Similarly, the results of the 
Placebo test are reported in columns 5-8 where we construct an indicator variable assuming that each member country had joined the AFI 
network three years prior to the actual membership timing. In Panel B, we use three different matching methods include Kernel matching, 
Stratification matching and the nearest-neighbour bias-corrected matching estimators proposed by Abadie and Imbens (2006). Abadie and 
Imbens method adjusts the differences within the matches for the differences in covariate values. ATT is the average treatment effect for the 
treated. The standard errors in Abadie and Imbens are heteroskedasticity-consistent, and z-stats are reported. For the rest, we report absolute 
values of bootstrapped t-stats in brackets. The number of observations differs due to the difference in the underlying matching approaches. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Source: BankScope and AFI. Coverage: 2004-2012. 
Panel A: Difference-in-differences Financial Access Policy Placebo test: Financial Access Policy (-3) 
  
Cost 
efficiency 
Profit 
efficiency 
Cost 
efficiency 
Profit 
efficiency 
Cost 
efficiency 
Profit 
efficiency 
Cost 
efficiency 
Profit 
efficiency 
variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Financial Access Policy 0.020*** 0.021* 0.015*** 0.023** -0.013* 0.009 -0.020*** 0.006 
 [0.006] [0.012] [0.004] [0.011] [0.007] [0.013] [0.005] [0.013] 
Bank-level controls         
Loan Ratio 0.046*** 0.034** 0.070*** 0.014 0.047*** 0.034** 0.074*** 0.017 
 [0.008] [0.014] [0.015] [0.038] [0.008] [0.014] [0.015] [0.038] 
Bank Size -0.013*** -0.004*** -0.005 0.061*** -0.013*** -0.004*** -0.002 0.063*** 
 [0.001] [0.002] [0.006] [0.012] [0.001] [0.002] [0.006] [0.012] 
Loan Loss Provision -0.005 -0.483*** -0.054 -0.547*** -0.006 -0.483*** -0.053 -0.547*** 
 [0.051] [0.111] [0.061] [0.167] [0.051] [0.111] [0.061] [0.167] 
Income Diversification -0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 
 [0.001] [0.005] [0.001] [0.005] [0.001] [0.004] [0.001] [0.005] 
Management Quality 0.072*** 0.086*** -0.054** -0.015 0.072*** 0.087*** -0.056** -0.013 
 [0.020] [0.031] [0.024] [0.051] [0.020] [0.031] [0.024] [0.051] 
Capitalisation -0.108*** 0.087** -0.433*** 0.264*** -0.109*** 0.086** -0.427*** 0.268*** 
 [0.028] [0.036] [0.045] [0.087] [0.028] [0.036] [0.045] [0.087] 
E-Lerner -0.034*** 0.014 -0.027*** 0.042* -0.034*** 0.014 -0.027*** 0.042* 
 [0.009] [0.015] [0.009] [0.023] [0.009] [0.015] [0.009] [0.023] 
Country Macro-controls         
GDP Growth Rate 0.172*** 0.307*** 0.218*** 0.390*** 0.171*** 0.297*** 0.221*** 0.381*** 
 [0.036] [0.099] [0.029] [0.099] [0.036] [0.100] [0.029] [0.099] 
Per Capita GDP 0.110*** -0.002 0.095*** -0.157*** 0.149*** 0.02 0.129*** -0.134*** 
 [0.022] [0.042] [0.018] [0.046] [0.022] [0.041] [0.018] [0.045] 
Constant -0.268 0.477 -0.047 1.550*** -0.636*** 0.275 -0.390** 1.318*** 
  [0.210] [0.400] [0.159] [0.422] [0.208] [0.387] [0.159] [0.408] 
Observations 15,509 15,509 15,509 15,509 15,509 15,509 15,509 15,509 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No 
Bank Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.82 0.29 0.91 0.39 0.82 0.29 0.91 0.39 
Panel B: Matching estimators Cost efficiency Profit efficiency 
Variables Kernel Stratification Abadie-Imbens Kernel Stratification Abadie-Imbens 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
ATT 0.064*** 0.056*** 0.049** 0.055*** 0.051*** 0.022 
S.E. [0.011] [0.011] [0.019] [0.013] [0.012] [0.039] 
t-stat [5.674] [5.179] [2.510] [4.354] [4.371] [0.560] 
Observations 17291 17291 17159 17291 17291 17159 
Common support condition Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Financial Inclusion variable has some missing observations. As we do not use this variable in the DID and Matching estimators the 
total number of observations has increased compared to earlier regressions in this paper.  
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Appendix 5.A 
 
 
Table 5.A1 
Correlation Matrixes 
This tables presents correlation between key variables used in this study. Variable definitions are provided in Table 5.1. 
 Bank-level variables 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8     
1 C-Lerner 1          
2 E-Lerner 0.67*** 1         
3 Loan ratio 0.11*** 0.02* 1        
4 Total assets 0.02** -0.11*** 0.02* 1       
5 LLP ratio 0.01 0.02* -0.06*** -0.04*** 1      
6 Income diversification  0.04*** 0.06*** -0.05*** -0.01 0.03*** 1     
7 Management quality -0.05*** -0.19*** 0.22*** 0.12*** -0.15*** -0.08*** 1    
8 Equity ratio 0.06*** 0.27*** -0.07*** -0.39*** 0.11*** 0.07*** -0.29*** 1   
 Country-level variables 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Financial inclusion  1                   
2 GDP growth rate -0.44*** 1         
3 log GDP per capita 0.69*** -0.52*** 1        
4 Voice and accountability 0.58*** -0.42*** 0.78*** 1       
5 Political stability 0.56*** -0.37*** 0.79*** 0.75*** 1      
6 Government effectiveness 0.66*** -0.34*** 0.80*** 0.79*** 0.79*** 1     
7 Regulatory quality  0.60*** -0.42*** 0.86*** 0.86*** 0.80*** 0.91*** 1    
8 Rule of law 0.63*** -0.35*** 0.81*** 0.84*** 0.81*** 0.97*** 0.94*** 1   
9 Control of corruption  0.61*** -0.30*** 0.79*** 0.78*** 0.80*** 0.97*** 0.89*** 0.97*** 1  
10 Institutional quality index 0.65*** -0.39*** 0.86*** 0.89*** 0.88*** 0.97*** 0.96*** 0.98*** 0.96*** 1 
 
248 
 
Appendix 5.B 
Table 5.B1 
First-Stage Regression Results 
This table reports the first-stage regression results of the IV Tobit estimation for the period 2004-2012. The 
dependent variable is the financial inclusion index. Variable definitions are provided in Table 5.1. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are presented in brackets. *, **, and *** represent statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Instrumental variables             
Remittance flow to GDP -0.195*** -0.214*** -0.187*** -0.217***   
 [0.042] [0.043] [0.037] [0.039]   
Government bank ownership -0.000*** -0.000***     
 [0.000] [0.000]     
Monetary freedom   0.015*** 0.014***   
   [0.000] [0.000]   
New firm entry density     -0.006*** -0.006*** 
     [0.000] [0.000] 
# of banks     0.000*** 0.000*** 
     [0.000] [0.000] 
Bank-level controls       
Loan Ratio -0.030** -0.032*** -0.090*** -0.096*** -0.160*** -0.169*** 
 [0.012] [0.011] [0.009] [0.009] [0.010] [0.010] 
Bank Size 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.016*** 0.014*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Loan Loss Provision -0.026 -0.037 -0.036 -0.064 -0.019 -0.055 
 [0.058] [0.064] [0.057] [0.070] [0.052] [0.068] 
Income Diversification -0.105*** -0.101*** -0.011 -0.011 -0.01 -0.009 
 [0.032] [0.030] [0.010] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] 
Management Quality 0.164*** 0.154*** 0.167*** 0.138*** 0.128*** 0.118*** 
 [0.026] [0.025] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] 
Capitalisation 0.008 0.033 -0.142*** -0.065*** -0.190*** -0.103*** 
 [0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.022] [0.023] [0.024] 
C-Lerner (-1) -0.030***  -0.088***  -0.137***  
 [0.008]  [0.007]  [0.007]  
E-Lerner (-1)  -0.069***  -0.168***  -0.205*** 
  [0.010]  [0.009]  [0.009] 
Country-level controls       
GDP Growth Rate -0.719*** -0.688*** -0.598*** -0.549*** -0.095** -0.091** 
 [0.044] [0.044] [0.042] [0.041] [0.047] [0.046] 
Per Capita GDP 0.096*** 0.096*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.080*** 0.082*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
Constant -0.585*** -0.568*** -1.425*** -1.333*** -0.386*** -0.361*** 
  [0.031] [0.030] [0.025] [0.026] [0.024] [0.024] 
Observations 11,165 11,165 14,575 14,575 12,869 12,869 
F 1192 1165 2693 2827 2098 2144 
Adjusted R-squared 0.47 0.48 0.64 0.65 0.56 0.57 
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 Table 5.B2 
Interactive result of financial inclusion with bank competition and institutional quality using IV 
Tobit regressions 
We use IV Tobit regressions to estimate the interactive effects of financial inclusion with bank competition 
and institutional quality. The only addition in this model is the interaction term and its constituents. All 
regressions include year fixed effects. Financial Inclusion and Financial Inclusion times E-Lerner are treated 
as endogenous variables, and they are instrumented via the instruments listed at the bottom of the table. ***, 
**, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Source: BankScope and 
WDI. Coverage: 2004-2012. 
VARIABLES Cost efficiency Profit efficiency Cost efficiency Profit efficiency 
  1 2 3 4 
Financial inclusion 3.568*** 2.450*** 3.935*** 2.407*** 
 [0.589] [0.682] [0.436] [0.252] 
E-Lerner 2.360*** -0.804* 0.105*** 0.136*** 
 [0.782] [0.438] [0.037] [0.025] 
Financial inclusion x E-Lerner -3.189*** 1.206**   
 [1.054] [0.605]   
Institutional quality index   -0.153*** -0.048* 
   [0.046] [0.026] 
Financial inclusion x Institutional quality index   0.469*** 0.182*** 
   [0.095] [0.055] 
Bank-level controls     
Loan Ratio 0.111 -0.061 0.024 0.058** 
 [0.090] [0.060] [0.045] [0.030] 
Bank Size -0.084*** -0.006 -0.049*** -0.024*** 
 [0.015] [0.005] [0.007] [0.004] 
Loan Loss Provision -0.248 -0.540*** 0.147 -0.528*** 
 [0.272] [0.155] [0.182] [0.123] 
Income Diversification 0.331*** 0.174*** 0.241*** 0.180*** 
 [0.064] [0.042] [0.045] [0.028] 
Management Quality -0.665** 0.251** 0.224* 0.065 
 [0.276] [0.103] [0.115] [0.072] 
Capitalisation -1.137*** -0.02 -0.609*** -0.233*** 
 [0.233] [0.102] [0.104] [0.069] 
Country Macro-controls     
GDP Growth Rate 1.273 1.814* 1.226** 0.846** 
 [0.912] [1.026] [0.608] [0.368] 
Per Capita GDP -0.249*** -0.208*** -0.381*** -0.235*** 
 [0.051] [0.058] [0.044] [0.025] 
Constant 2.246*** 1.037*** 2.289*** 1.521*** 
 [0.285] [0.185] [0.319] [0.180] 
Observations 9,596 9,652 9,596 9,652 
chi2 131.1 128.1 361.4 288.1 
Wald Chi2 statistics: exogeneity 1027 84.49 1623 297.4 
p-value of exogeneity 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Under-identification test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Over-identification test (p-value) 0.09 0.13 0.07 0.11 
IV instruments     
Remittance √  √  
Government bank ownership √ √ √ √ 
Monetary freedom  √   
Entry density √ √ √ √ 
# of banks       √ 
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Appendix 5.C 
 
Table 5.C1 
The propensity score matching analysis–Logit model and balancing tests 
Logit model: dependent variable = Financial Access Policy Balancing tests 
Variables coefficients z-statistics Full sample Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 
Log of total assets of the financial system  0.879*** [5.500] 0.94 0.13 0.14 0.4 
Log of per capita GDP -1.260*** [-5.432] 0.72 0.1 0.07 0.78 
GDP growth rate 4.614 [1.277] 0.69 0.9 0.39 0.41 
Financial freedom 0.005 [0.307] 0.89 0.46 0.11 0.47 
Regulatory Quality 1.737*** [2.729] 0.84 0.25 0.15 0.31 
Rule of Law -1.012 [-1.591] 0.9 0.29 0.72 0.05 
Control of Corruption -0.504 [-0.837] 0.8 0.33 0.52 0.14 
Constant 1.026 [0.628]     
Observations 433           
Chi-squared 55.51***       
Pseudo R-squared 0.149       
Hosmer–Lemeshow test (p-value) 0.12       
Standard deviation of the propensity score 0.14           
Note: The dependent variable,  Financial Access Policy takes the value of 1 for a country that participates in the AFI network in year 
2009 and thereafter, or else zero. The detailed description of the independent variables is given in Table 5.1. Z-statistics are reported in 
brackets. The Hosmer–Lemeshow test confirms the goodness-of fit of the logit model. Regarding balancing tests, we conduct t-tests of 
each independent variable used in the logit model. P-values are reported where the first column shows the balancing tests of the entire 
sample. The observations have been divided into four blocks (or strata), of which Stata does not report any t-tests for the fourth block 
as it has only 5 observations. Based on p-values, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that each characteristic is equal across the control 
and treatment groups in the full sample or in each block. 
 
Figure 5.C1 
Propensity score matching blocks and matched distribution 
 
Note that while the left figure shows common support between the treated (member of AFI network) and 
untreated/comparison groups (non-member), the right figure shows the distribution of the unmatched and 
matched sample.  
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Chapter VI 
 
Conclusions 
6.1 Overview 
In this thesis, we study bank competition and financial inclusion, analysing their 
impact on bank performance–profitability, stability and efficiency. Analysing the 
consequences of the changes of banking market structure and the degree of financial 
inclusion is important, as the banking systems around the world–especially emerging 
market economies–have gone through numerous important reforms and structural changes. 
The outcome of the changes is a strong competitive environment, where banks of 
heterogeneous sizes and ownership types compete fiercely for market shares. Currently, 
they are more inclined to broaden the access of unbanked people to financial services and 
diversify business towards areas that used to be excluded or underserved–partially due to 
enabling an inclusive financial environment. This chapter provides overall concluding 
remarks for each of the four essays in this thesis. It highlights the core contributions of 
each essay to the current literature. It also acknowledges the limitations that are associated 
with selected techniques and methodologies, provides public policy implications of this 
research and finally unearths some areas for further research.  
Chapter II is the first essay in this thesis and investigated the effects of bank credit 
risk and income diversification on profitability of the Indian banking industry using bank-
level data of the post-reform period 2004-2011. Despite multiple reforms, the Indian 
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banking sector still remains dominated by big and government-owned banks. Limited 
empirical research on such issues also necessitates this study to examine the role of 
heterogeneous bank size and mixed ownership groups on the effects of credit risk and 
income diversification. The empirical results that we have found in this chapter are in line 
with the results of developed market economies, that large banks dominate the entire 
banking industry. The result shows that credit risk has a negative impact on profitability 
which is pronounced for the foreign-owned banks. The dampening effects of 
nonperforming loans diminish as banks gets bigger. Again, as bank size gets bigger, the 
positive effect of non-interest income also increases.   
Chapter III built upon the findings of chapter II and delved deep into the most 
perennial problem of the Indian banking sector–nonperforming loans. Over the last two 
decades, the Indian government has introduced various laws and institutional mechanisms 
to curb credit risk. In 2002, RBI introduced an institutional mechanism–Corporate Debt 
Restructuring (CDR) – to minimise a bank’s exposure to sick corporates. The aim of CDR 
has been to provide a speedy, cost effective, and market friendly alternative to in-court 
restructuring procedures for banks to undertake restructuring of corporate loans, and 
subsequently reduce credit risk. By restructuring corporate loans, banks that were members 
of the CDR system could retain asset classification of those loans, and even upgrade 
nonperforming restructured assets to standard (performing) category after a specified 
period and charge less to their net income for loan loss provisions. This special regulatory 
forbearance on asset classification and provisioning gave more opportunities to member 
banks to understate nonperforming loans and overstate net income. Therefore, in this 
chapter, we have contributed to the literature on debt restructuring from the creditor’s 
perspective by investigating the impact of the CDR system on bank stability. We have 
exploited the membership variation of banks of the CDR programme and empirically 
examined the treatment effects of CDR on bank-level stability using the ‘natural 
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experiment’ type difference-in-differences (DID) approach. Sample selection bias is 
eliminated by using a number of matching estimators including the recently developed 
bias-corrected covariate matching estimator. Both DID and matching estimators suggest 
that after the genesis of CDR, member banks with generous regulatory forbearance on 
asset classification and provisioning experience an improvement in stability. We also show 
that the positive impact of CDR diminishes as the market power of member banks 
increases. Given the scarcity of research on the Indian banking sector, we have also looked 
at the ambiguous issue of whether greater competition is good or bad for banking stability, 
and contributed to the current literature by providing evidence from an emerging market 
economy that greater bank competition induces excessive risk-taking of individual banks, 
supporting the competition-fragility hypothesis.  
Chapter IV moved away from single-country to cross-country analysis. It took a 
unique approach and used large cross-country data from a number of sources, and 
investigated the effects of the most contemporary global policy issue–financial inclusion–
on bank level stability. Broadening access of the low income groups to formal financial 
services is the most challenging issue for banks as serving poor customers is costly and 
risky. Therefore, extending the access of the poor people to finance has always been 
perceived as an antagonistic strategy by banks that might dampen their performance. 
Despite financial inclusion being the crucial component to financial development 
strategies and inclusive economic growth, empirical study on this important public policy 
issue is non-existent. The obvious reason for limited research in this area is due to supply- 
and demand-side data constraints on access. Another important reason is the lack of 
development of a reliable quantitative index of financial inclusion. In this chapter, we have 
made several contributions to the literature. First, using a unique dataset–Financial Access 
Survey (FAS)–we have constructed a multidimensional index of financial inclusion for 87 
countries for the period 2004-2012, and then investigated a new research question–for the 
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first time–as to whether the global policy drive towards greater financial inclusion is good 
for bank stability in a sample of 2,913 banks. Second, we have also contributed to the 
literature that explores the determinants of banking stability. Finally, by exploiting the 
exogenous variation in the membership timing of developing countries’ network of 
financial inclusion policymakers, we  have explored whether enabling the inclusive 
financial environment has any causal effect on banking stability, using parametric 
(difference-in-differences) and non-parametric matching estimators. The results show that 
a more inclusive financial sector leads to greater bank stability, and this nexus is reinforced 
while banks have higher market power and operate in the countries where institutional 
qualities are greater, providing novel insights for regulatory authorities, banking 
supervisors and market participants.  
Chapter V extended the analysis of chapter IV, and dug deep into another 
important aspect of bank performance. Banks typically “shy away” from extending credits 
to poor customers due to high operating costs associated with them assuming that serving 
low creditworthy customers might dampen their efficient financial intermediation. 
Therefore, in this paper, we have contributed to the existing empirical analyses in 
numerous ways. First, we fill an important gap in the literature by providing new evidence 
on the impact of financial inclusion on bank efficiency, and seeing the role of bank 
competition and institutional quality on this relation using an international sample of 2913 
banks across 87 countries for the period 2004-2012. Second, as well-functioning and 
efficient financial systems exert a first-order impact on economic growth (see e.g., Levine, 
2005), we have also contributed to the literature on finance and growth by exploring the 
connection between important aspects of financial development and the efficiency of 
financial institutions. Third, exploring the determinants of bank efficiency is also an 
important contribution to the banking literature. Finally, by exploiting cross-country and 
cross-year variation in the timing of countries into a global network of financial inclusion 
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policymakers, we have also contributed to the literature showing how enabling an inclusive 
financial environment affects bank efficiency. The results indicate that the higher the 
degree of financial inclusion, the better the banks’ performance in terms of increasing cost 
and profit efficiency. To address potential omitted variable biases and reverse causality, 
which might bias the empirical results, we have confirmed our findings using an 
instrumental variable approach. Further evidence shows that the efficiency enhancing 
effects of financial inclusion are stronger when banks have lower competition and operate 
in countries with stronger rule of law and institutional quality. We have shown that 
enabling an inclusive environment has a positive impact on bank efficiency. 
 
6.2 Summary and public policy implications 
This thesis bundles four essays and makes several contributions to the most 
contemporary global policy issue related to market structure, bank performance, financial 
development and financial inclusion. The results of this thesis give rise to several important 
public policy considerations.   
First, chapter II uncovered the strong influence of bank size/ownership structure 
on the relationship between credit risk/income diversification and bank profitability. These 
results emphasise the importance of taking bank size and ownership heterogeneities into 
consideration while formulating policies in order to augment profitability in the banking 
sector. Bank managers can reap the diversification benefit if they pursue cautiously by 
considering their sizes, strengths, capabilities and risk level, and embarking on the areas 
they are good at. Second, by exploiting membership variation of the banks that have 
undertaken restructuring of corporate loans and making use of extensive regulatory 
forbearance on asset classification and provisioning, chapter III showed the robust 
treatment effect of the corporate debt restructuring (CDR) programme on banking stability. 
However, the finding of the interactive effect is alarming for the regulator as the marginal 
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effect of CDR on soundness of banks is statistically different from zero before a threshold 
level of efficiency-adjusted Lerner Index of around 38 points. Although improving 
soundness of banks was largely achieved by exploiting the CDR programme, the recent 
up-trend in restructuring of corporate loans is worrying. Therefore, regulators should 
tighten the macroprudential norms and emphasise international best practice in asset 
classification and provisioning of restructured corporate loans ensuring no scope for ever-
greening (Peek and Rosengren, 1995). Since it is predicted that at least 20-30% of 
restructured standard corporate loans will slip into sub-standard loans eventually (WG, 
2012), banks should increase provisioning on existing restructured loans gradually, 
otherwise any substantial losses might lead them to exhaust capital base at a point where 
insolvency or illiquidity would be inevitable.  
Third, our study on the effects of an inclusive banking sector on banking stability 
has substantial public policy implications. The outcome of chapter IV suggests that 
banking stability is strongly influenced by the degree to which the poorest of the poor 
individuals and small enterprises have access to basic financial services, which indicates 
the importance of ensuring an inclusive financial system. An inclusive financial system 
will allow banks to exploit the untapped potential of customers who were previously 
unbanked or under-banked, and strengthen their balance sheets making them more resilient 
against a possible future shock. Since expanding access to financial services is a key 
ingredient of a financial development strategy, the concerted and sustained efforts of 
formal financial institutions to allocate resources in more productive areas of the economy 
would make them more profitable. As only 41% of people in the developing countries 
compared to 89% in developed ones have bank accounts (see Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper, 
2012), additional policies should focus on ensuring access of all those excluded to formal 
financial services, especially in the developing economies. Furthermore, our results also 
stress the importance of the underlying competitive and institutional framework. The 
 257 
beneficial effects of financial inclusion on bank stability are greater in the countries where 
the market power of banks and institutional qualities are high. In this respect, since 
competition is perceived to be instrumental to broadening access to finance but detrimental 
to banking stability, broadening access without paying attention to potential negative 
consequences of competition on financial stability is obviously suboptimal.  Therefore, it 
is important for the authorities to strike the right balance between financial inclusion and 
bank competition while avoiding stepping into financial fragility. They should also 
continue the efforts of establishing an institutional environment that will complement the 
access-stability nexus.   
Finally, the results of Chapter V suggest that the greater the banking population 
the higher the bank efficiency, both in terms of cost and profit. Therefore, policymakers 
should introduce more policies that are conducive for access to finance aiming at ensuring 
efficient financial intermediation. Furthermore, our results also stress the importance of 
the underlying competitive and institutional framework. The beneficial effects of financial 
inclusion on bank cost (profit) efficiency are more (less) in the countries where bank 
competition is high (low). In this respect, regulators should pay adequate attention to 
balancing this moderating effect of bank competition on the nexus between financial 
inclusion and cost/profit efficiency. They should continuously make efforts to provide an 
environment that would be conducive for increasing financial inclusion and hence bank 
efficiency. The overall findings of this thesis on such an important contemporary policy 
issue would be useful to researchers and policymakers alike for making informed decisions 
on access policies knowing the likely effect of those decisions on the soundness and 
efficient functioning of financial institutions. The policy areas that we have identified in 
this thesis would be critical for policymakers to spur inclusive economic growth as banking 
stability and efficiency gains would certainly increase the availability of more productive 
loans and overall economic development.  
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 6.3 Limitations of the thesis 
Though this thesis has employed a number of techniques and methodologies to 
offer robust results that should have a wide range of implications for policymakers, 
regulators, bank managers and the general public, it is not without some limitations. First, 
despite using two variant measures of Lerner indices–conventional Lerner and efficiency-
adjusted Lerner–that provide relatively close estimates of banking competition, the most 
important challenge in this measure is the difficulty in gathering data on prices and 
marginal cost. However, using two variant measures of Lerner indices in this thesis serves 
as a good indicator of the level of bank competition, making the ensuing analysis related 
to competition more robust. Second, in chapters IV and V, though we tried to add as many 
dimensions as possible to get a comprehensive picture of the overall financial inclusion of 
a country, we acknowledge that there must be other factors contributing to financial 
inclusion. However, the robustness of our index of financial inclusion has been checked 
using both household-based indicators of financial inclusion and firm-level data from 
World Bank Enterprise Surveys. Finally, despite our best effort to address the endogeneity 
concern in each line of research in this thesis, it is possible that the results of chapter II 
may be biased because of the endogeneity problem between income diversification and 
bank profitability. Endogeneity can arise if banks engage more in non-interest income 
activities because of higher profitability. However, we have got relatively good results with 
satisfactory diagnostic statistics by using static panel estimators, where using instrumental 
variable techniques would have reduced the total number of observations and resulted in 
loss of degrees of freedom due to one or two period lagged values. The core findings of 
this chapter remain unaltered even after conducting an array of robustness tests.  
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6.4 Avenues for future research 
This thesis has undertaken comprehensive analyses on numerous contemporary 
issues of bank performance and financial development. Since this thesis contains essays 
from an emerging market economy–India– and constitutes the first attempt to explain 
statistically how an inclusive financial sector affects bank performance, it has unravelled 
a number of key questions and developed promising avenues for future research as follows:  
First, considering the recent development in the measurement of bank 
competition, future research can focus on the Boone indicator method (Boone, 2008)–a 
measure of bank competition–to see the link between bank completion and stability for 
Indian banks. The Boone indicator considers that competition improves the performance 
of efficient banks and weakens the performance of inefficient ones. Given the market and 
regulatory environment, this indicator is better suited to measure competition for Indian 
banks and for use in subsequent analysis.  
Second, we need more empirical evidence on the impact of financial inclusion on 
bank performance that would be useful to policymakers for making informed decisions on 
such an important development issue. Third, as more data–both supply and demand-side–
become available, as many dimensions as possible should be incorporated in the 
construction of the financial inclusion index for more reliable subsequent analysis. Finally, 
since developing countries are gradually introducing supportive new laws and regulation 
to enhance inclusive financial activity, a fourth component of the research agenda concerns 
the effect of these legal changes on the lending behaviour of banks in developing countries.  
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